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1. Introduction 
 
Purpose of the report 
This is the first report of the study of comparative systems of assessment of illness or 
disability for the purposes of adult ‘incapacity’ social welfare payments. The purpose 
of the research, as set out in the RFT is to examine systems for medical/disability 
assessment and review used in other comparable jurisdictions for assessing 
entitlement to social welfare illness and disability payments, and to draw key 
learning for the Irish system. 
A second report will consider assessment systems for carer payments in relation to 
disability status of an adult cared-for person. 
 
Context 
The Irish Department of Social Protection (DSP) is currently looking at the structure 
of illness/disability support payments in the context of  
(a) Shifting the focus from ‘incapacity’ so that capacity, where it exists, is 
acknowledged and supported through closer engagement with people in 
receipt of such payments - the introduction in 2012 of partial capacity 
benefit is an example, and 
(b) Preventing a drift into long term welfare dependency. 
To this end, the Department is already in the process of broadening the existing 
Intreo service so that people with disabilities can engage with the service on a ‘walk 
in’ basis across the country. Such an approach is also relevant in the context of the 
recently-launched Comprehensive Employment Strategy for people with disabilities. 
 
Methodology 
The research looks at assessment systems for adult illness and disability payments in 
a number of OECD countries, using 
 a review of relevant literature (including review of various online academic 
databases)  
 access to on-line information from social security authorities and others  
 review of detailed evaluations of assessment systems (where these are 
available) 
 contacts with key informants in the chosen countries.  
Mel Cousins & Associates  
 
5  
 
The researchers first carried out a rapid review of assessment systems in a range of 
OECD countries (see Interim Review). On the basis of this study it was agreed to 
focus the research on Australia, Finland, France, Netherlands, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom (UK).2 
Given the interest in ‘capacity’ and return to work (RTW), we have taken a broad 
interpretation of our remit and have examined the range of recent reforms of 
sickness and disability systems in the six countries insofar as they are relevant rather 
than focussing solely on their assessment systems. The NDA is currently carrying out 
a similar study of vocational rehabilitation and these issues are not addressed in this 
report. 
 
Structure of the report 
In chapter 2, we provide a short overview of issues concerning sickness absence and 
work-related disability including a look at the available data and a summary of the 
relevant literature. Chapter 3 provides an overview of the sickness and disability 
assessment systems in the six countries. Finally chapter 4 discusses the relevance of 
the findings to the Irish system.  The detailed country reports are set out in the 
Annexes. 
 
 
                                         
2 Strictly speaking we focus here on the system in Great Britain as the Northern Irish system is legally 
separate and is not covered in most GB studies. 
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2. Sickness and disability absence – an overview.  
 
Introduction 
The importance of sickness and disability payments as policy issues has increasingly 
been recognised in recent decades (OECD, 2010).  The OCED (2010) has emphasised 
the extent to which the barriers to people with health problems and/or disability 
participating fully in the labour market represents a ‘social and economic tragedy’. 
At the same time, the economic costs of such non-participation and the rising 
financial costs of sickness and disability benefits has led to an increasing focus on the 
role of such payments and on policies for improving work retention and return to 
work across a wide range of countries. 
 
Data 
Despite the recognition of the importance of the issues, the available data is 
surprisingly limited. Although there are a number of comparative studies of sickness 
absence in Europe (e.g. Gimeno et al., 2004; Chaupain-Guillot and Guillot, 2009; 
Niedhammer et al., 2012), these are generally based on the limited questions set out 
in Europe-wide employment studies such as the European Labour Force Survey and 
the European Working Conditions Survey. As set out in table 1.1, Chaupain-
Guillot and Guillot, 2009 (on the basis of the then European Community Household 
Panel (ECHP)) found that, on average, one in 12 employees had taken at least one 
days absence during the last four weeks.3 Women were more likely to take leave 
than men and, of the countries considered in this study which we covered, absence 
was highest in Finland and the Netherlands and lowest in France. Ireland had 
average levels of absence. 
Table 1.1: Employees having at least one day of absence during the last four weeks (%), 2001 
 Men Women Total 
Finland 19.2 24.3 21.3 
France 8.6 11.3 9.7 
Ireland 10.7 15.0 12.6 
Netherlands 16.6 22.4 18.8 
Total 10.4 13.7 11.7 
Source: Chaupain-Guillot and Guillot, 2009. 
                                         
3 Note that this was not confined to sick leave. 
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Using data from a different source (the European Working Conditions Survey) for 
2000, Gimeno et al. (2004) found a somewhat higher rate of absence over a longer 
period but found that men were generally more likely to be sick absent (except in 
Nordic countries. This study again found the highest rates of sick absence in Finland 
and the Netherlands but France was at average levels and Ireland was the lowest. 
Table 1.2: Age adjusted sickness absence (at least 1 day in the last 12 months) (%), 2000 
 Men Women Total 
Finland 24.0 22.0 25.7 
France 14.3 15.4 12.9 
Ireland 8.3 9.2 7.3 
Netherlands 20.3 21.8 18.9 
Sweden 17.0 14.9 18.8 
UK 11.7 13.3 10.0 
EU 14.5 15.5 13.3 
Source: Gimeno et al. (2004) 
The European Working Conditions Survey, 2010 asked a question about absence 
from work for health reasons for more than five days over the past year (thus 
excluding more short-term absence). The survey found that almost one-third of 
workers had been so absent. Absence was highest in the Finland and lowest in 
Ireland. 
Table 1.3: Absence from work due to health reasons for more than five days over the past 
12 months (%), 2010 
 Total 
Finland 40.8 
France 29.2 
Ireland 17.1 
Netherlands 25.2 
Sweden 34.3 
UK 24.2 
EU 31.8 
Source: European Working Conditions Survey, 2010 
These surveys do not give a comprehensive picture of the level of sickness absence, 
e.g. the number of days of sickness absence in each country. Studies in the Nordic 
countries have found that these limited questions can be misleading and that 
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countries which score highest on one indicator may score lower on a different 
indicator (Thorsen et al., 2015). 
The growing number of studies on the incidence of ‘disability’ are of limited use in 
the current context as disability in this context is usually meant in the sense of the 
Irish Disability Act, i.e. a substantial restriction in the capacity of the person to carry 
on a profession, business or occupation in the State or to participate in social or 
cultural life in by reason of an enduring physical, sensory, mental health or 
intellectual impairment. In this study, we focus on impairments which affect capacity 
to work only and again comparative data on the extent of disability in this sense is 
lacking. 
There have been a number of studies which have attempted to use more detailed 
national administrative data for comparative purposes but there are significant 
differences between the coverage of national sources which again limit the extent to 
which valid comparisons can be made (e.g. OECD, 2010; Edwards and Greasley, 
2010; Gimeno et al., 2014; Thorsen et al., 2015). 
 
Literature review 
As can be seen from this report (and the detailed bibliography) there is a vast 
literature on sickness and disability related issues. The more general literature 
emphasises the extent to which sickness and disability cannot be seen simply as a 
function of health-status and how it is affected by wider socio-economic factors. For 
example, studies generally find that sickness absence is higher for women and that 
not all of the difference can be explained by medical factors (e.g. Marbot and Pollak, 
2014). There are also variations in sickness absence and disability by age, socio-
economic status, work environment, type of employment, levels of human capital, 
firm size and in accordance with the business cycle (see, for example, Thorsen et al., 
2015).4 Benitez-Silva et al. (2010) found that ‘levels of claims for disability benefits 
are not simply related to changes in the incidence of health disability in the 
population and are strongly influenced by prevailing economic conditions’. These 
studies emphasise the extent to which sickness and disability is a social 
construct. For example, the evidence suggests that the incidence of disability is likely 
to be higher when the economy is booming and unemployment is lower. 
Most of these studies do not look specifically at systems of assessment of illness or 
disability. Here the literature is much more limited. We have identified a number of 
different strands to this literature which are discussed in more detail in Chapters 3 
and 4.  
 
                                         
4 Detailed studies are set out in the Annexes. 
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Studies of sickness certification 
There are many studies of sickness certification by doctors (e.g. Letrilliart and Barrau, 
2012). These studies show that certification forms an important part of the work of 
doctors especially GPs but that, generally speaking, doctors often have limited 
knowledge or training in relation to the role and/or do not attach a high degree of 
importance to the task. The studies also look at the views of doctors in relation to 
certification and there are a number of common themes including a lack of clarity 
about certain aspects of the role, difficulties in certification in the absence of clear 
medical symptoms, difficulties in predicting the likely duration of absence, etc. It is 
clear that in all countries, there is a certain degree of ‘negotiation’ between the 
doctor and patient (Monneuse, 2015; Nilsen et al., 2015; Wainwright et al., 2015) 
and that certificates are sometimes given even though the doctor may have doubts 
about whether a person is incapable. In the countries considered here, these types 
of studies are most common in Sweden and the UK although they are also to be 
found in Australia, Finland and France. These studies are discussed in more detail in 
the Annexes. As discussed in Chapter 3, the Netherlands adopts a different approach 
to certification: separating treatment from control (i.e. certification). 
 
Comparative studies of disability assessment 
There are a number of, mainly descriptive, studies of disability assessment which 
focus mostly on European countries (Council of Europe, 2002; de Boer et al., 2004; 
ISF, 2013:7).5 De Boer et al. (2004, 2007) provided a comparison of the organisation 
of work disability evaluation in 15 countries (mainly European but also including the 
USA). These studies are now over a decade old and, although there is considerable 
continuity in assessment systems, they do not reflect the recent reforms in a number 
of countries such as the Netherlands. De Boer et al. (2007) identified a number of 
different approaches to disability assessment. The different approaches are 
explained as follows:  
 medical is characterised by an emphasis on symptoms, diagnoses and 
impairments. These findings, in themselves, call for decisions regarding 
disability; 
 functional is characterised by an emphasis on activity (or activity 
restrictions). These findings lead, either in themselves or through job 
matching, to decisions regarding disability;  
 rehabilitation is characterised by an emphasis on the options for 
rehabilitation. These findings also lead to decisions on disability. 
                                         
5 The de Boer study has appeared in a number of different guises: in most detail in de Boer et al. 
(2004), as a separate article (de Boer et al., 2007) and as part of his thesis (de Boer, 2010). 
Mel Cousins & Associates  
 
10  
 
On the basis of this schema, de Boer et al. (2007) categorised assessment systems as  
 purely medical (e.g. USA); 
 medical combined with functional (IE, GB); 
 medical combined with rehabilitation (FR); 
 medical combined with functional and rehabilitation (NL). 
 
Role and function of disability assessment 
As Meershoek (2012) points out there is an ‘implicit assumption that illness 
certification is a process in which physicians objectively determine whether clients 
suffer from a certain (official) medical condition by diagnosing complaints and that 
functional limitations can be derived objectively from diagnoses’. However, this 
assumption has been criticised by many researchers who have argued that that a 
person’s incapacity to work cannot be deduced solely from that person’s medical 
condition. Instead ‘sickness, disability and incapacity are intricate and complex 
human experiences, rather than well-defined clinical conditions’ and incapacity for 
work ‘is the result of the complex mutual interaction between social, physical and 
psychological aspects and not a consequence of a medical condition only’ 
Meershoek (2012, 545). Studies indicate that doctors often find sickness certification 
to be problematic and find it difficult to assess ability to work for patients with 
symptoms that are difficult to diagnose. 
 
Methods to improve assessment methodology 
There are a number of studies, particularly in the Netherlands, of methods to 
improve the quality of disability assessment by, for example, the use of protocols for 
assessment, greater use of evidence based medicine (EBM) or improving the 
communications skills of doctors. These are discussed in more detail in the Annexes. 
However, considerable caution is required in considering these as they are often 
carried out under ‘experimental’ conditions (rather than in actual working 
conditions) and the assessment is based on the views of participants rather than on 
an actual assessment of the outcome on real-life decision-making. 
 
Evaluations of assessment reforms 
Finally, there are a number of Government-sponsored evaluations of assessments 
reforms (e.g. for UK Adams et al., 2012) or, in the French case, the need for reform 
(Roquel et al., 2012). Relevant findings are discussed in the individual country 
chapters. 
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3. Incapacity assessment in 6 countries.  
This section addresses the key questions identified by NDA in the RFT (see Annex 1) 
in relation to the six countries, i.e. Australia, Finland, France, Netherlands, Sweden, 
and the UK.  We focus on the main payments for incapacity for work (sickness and 
disability) in each of the countries. Where there are separate schemes for different 
groups (e.g. for the public sector) we have focused on the main scheme for private 
sector employees.6  
 
Overview of supports during sickness absence/disability 
There is a clear distinction between the four continental European countries and the 
two Anglophone countries.  
In the case of the continental European countries, there is a much clearer link to 
employment. Persons who become incapable of work due to health issues qualify 
initially for sick pay or sickness benefits (often with supplementary employer 
payments). These are insurance-based (contributory) payments. In most cases, the 
employment relationship subsists for some or all of the sick leave. Only after the 
expiry of sick leave, in most cases, do people transition to a long-term disability 
payment. OECD (2010) data shows that in these countries between three-quarters 
(Finland and Sweden) and 100% of inflows to disability pensions come either from 
work (including sick pay) or from sickness benefits.7  These payments are generally 
income related with benefit levels (including employer top-ups) of up to 90% of 
previous earnings at least for an initial period. 
Within this there is quite a range of approaches with Dutch employers now being 
responsible for sick pay for the first two years while in the other three countries 
sickness benefit is still payable from early on in the sickness absence period 
(although in many cases employers are required to provide supplementary 
payments). 
In contrast, in Australia, a person is entitled to up to 10 days paid sick leave per year. 
After that s/he may be entitled to continued paid or unpaid sick leave and a small 
number of persons claim the restrictive sickness allowance which is means-tested. 
                                         
6 Most of the countries have a separate scheme for occupational injuries but this is not included here. 
Again, some countries have specific schemes for persons who are disabled before adulthood 
(Borghouts-van de Pas and Pennings, 2008; Kaltenbrunner et al., 2013) while in several countries 
persons who do not qualify for the main insurance-based payments may qualify for a general social 
assistance payments. Again these are not included in this study. 
7 France was not included in this study but French data indicates that the average persons coming 
onto invalidity pension has been on sick leave for about 2 years. 
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But less than half (45%) of inflows to the disability support pension are from 
employment (including sick pay) or sickness allowance. In the UK, in the past, the 
system was closer in structure to the European model with an initial period of short-
term sickness benefit followed by a transition to a longer-term invalidity pension.8 
There have been a range of reforms of the UK system beginning with the transfer of 
responsibility for the initial period to employers (statutory sick pay). In 2008, the 
existing incapacity benefit was replaced by an employment and support allowance 
(ESA). ESA has both a contributory and a non-contributory (income-based) element. 
The OECD study found that in 2002 only 57% of inflows to the longer-term payment 
came from employment or statutory sick pay. However, a more recent (post-ESA) 
study found that only half (51%) have been in paid employment before their claim 
(22% had been on paid or unpaid sick leave) while the other half (49%) were from a 
non-work background (Sissons et al., 2012).9 The Australian and UK schemes are flat-
rate benefits with increases for specific purposes. 
Thus the European schemes are much more closely related to employment and seek 
to provide a replacement income for those unable to work while the Anglophone 
schemes are more poverty-focussed with less close links to the labour market. 
A summary of the main points of initial sickness absence is set out below and more 
detail in contained in the country reports.10 Long-term disability benefits are 
normally not limited in time (up to pension age). 
Country Australia Finland France Netherlands Sweden UK 
Duration 
of 
uncertified 
sick leave 
- 9 days - - 7 days 7 days 
Waiting 
days 
- - 3 days - 1 day 3 days 
Duration 
of sickness 
pay 
10 days 
minimum 
300 days 360 days – 3 
years 
2 years - 28 weeks 
Duration 
of sickness 
benefit 
No limit - -  28 days 
(normal) 
550 days 
(extended) 
 
                                         
8 In the UK this transition came very quickly at 28 weeks which is one of the reasons for the surge in 
the numbers on invalidity pension (Banks et al., 2015). 
9 See also Adams et al., 2015. This study, which looked only at persons who had worked in the last 12 
months before claiming ESA, found that 19% came straight from work, 45% had a period of sick leave 
and 36% were unemployed immediately before claiming ESA. 
10 Note that in several countries, employers may pay additional benefits, for example, during waiting 
periods. 
Mel Cousins & Associates  
 
13  
 
Country Australia Finland France Netherlands Sweden UK 
Detail All full-time 
employees are 
entitled to up to 
10 days paid sick 
leave After that, 
sick pay depends 
on employment 
contract . 
Means-tested 
sickness 
allowance may 
be payable. No 
limit to the 
length of time on 
Sickness 
Allowance but 
medical 
condition must 
be considered 
temporary (likely 
< 2 years).  
Sickness 
benefit 
is 
payable 
for up to 
300 days 
within a 
two year 
period 
Sickness 
benefit is 
payable as a 
rule, for 12 
months 
(360 days) 
per period 
of 3 
consecutive 
years; up to 
36 months 
in case of 
long-term 
sickness. 
 
Employer is 
responsible 
for paying 
sick pay for 
up to 2 
years 
Sickness 
benefit may 
be paid for 
up to 364 
days during 
a 450‐day 
period.  
If the 
incapacity 
continues, 
the  
person can 
apply for 
extended 
sickness 
benefit 
which can 
be paid for 
up to 550 
days. 
Statutory 
sick pay is 
payable for 
up to 28 
weeks 
 
Nature of incapacity criteria or fitness to work criteria 
In the case of sick pay or short-term sickness benefit, the criterion is generally that 
the person is unable to work. In several countries, there is a period where this 
incapacity initially relates to the person’s own job but over time this is broadened. 
For example, in Sweden for the first 90 days, working capacity is assessed against the 
persons existing job, or other temporary suitable work provided by the employer. Up 
to 180 days, the worker is assessed against an alternative job with the same 
employer. Subsequently, working capacity is evaluated against all jobs on the regular 
labour market.    
The Scandinavian countries generally have part-time capacity benefits whereby 
people who have a partial capacity to work can work part-time and receive a partial 
benefit. This is a long-standing system in Sweden and has recently been introduced 
in Finland. Studies indicate that these part-time benefits have some positive impact 
on return to work and reducing sickness absence at least for some claimants and in 
some periods (Andrén and Svensson 2012; Andrén, 2014; Kausto, 2013). 
In the case of the disability pensions, there are a range of different approaches (see 
table). As can be seen, there is again a distinction between the Continental European 
models and the Anglophone approaches. In general, the European definitions 
require a long-term loss of labour capacity of a certain percentage while Australia 
and the UK use impairment tables (Australia) or Descriptors (UK) to assess incapacity 
for work. These are described in more detail below.
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Country Australia Finland France Netherlands Sweden UK 
Short-term support Paid sick 
leave/sickness 
allowance 
Sickness allowance Sickness benefit Paid sick leave Sickness benefit Statutory Sick Pay 
Name of long-term 
payment 
Disability Support 
Pension 
Disability Pension  Invalidity pension WIA benefit Disability Pensions Employment and 
Support Allowance 
Definition of long-
term incapacity 
Recipients have to be: 
either permanently 
blind, or have been 
assessed as having a 
physical, intellectual 
or psychiatric 
impairment and 
unable to work for 15 
hours or more per 
week within the next 
2 years because of 
the impairment.  
To receive a disability 
pension under the 
earnings-related 
system, a person 
must have lost at 
least three-fifths of 
their working capacity 
(which is lowered to 
two-fifths for 
eligibility for a partial 
disability pension). 
Under the residence 
based national 
Disability Pension 
scheme the eligibility 
criteria is loss of at 
least three-fifths of 
working capacity. 
In order to qualify for 
IP, a person must 
have lost at least 66% 
of their work capacity 
due to a (non-
occupational) 
accident or illness. 
This means that the 
person must only be 
able to earn less than 
one third of the 
normal wage of a 
person in the same 
work category and 
region.  
A person must be 
more than 35 per 
cent work-disabled. If 
an employer can earn 
more than 65% of 
his/her former salary 
with generally 
accepted work (this 
includes work duties 
other than his/her 
former work duties), 
he/she is then 
considered to be less 
than 35% 
occupationally 
incapacitated and is 
not entitled to 
receive WIA benefits.  
Sickness compensation 
(sjukersättning): 
Permanently full or 
partial incapacity for 
work (by at least 25%), 
on grounds of illness, or 
other impairments to 
the physical or mental 
capacity for work. 
Activity compensation 
(aktivitetsersättning): 
Long‐term (at least one 
year) full or partial 
incapacity for work (by 
at least 25%), on 
grounds of illness, or 
other impairments to 
the physical or mental 
capacity for work. 
Incapacity for work 
based on functional 
criteria known as 
Work Capability 
Assessment.  
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Country Australia Finland France Netherlands Sweden UK 
Incapacity threshold 
as % of previous work 
capacity 
- To receive a disability 
pension under the 
earnings-related 
system, a person 
must have lost at 
least three-fifths of 
their working capacity 
(which is lowered to 
two-fifths for 
eligibility for a partial 
disability pension). 
Under the residence 
based national 
Disability Pension 
scheme the eligibility 
criteria is loss of at 
least three-fifths of 
working capacity. 
33% or less 65% or less 75% or less - 
How assessed Impairment Tables 
are used to assess the 
functional impact of 
medical conditions on 
work capacity.     
Assessment by social 
insurance officer of 
work capacity?? 
Earning capacity as % 
of normal wage for 
same work category 
and region 
Earning capacity as % 
of previous wage 
Assessment by social 
insurance officer of 
work capacity 
The WCA 
assessment is 
points-based and is 
based on 
‘descriptors’ which 
describe a 
restriction in 
activity. 
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Country Australia Finland France Netherlands Sweden UK 
Who certifies – short 
term payments 
Mainly own GP.  
Could be pharmacist, 
acupuncturist etc. 
Mainly own GP but 
may also include 
dentists.  
Must be cert from 
occupational 
physician if over 90 
days on short term 
payment 
GP, other doctor, 
midwife. GPs give 
75% of certs, 
specialists 25% 
Doctors from 
Arbodienst 
(occupational health 
and safety 
organisations)  
GP or other doctor Own doctor, mainly 
GP (Statutory Sick 
Pay) 
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Country Australia Finland France Netherlands Sweden UK 
Guidelines on 
duration of absence  
No No Yes No. However,  after 6 
weeks, Return to 
Work plan must be 
prepared 
Yes No.  
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Country Australia Finland France Netherlands Sweden UK 
Who certifies – long-
term payments 
Disability medical 
Assessments – 
government-
contracted doctor 
reviews supporting 
medical evidence 
Job Capacity 
Assessments 
Health/allied health 
professionals from 
agency of Dept of 
Human Services do 
desk or face to face 
assessment 
Typically own GP or 
treating doctor. Desk 
review of eligibility by 
social insurance 
doctor 
Social insurance 
doctors employed in 
local medical service 
Insurance doctor Own doctor’s report 
reviewed by social 
insurance officer. May 
be referred to doctor of 
social insurance agency 
for a second opinion 
Fit note – GP 
Work Capability 
Assessment – 
health care 
professional from 
contracted agency 
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Country Australia Finland France Netherlands Sweden UK 
Summary of test of 
long-term disability 
Physical, intellectual, 
mental health 
impairment scoring > 
20 points and unable 
to work more than 15 
hours a week in next 
2 years at or above 
minimum wage 
To receive a disability 
pension under the 
earnings-related 
system, a person 
must have lost at 
least three-fifths of 
their working capacity 
(which is lowered to 
two-fifths for 
eligibility for a partial 
disability pension). 
Under the residence 
based national 
Disability Pension 
scheme the eligibility 
criteria is loss of at 
least three-fifths of 
working capacity. 
Lost 66% of work 
capacity, i.e. can earn 
under 1/3 of normal 
wage of equivalent 
worker 
Lost over 35% of work 
capacity, as measured 
by earning capacity 
relative to former 
work 
Full or partial (at least 
25%) incapacity due to 
illness or impairment 
Incapacity for work 
Capacity to Work 
formula 
Impairment Tables 
assess extent to 
which medical 
condition has 
functional impact on 
capacity to work.  
No No Scores on Functional 
Ability List (70 items) 
matched against 
computerised list of 
requirements in 7,000 
occupations 
Activity Capacity 
Assessment model used 
after 6 months of 
absence 
Points-based Work 
Capacity 
Assessment on 
restrictions in 
activity under 
various descriptors 
Desk assessment by 
social security office? 
Interview by Disability 
Support officers for 
Disability Support 
Pension 
Yes Yes Desk assessment of 
medical and employer 
reports, plus face to 
face check  
Yes Yes. May be called 
for face-to-face 
assessment 
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System of assessment of incapacity 
Assessment of incapacity can be divided between short-term (sick pay and sickness 
benefit) and long-term (disability pension) systems. 
In the case of short-term sickness absence, the key player in the original award of 
benefit is generally the certifying doctor (normally the claimant’s GP) even if the 
actual decision is made by the social security authorities. In contrast, decision-
makers employed by the social security authorities generally play a more active role 
in the award of long-term disability benefits. 
 
Short-term assessment 
In most OECD countries and all the countries here, except the Netherlands, short-
term absence is assessed by the person’s doctor (normally the GP). In some 
countries a wider range of persons are allowed to certify. For example, in Australia 
certificates can be issued by 10 types of ‘registered health practitioner’, including 
pharmacists, acupuncturists, chiropractors and traditional Chinese medicine 
practitioners.   
As noted in chapter 2, there have been extensive studies of sickness certification, 
especially in Sweden and the UK (see, for example, Campbell and Ogden, 2006; 
Löfgren et al. 2007; Wynne-Jones et al., 2010; Letrilliart and Barrau 2012; Kiessling 
and Arrelöv 2012; Nilsing, 2013; Ljungquist, T. et al. 2015; Mazza et al., 2015).  These 
are discussed in more detail in the country reports. Studies indicate the extent to 
which certification involves negotiations between the claimant and the certifier and 
the fact that doctors sometimes provide certificates even where they feel that this 
may not be warranted on medical grounds. Although there are, of course, 
differences between studies in different countries, there is a surprising level of 
common findings. Certifying doctors are often not trained on occupational capacity 
issues and, often, are not well-informed about detailed benefit rules. Certification 
makes up a considerable proportion of GPs’ work but is often not seen as a high 
priority. Doctors in a number of countries highlight issues such as their lack of 
training on certification issues, the difficulties in dealing with requests for 
certification in the absence of clear symptoms, difficulty in predicting duration of 
illness and problems in communications with other stakeholders. 
A number of reforms have been introduced in the sickness certification process in a 
number of countries. In particular, disease-specific guidelines have been introduced 
which advise doctors on whether certificates should be grated for common illnesses 
and as to the recommended duration (e.g. France and Sweden). Only limited 
evaluations of the impact of these guidelines have been carried out but the 
indications are that they have had an impact in limiting sickness absence. 
In the UK, arising from the Review into the Health of Britain’s Working Age 
Population in 2008, the sickness certificate was revised into a Statement 
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of Fitness for Work (or Fit Note). The purpose is to move the emphasis from 
certification of incapacity to a focus on capacity. Studies indicate that workers and 
doctors have a generally positive view of the reform although the impact on 
certification is less clear (Hann and Sibbald, 2012; DWP, 2013; Shiels et al., 2013; 
Coole et al., 2015; Gabbay et al, 2015). However, it is quite possible that such 
changes will take a number of years to have a full impact. 
The Netherlands distinguishes between treatment and control and here assessment 
is by doctors that work for an arbodienst who are licensed to assess employees’ sick 
leave claims. Arbodiensten are private organizations that are responsible for advising 
employers in matters relating to the health and safety of their employees. The main 
task of the doctors is to inform employers about the legitimacy of their employees’ 
sick leave and to provide socio-medical coaching to employees who have reported ill. 
They are not involved in treating employees’ health complaints. Depending on the 
agreements made between the employer and the arbodienst, doctors have an initial 
consultation with sick employees between two days and four weeks after they 
report ill. Subsequent visits are dependent on the specific nature of the complaints 
and, again, on the agreements made between the employer and the arbodienst. 
Most arbodiensten are specialized and work for certain sectors, such as industry, 
health care and transport. 
 
Long-term assessments 
In the continental European countries, decisions are made by social security officials 
following a process of information gathering by the social security authorities. This 
will not only start with the medical history of short-term certification11 but may also 
include reports from specialists treating the claimant and other relevant evidence.  
In some countries, e.g. France, the process appears to be quite unstructured without 
clear guidelines for the decision-makers. In contrast, in the Netherlands the first step 
in the process is an assessment of the claimant’s work limitations by an insurance 
doctor. This is quite a structured process with a number of assessment protocols 
(see country report). These work limitations are recorded in a standardized list – the 
Functional Ability List (FAL). In this list the insurance doctor registers what work 
limitations the patient has and their extent. In the next step, a labour expert 
examines which jobs the employee is still able to perform despite the work 
limitations as assessed by the insurance doctor. The labour expert is supported by a 
computer which matches the work limitations as listed in the FAL with a database of 
7,000 occupations that describes the job demands in detail. The occupations 
selected by the computer are assessed by the labour expert as to their suitability for 
                                         
11 As we have seen in these countries from c.75-100% of claimants of disability pension come from 
sick pay and/or sickness benefit. 
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the individual employee. Decision are then made on the basis of these reports by the 
social security authorities. 
Australia and the UK have adopted quite a different approach with the 
establishment of a points-based system with specific indicators. For example, in 
Australia a person’s eligibility for Disability Support Pension (DSP) requires a Job 
Capacity Assessment (JCA) to be conducted using Impairment Tables.  In addition, 
claimants may have been required to undergo a Disability Medical Assessment 
(DMA).  These assessments are conducted to review the medical evidence used to 
support a DSP claim.  They are conducted by a government-contracted doctor, and 
cannot be carried out by the applicant’s own doctor or specialist.  The DMA does not 
involve any diagnosis of conditions, medical advice or treatment; rather it is a review 
of the supporting medical evidence for a claim for DSP. Eligibility for DSP is then 
determined by a social security decision-maker (or delegate) under the Social 
Security Act (SSA).  
A broadly similar process – the Work Capacity Assessment (WCA) - has been 
established in the UK for the new Employment and Support Allowance (ESA).12 The 
WCA is based on ‘descriptors’. Descriptors are defined in the legislation and 
‘describe’ a restriction in an activity – for example ‘Cannot single-handedly use a 
suitable keyboard or mouse’. The descriptors attract various points. The descriptor 
representing the most severe level of disability will attract 15 points meaning the 
person will be considered as having limited capability for work. In many of the 
situations, this will also mean the restriction is so severe that the person would also 
be considered as having limited capability for work-related activity. Within the WCA, 
there are a number of assessments:  
 Limited Capability for Work-Related Activity (LCWRA) Assessment – This aims 
to identify the most severely disabled where interaction with work-related 
activity is not required.  
 Limited Capability for Work (LCW) Assessment - This aims to identify those 
people who currently have a limited capability for work but who would 
benefit from assistance and support with work and health related activity to 
maximise their full potential. (Department for Work and Pensions 2015: 21). 
Certain well-defined groups are exempt from the test on the grounds that their level 
of functional impairment is such that they would clearly be found incapable of work. 
The exempt groups consist of those with specified severe and progressive conditions 
or severe disabilities. In addition, those who are terminally ill and claimants in 
receipt of the highest rate care component of Disability Living Allowance are exempt. 
                                         
12 New Zealand has also adopted a similar approach in recent years but there do not appear to be any 
evaluations as of yet. 
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The WCA has been rather controversial (see country report) and there have been a 
number of critical reports about the operation of this approach and a number of 
reforms as to how it operates in practice. However, the UK Government remains 
committed to this new approach. 
It is difficult to compare the highly structured approach in the UK and Australia with 
the less-structured approach used in the other countries (and in Ireland). The new 
WCA criteria in the UK were intended to tighten up the criteria to qualify for a long-
term sickness payment and a reassessment of claimants of the existing incapacity 
benefit was carried out. Data in 2012 indicated that about two-thirds of existing 
claimants (64%) were found to be entitled to ESA while over one-third (36%) were 
found fit for work and not entitled to ESA.13 There was a high rate of appeal from the 
decisions concerning ESA and a Parliamentary Committee found that 40% of appeals 
concerning ‘fit-for work’ decisions had been overturned in favour of the appellant 
(House of Commons, 2011, 45). 
In terms of system to establish uniformity of decisions, de Boer (2004) did not find 
a strong emphasis on quality control systems and it is not clear that there has 
been a significant change in most countries since that study. The focus tends to be 
on the inputs to the process (e.g. qualifications of certifiers and decision-makers, 
training, guidelines, etc.) and on the systems of reviews discussed below rather 
than on specific mechanisms of quality control.  
The UK appears to be one of the countries which puts more emphasis on quality 
control although it is not clear that this has assured good quality. For example, in 
the case of assessment reports for ESA (which are carried out by a contracted 
private-sector provider) the reports are audited by both the provider and DWP 
and there is a quality target of achieving a minimum of 95% of assessment of an 
acceptable standards.14 The DWP also introduced a Quality Assurance Framework 
in summer 2011 as a continuous improvement tool intended to act as a rigorous 
and robust measurement of decision making quality (Litchfield, 2013). The QAF 
requires that Decision Makers make justifiable decisions, but the Independent 
Reviewer found that there were limited incentives to make ‘accurate’ decisions. 
The Reviewer found that the Quality Assurance Framework focuses principally on 
whether processes have been followed correctly and there is less emphasis on 
outcomes than on the manner in which decisions have been reached so, for 
example, individual Decision Maker overturn rates are not monitored. The 
Reviewer noted examples of the Quality Assurance Framework being applied 
inconsistently between Benefit Centres. 
 
                                         
13 These were not final figures as they did not take into account the outcome of appeals. 
14 Although there were major issues about the quality of these reports in practice. 
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Life-long disabilities 
Sweden is the only country which has a specific benefit for young adults which 
forms part of the overall disability pension. However, the system of assessment is 
generally the same as for older claimants. Issues in relation to (incapacity related) 
life-long disabilities are likely to arise in Australia and the UK where a significant 
number of claimants do not come from previous employment. In both countries, 
there are specific systems to avoid the need for claimants with certain specific 
disabilities (which might include some persons with life-long disabilities) to go 
through the full assessment process.15 In Australia, persons considered to be 
‘manifestly eligible’ (e.g. terminal illness, permanent blindness) may be granted 
DSP without referral for an assessment although the categories which qualify 
would appear to be quite limited. In the UK, certain claimants are treated as 
having limited capacity to work and do not have to undergo an assessment.  These 
include persons with terminal illness or undergoing cancer treatment. Again the 
categories covered are quite limited and there would appear to be many persons 
with like-long disabilities who would not be affected by these procedures and 
would, therefore, go through the normal assessment process. In the other 
countries studied, persons with lifelong disabilities are likely to qualify for other 
benefits (see Kaltenbrunner et al., 2013). 
 
Desk review 
In all countries desk reviews (i.e. review on papers only) form a part of the 
assessment system although this varies from country to country and depending on 
the assessment issue. Unfortunately detailed statistics are not available for many 
countries. In the case of claims for sickness benefit, the person will generally have 
met with a doctor (normally the person’s GP). However, in the case of applications 
for disability pension, desk review is more common. It would appear that desk 
review (based on existing medical evidence) is the norm in Sweden and Finland 
although a medical assessment can be directed if this is left to be necessary (ISF, 
2013:7). In contrast, personal interview is the norm in the Netherlands. In Australia, 
about 90% of claimants of disability support pension are seen face-to-face. In the UK, 
in the majority of cases (72% in 2013) the claim proceeds to a face-to-face 
assessment. (Litchfield, 2014, p. 9). In the case of reviews of existing payments, it 
would seem that desk review is common although again it is difficult to get detailed 
data. 
We have not identified any legal challenges to desk review in itself although in some 
cases, courts and/or external assessors have expressed some concerns about the 
                                         
15 Further details are set out in the country reports. 
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appropriateness of desk reviews in certain cases. In the Australian case of Gilbert v 
Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous 
Affairs16 (a case where a claim for DSP was rejected after a desk assessment), the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal quashed the decision on the basis that the medical 
assessors did not have ‘adequate medical information upon which to base their 
assessments’. The Tribunal recommended that a further medical examination be 
carried out. It expressed concerns about the practice of carrying out desk 
assessment where the available information was sparse and suggested that 
Centrelink should have in place written advice to guide job capacity assessors and 
decision makers in situations where doubts arise as to the adequacy of medical 
reports. In the UK, the Independent Reviewer recommended that where a person is 
found Fit for Work on paper without a face-to-face assessment and subsequently 
disagrees with the decision, a second Decision Maker should then reconsider the 
need for a face to face assessment as part of the new mandatory reconsideration 
process. This recommendation has been accepted in principle by DWP. 
 
Reviews and return to work 
Traditionally in all the systems examined there have been time-limited reviews. 
These were often carried out on a paper basis by the same people involved in the 
decision-making process. It appears from available studies that these often had a 
limited impact on entitlements (see the country reports for France and Sweden).  
However, one clear trend in continental European countries has been to tighten up 
on controls of short-term sickness and, in some countries, to require that an 
assessment of capacity to return to work be carried out. The Netherlands (under the 
Gatekeeper protocol) sets out a guideline and time-table for employers in case of 
sickness. After a maximum of 6 weeks of sickness an occupational physician has to 
make a Problem Analysis, i.e. an assessment of medical cause, functional limitations 
and prognosis regarding work resumption. On the basis of this assessment the 
employer and sick employee together draft a return-to-work (RTW) plan in which 
they specify an aim (resumption of current/other job under current/accommodated 
conditions) and the steps needed to reach that aim. They appoint a case-manager, 
and fix dates at which the plan should be evaluated, and modified if necessary. The 
RTW plan should be ready in the eighth week of sickness. It is binding on both 
parties. Disability pension claims are only admissible if they are accompanied by a 
report containing an assessment as to why the plan has not resulted in work 
resumption.  
Assessments of the return to work approach (the Gatekeeper Protocol) indicate that 
it has been successful in increasing return to work. At the introduction of the 
                                         
16 [2012] AATA 198. 
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Gatekeeper approach, stricter screening was piloted in certain areas and evaluation 
showed that it reduced sickness benefit and disability applications (de Jong et al., 
2006). One study found that the frequency of contact with the occupational doctor 
increased return to work (Dutch language studies quoted in van Sonsbeek and 
Gradus, 2013 and Everhardt et al., 2011). A second found that the full and timely 
implementation of the Protocol doubled the probability of having returned to work 9 
months later. A third found that the Protocol had contributed to about half of the 
43% reduction to inflows to disability pension between 2001-4. Everhardt et al., 2011 
also found that employer-based vocational interventions (e.g. graduated work 
resumption) under the Gatekeeper Protocol had a strong impact on RTW.  
Sweden introduced the Rehabilitation Chain in 2008 (although despite the name this 
has little to do with rehabilitation).  For the first 90 days, working capacity is assessed 
against the person’s existing job, or other temporary suitable work provided by the 
employer. From the 91st to the 180th days, the worker is assessed against an 
alternative job with the same employer. Alternatively the worker may be given leave 
of absence to try to find another job with an alternative employer. From the 181st 
day, working capacity is evaluated against all jobs on the regular labour market.  An 
evaluation by the ISF of the ‘rehabilitation chain’ found that introducing time-
restricted assessments had strengthened the downward trend in sickness absence 
(Hägglund, 2010). Large and positive effects on the exit rate from sickness benefit 
were found around the 181st day and smaller but positive impacts around the 91st 
day. The reform reduced the number of compensated days by 0.27 days.17 France 
and Finland have also introduced earlier reviews of sickness absence which appear 
have some positive impact on sickness impact. 
The UK independent review of sickness absence (Black and Frost, 2011) 
recommended that the UK should establish a new Independent Assessment Service 
which would assess a person’s capacity and provide advice on return to work. This 
would be accessed after about four weeks sick absence. The UK government 
accepted this recommendation (DWP, 2013) and this new service (Fit for Work) is 
now being rolled-out.18 However, the assessment, which will not be mandatory, has 
only just been put in place and it is not possible to assess its impact. 
 
Role of medical assessors 
As discussed in more detail in the country reports, medical assessors (i.e. medical 
personnel employed or contracted by the social security authorities) are involved in 
                                         
17 While this may seem small, relatively few claimants reach either the 91st or 181st day. 
18 http://fitforwork.org/ 
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reviewing initial sickness claims and, in most countries, in assessing claims for long-
term disability benefits.  The role of the medical assessors is summarised below. 
Country Australia Finland France Netherlands Sweden UK 
Assessment 
for sick/pay 
benefit 
- Involved in 
reviews of 
sickness 
benefit 
- Entitlement 
to sick pay is 
assessed by 
doctors 
employed 
by 
arbodienst 
Involved in 
reviews of 
sickness 
benefit 
- 
Assessment 
for 
disability 
pension 
Assessment 
carried out 
by doctor 
appointed 
by social 
security 
authorities 
May be 
involved in 
assessment 
and/or 
review 
Assessments 
are carried 
out by 
doctors 
employed 
by social 
security 
authorities 
who also 
make the 
decision 
Assessments 
are carried 
out by 
doctors 
employed 
by social 
security 
authorities 
(and by 
labour 
experts) 
May be 
involved in 
assessment 
and/or 
review 
Assessment 
carried out 
by medical 
personnel 
appointed 
by social 
security 
authorities 
 
Appeals 
In all the countries, there is a right of appeal to an independent court or tribunal 
following an internal review of the decision. In general, these courts and tribunals 
form part of the overall court system: for example, the First Tier Tribunal in the UK, 
the district court in the Netherlands and the Administrative Appeals Tribunal in 
Australia. Generally the judges are legally qualified persons (or persons with other 
relevant qualifications). In the UK, for appeals involving assessments for ability to 
work, such as in Employment and Support Allowance cases, the tribunal will 
comprise a Judge and a medical practitioner. In France, incapacity appeals are heard 
by a special Disability Appeals Tribunal (which includes medical members). In the 
Netherlands, a medical doctor can be appointed by the court to give an expert 
opinion on the case. 
The impact of these courts and tribunals on assessment appears to vary from 
country to country. In the UK, decisions as to the interpretation of the law by the 
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specialist Upper Tribunal (formerly the Social Security Commissioners) are included 
in the DWP Guidelines for Decision Makers (DMGs).19 The DMGs are a detailed 
summary of the law in relation to specific benefits (legislation and case law) to assist 
in decision making. In contrast in France, a recent study (Roquel et al., 2012) found 
that the appeals system did not establish any general principles or guidance as to the 
interpretation of incapacity.  
 
Overall assessment 
It is very difficult to compare the different national systems in terms of outcomes. 
Even in terms of numbers on payments and the costs of payments, there are major 
issues in terms of comparable data. Some countries rely more heavily on private 
sector payments (sick pay) for which data is often lacking. Countries are also coming 
from different historical situations. For example, the Dutch system has to be seen in 
the context of very high reliance on the disability pension system in the past (Koning 
and Lindeboom, 2015) 
There have been a range of reforms in all the countries studies including a reduction 
in the level of public benefits in many countries. The reforms have ranged from 
paradigmatic in the Netherlands to rather minor in Finland and France. 
In terms of the structure of the current system and the rationale for reforms, the 
Netherlands system is clearly the most coherent. In a recent evaluation, Koning and 
Lindeboom (2015) identified the three main areas of reform in the Dutch system as 
(i) enhancing employer incentives to avoid sickness (e.g. experience rating), (ii) 
increased gatekeeping; and (iii) tightening eligibility criteria. They identified positive 
impacts in all three areas in reducing disability inflows with the introduction of the 
Gatekeeper Protocol consider to the most effective policy measure. The authors 
found that the tightening of eligibility criteria had led to a sharp increase in claims 
refused since 2006 (introduction of WIA).  They concluded (2015, 164) that  
The key to the success of disability insurance reform in the Netherlands has 
been the intensified role of employers in preventing long-term sickness, 
absence, and subsequent disability, with a strong emphasis on early 
interventions. The employer incentives increased the economic urgency 
among employers to exert sickness and accident prevention and workforce 
reintegration activities, while the Gatekeeper protocol has facilitated 
employer awareness and guided employers in their new role. 
                                         
19 The DMGs are a detailed summary of the law in relation to specific benefits (both legislation and 
case law) to assist in decision making. They are publically available on the DWP website: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/decision-makers-guide-staff-guide 
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Sweden has also introduced a number of successful reforms, including guidelines for 
GPs, strengthening reassessment of sickness claims (Rehabilitation Claim) and 
tightening conditions for access to benefits. In France and Finland, reforms have 
been more limited but have included strengthening reassessment of sickness claims, 
guidelines for certifiers (in France) and the introduction of part-time benefits (in 
Finland). 
Australia and the UK have adopted quite a different approach. Reforms here have 
focused on making it more difficult to qualify for long-term benefits (DSP and ESA 
respectively) and encouraging claimants to ‘return’ to work. However, in both 
countries only about half of those going onto long-term benefits have come from 
employment and so they have limited links to work. Although the UK was an early 
reformer in terms of privatisation of sick pay, the focus on the role of the private 
sector appears to have stopped there and, until recently, there appears to have been 
little emphasis on the importance of keeping people in work and ensuring early 
return to work. This has begun to change with the introduction of the Fit Note and 
the reforms proposed by the Independent review of Sickness Absence (Black and 
Frost, 2011). However, this has as yet had a limited impact and it is difficult to 
predict whether it will have a long-term impact on sickness absence in the UK. 
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4. Relevance of the findings to Ireland 
There is now widespread agreement on the need to promote employment for 
people with illness and disability issues. As the recent Department of Social 
Protection (2015) certification guidelines point out: 
There is a wealth of evidence to show that employment is good for one’s 
mental and physical health and wellbeing and conversely, that 
unemployment is damaging to one’s mental and physical health and 
wellbeing.  
There are two key lessons from this study for Ireland from a policy perspective. First, 
as highlighted by the OECD (2010) and as shown in the Dutch case, there is a need 
for cultural change supported by financial and other incentives for all actors 
(employers, individuals, medical professionals and social security authorities) to 
promote work-retention and return to work. As part of this reforms need to take 
into account the overall labour market and social welfare systems to ensure that 
particular approaches will have a positive impact and not simply lead to a transfer of 
costs from one sector to another or a transfer of claimants from one welfare scheme 
to another.  
Second, early intervention to reduce sickness absence and promote return to work is 
most effective. The countries which have been most successful in achieving return to 
work (such as the Netherlands) have put the focus on assessing work capacity and 
developing return to work plans at an early stage. In contrast, by the time people are 
approaching long-term incapacity they have (almost by definition) reduced work 
capacity and they are further from the labour force. Rates of return to work from 
long-term disability are low in most countries.20 
 
Reducing sickness absence 
The country studies show a number of measures which could be relevant to Ireland. 
These include: 
Reforming the role of certifiers – The limited Irish studies indicate that the same 
issues identified in other studies of certification also apply in Ireland (Foley et al., 
2012; 2013). This would indicate a need for improved training and information for 
certifiers so that they are clearer about their role and function. As we have seen a 
number of countries (including Ireland) have recently introduced guidelines on 
certification (e.g. where and for how long certificates should be issued). The 
implementation of these guidelines could draw on lessons from the implementation 
                                         
20 Some of the early reforms of the Dutch disability schemes led to significant levels of return to the 
workforce but this is probably more reflective of the level of capacity of those who had been allowed 
onto the Dutch rolls at the time. 
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in other countries. The reform of the sickness certificate in the UK to place an 
increased emphasis on return to work (Fit Note) could also be examined to see how 
far it could inform Irish practice. 
Improved reassessment - As we have seen most countries have strengthened early 
reassessment and some have included mandatory development of return to work 
plans. DSP could usefully learn from this experience by looking at whether its current 
system of reviews could be better targeted both in terms of the timing and in 
focusing on illnesses likely to be of long duration. A number of studies have 
emphasised that it is possible to identify people at risk of long-term dependency on 
sickness and disability payments based on personal and medical characteristics (e.g. 
Flach et al., 2012 Lidwall, 2013). DSP have developed a system of profiling for 
unemployed claimants which aims to identify those at risk of long-term 
unemployment and, therefore, in need of intervention. Similarly, it should be 
possible to profile sickness claimants so as to identify those at risk of longer-term 
sickness and disability and, therefore, in need of intervention. Studies (e.g. Halonen 
et al., 2015) also suggest that the appropriate time for intervention may vary 
depending on the certified illness and again this could be built-in to the profiling 
system. Of course, this would require a significant improvement in the recording of 
the medical cause of certification. 
Engaging employers – the Dutch experience shows the importance of involving 
employers centrally in the process. It might, perhaps, be unrealistic to expect that it 
will be possible to make Irish employers responsible for the costs of payments to the 
extent that this has happened in the Netherlands or even to impose a mandatory 
Gatekeeper Protocol. However, it would be possible to adapt this approach to an 
Irish context with, for example, a mandatory reassessment of persons at risk of long-
term absence at an early stage followed by referral to assessment and occupational 
health services which support employers and employees in developing a return to 
work plan (as in the Fit for Work service in the UK).21 
 
Part-time benefits 
As noted above, the Scandinavian countries have part-time capacity benefits and 
studies seem to indicate at least some success in achieving earlier return to work and 
reducing sickness absence. However, these studies do not appear to have looked at 
the overall impact of part-time benefits, e.g. would claimants of such benefits have 
remained in work or claimed full-time benefits, and there is a lack of an overall cost-
                                         
21 See also the NDA and HSA guides which provide employers with information about how to help 
employees who have acquired a disability to stay in work or return to work after a period of 
recovery. See http://nda.ie/Publications/Employment/Employment-Publications/Retaining-
employees-who-acquire-a-disability-A-guide-for-employers1.html 
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benefit analysis. In addition, the Scandinavian benefits are different to the Irish 
model and operate in a different labour market context so it is difficult to draw any 
conclusions for Ireland from these studies. 
 
Incapacity assessment 
In all the countries studied – as in Ireland – the focus is on capacity to work, i.e. the 
effect of an impairment on capacity to work. In the continental countries, it is 
noteworthy that although all have, to some extent, introduced reforms of their 
sickness and disability systems (major reforms in some cases) none have made major 
changes in the decision-making systems. 
There would appear to be no major public dissatisfaction with the existing system of 
incapacity assessment in Ireland and recent trends in the numbers on illness benefit 
and invalidity pension are downwards (reflecting, in part, a number of recent policy 
changes re: eligibility). In that context, it is not obvious that there would be 
advantages in considering a major reform of the evaluation system along the lines 
adopted in Australia or the UK.  
 
Disability allowance  
Although it is not clear that there would be any advantage in moving to the 
Australian/UK approach to disability assessment, there are elements of their 
approach which might be relevant to DSP in relation to disability allowance (DA). 
There has been a dramatic growth in the numbers on DA over the last two decades 
from 37,000 in 1996 to 112,000 in 2014. In this context, there is a case for 
consideration of whether the approaches adopted in Australia (e.g. participation 
interviews and the program of support)22 and the UK (e.g. the Work Focussed 
Interviews and Work Programme)23 could be relevant in an Irish context.  
 
Legal robustness 
Despite the varying systems adopted, there is nothing to suggest that the different 
systems which we have studied have faced any major legal issues. Obviously (except 
for Australia) the rules in relation to a fair hearing of appeals under the European 
Convention on Human Rights apply and this has led to a number of cases concerning 
access to medical reports and the right to a public hearing.  
                                         
22 Although, as in Australia, one would expect that many claimants will have limited labour force 
capacity (see Brodway et al., 2014).  
23 Again the most recent UK statistics indicate a modest impact on employment: Department of Work 
and Pensions, Quarterly Work Programme national statistics to June 2015. 
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It might be suggested that the very high number of appeals concerning the UK ESA 
and the high rate of successful claimant appeals suggests that this system is not 
legally robust. However, it would probably be more accurate to see the high levels of 
appeal as the result of this major change in approach and also the practical 
difficulties experienced in its implementation. 
As noted above, we have not found that the concept of desk reviews (as opposed to 
face-to-face assessments) has been subject to legal challenge although in particular 
cases there has been criticism of the appropriateness of desk reviews or the manner 
in which they have been carried out. 
There is considerable UK case law on the role of the medical assessor (or equivalent) 
and how their findings should be taken into account. The UK courts24 have accepted 
that the examining medical practitioner acting on behalf of the DWP is 
‘independent’.25 However, the courts have also held that 
there is no general rule that where there is a difference between the 
evidence of a medical professional producing reports for the use of the 
Department of Work and Pensions in making decisions as to social security 
benefits and the evidence of a claimant, the evidence of the medical 
professional should be preferred.  It may be a legitimate conclusion in a 
particular case that a medical professional’s view is to be preferred because it 
is more objective and independent, but that is a conclusion only to be 
reached after a consideration of the particular evidence … .26 
In terms of balancing the evidence of the person’s doctor and an examining 
practitioner, the courts have stated that both the examining medical practitioner and 
the general practitioner should be assumed to be giving professional and 
independent evidence.27 The medical evidence provided by both (and any other 
relevant evidence including the claimant’s own evidence) should be evaluated and 
weighed on the issues in the case.  
The courts have accepted that where the examining practitioner does not have 
medical expertise in relation to the person’s disability (e.g. mental health) any 
medical opinion in relation to the disability is ‘of little or no value’. However, the 
examining practitioner may still be able to prove relevant evidence as to the impact 
of the disability on capacity to work.28 In the case of PF v Secretary of State for Work 
                                         
24 The specialist Upper Tribunal is equivalent to the High Court in its status in the judicial hierarchy. 
25 See, for example, CIB 2308 2001. 
26  CW v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2011] UKUT 386 at [24] citing CIB/16401/1996. 
27 CIB 2308 2001. 
28 See [2010] UKUT 340 and [2013] UKUT 469. 
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and Pensions,29 the First Tier Tribunal had preferred the evidence of the medical 
assessor (who was a physiotherapist) to that of the claimant’s psychiatrist without 
explanation. The Upper Tribunal held that ‘Where evidence of opinion is put 
forward, key to the evidential value of that opinion is the source of it. The level and 
extent of the expertise must be of central relevance in relation to the evaluation of 
opinion evidence.’30 
In Ireland, an issue has been raised in relation to the role of the deciding officers who 
make decisions on entitlement to sickness and disability payments ‘rubber-stamping’ 
the opinion of a Departmental medical assessor.31 In B. v Minister for Social 
Protection,32 a case involving domiciliary care allowance (DCA), the deciding officer, 
in rejecting B’s application, had relied on the negative opinion of the medical 
assessor. It emerged that in over 3,800 applications for DCA the same deciding 
officer had – in every case – relied on the medical assessor’s decisions and the 
Department conceded that it would be ‘highly unusual’ for a deciding officer to 
decide against a medical assessor's opinion. 
The High Court ruled that  
The policy whereby deciding officers generally defer to the opinions of 
department medical assessors … has yielded a situation in the instant case in 
which there has been an abdication of statutory duty by the deciding officer 
… . Indeed the manner of implementation of such policy … is such that the 
court finds it has vitiated the decision-making process employed in relation to 
that application; this is because the deference manifested by this particular 
deciding officer to the opinion of medical assessors has been proven to be so 
great that the court concludes that the medical assessor's opinion … was in 
fact determinative of that application, thus resulting in a contravention of 
s.300 of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act, 2005, thereby tainting the 
decision-making process. 
This case involved DCA rather than an incapacity payment but it seems likely that 
similar issues could arise in relation to incapacity payments.33 Without further 
amendment to the law, it is clear that deciding officers must make the decisions and 
                                         
29 [2013] UKUT 0634. 
30 At [13]. 
31 In McLoughlin v. Minister for Social Welfare [1958] IR 1 the Supreme Court ruled, at p.27, that 
‘deciding officers, are, and are required to be, free and unrestricted in discharging their functions 
under the Act.’  
32 [2014] 2 ILRM 290. 
33 The Social Welfare (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2015 inserts a new section 300A re the opinion of 
the medical assessor which provides, inter alia, that ‘a deciding officer shall have regard to [the 
medical assessor’s] opinion in deciding the question in respect of which the opinion was sought. 
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must have regard to all relevant evidence. This would still be likely to lead to 
decisions consistent with the medical assessor’s opinion in most (but not all) cases. 
This is the approach which is taken, for example, in the UK where (in ESA cases) the 
decision maker (DM) has regard to the opinion of the medical assessor (then Atos) 
but does not in all cases follow that opinion (Adams et al., 2012).  Research 
commissioned by the DWP found that in about one case in 40 the DM sought further 
guidance from the Atos or acted against its advice. These cases included those where 
there were difficulties in interpretation of the ‘descriptors’, where there were 
internal discrepancies in the assessment report or where the claimant had provided 
further medical evidence. 
The alternative would be to change the law to make the medical assessor the 
deciding officer in ‘disability’ cases. Of course, if this was to be done, the medical 
assessor would have to have regard to all the evidence in coming to a decision and to 
comply with general rules of fair procedures which apply to decision-makers. 
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Annex 1: Research questions 
 
 Who conducts capacity assessments for  
 Short-term illness 
 Longer term illness 
 Disability/invalidity 
  ‘fitness to work’ tests where these are in place 
Detail where it is the person’s own doctor, one from the public health service or 
the social security body; if a generalist(GP) or specialist medical opinion is 
required; whether other health professionals are involved and which e.g. 
occupational therapists; whether non-health professionals are involved, and 
which e.g. vocational guidance specialists  
 Is there desk review or actual medical examination at application stage 
 Does the medical or other specialist assessor make a decision or give an opinion 
 Is a medical etc opinion binding or is it advisory on the decision taker 
 If the medical or other specialist assessor makes a decision what if any is the 
appeals process.  
 What is the nature of the medical criteria or fitness to work criteria 
 What system is in place for review of medical or fitness for work assessments 
 What is the composition of the review panel (doctors, OTs etc) 
 What system is in place to ensure uniformity of decisions 
 Strengths or weaknesses of the systems 
 Robustness of the systems from a legal perspective 
 If possible, an assessment of the potential robustness of such systems in the Irish 
legal context.  
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Acronyms  
 
AAT – Administrative Appeals Tribunal 
AFU – Active Capacity Assessment 
CBT – Cognitive Behaviour Therapy 
CCG – Current Care Guidelines 
CES – Commonwealth Employment Service 
CITW – Continuing Inability to Work 
CMO – Commonwealth Medical Officer 
CNAM – Caisse Nationale de l’Assurance Maladie  
CPAM – Caisse Primaire d’Assurance Maladie 
CRS – Commonwealth Rehabilitation Service 
DA – Disability Allowance 
DASI - Disability Assessment Structured Interview  
DCA – Domiciliary Care Allowance 
DEEWR – Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations 
DLA – Disability Living Allowance 
DM – Decision Maker 
DMA – Disability Medical Assessment 
DMGs – Decision Maker Guidelines 
DSO – Disability Support Officers 
DSP – Department of Social Protection  
DSP – Disability Support Pension 
DSS – Department of Social Services 
DWP – Department of Work and Pensions 
EBM – Evidence Based Medicine 
ECHP – European Community Household Panel 
ECtHR – European Court of Human Rights  
EEA – European Economic Area 
ELSM - Employed in the Local Medical Service 
ESA – Employment and Support Allowance 
FAL – Functional Ability List 
GP – General Practitioner 
HCP – Health Care Professional 
ICF - International Classification of Functioning Disability and Health 
IGAS - Inspection general des affairs sociales 
IMA – Interview of Methodical Assessment 
ISF - Swedish Social Insurance Inspectorate/Inspektionen för socialförsäkringen 
IVA - Dutch Income Provision Scheme for People Fully Occupationally 
Disabled/Regeling inkomensvoorziening volledig en duurzaam arbeidsongeschikten 
JCA – Job Capacity Allowance 
LCW - Limited Capability for Work 
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LCWRA - Limited Capability for Work-Related Activity  
MCA – Mutli Casual Analysis 
MMR - Moderate Mental and Behavioural Disorders and Rehabilitation 
NDA – National Disability Authority 
NWRN – National Welfare Rights Network 
OECD – Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development 
PA – Personal Adviser 
PTSL – Part Time Sick Leave  
QAF – Quality Assurance Framework 
RFT – Request for Tender 
RTW - Return to Work 
SIP – Social Insurance Physician 
SSA – Social Security Act 
SSIA – Swedish Social Insurance Agency 
SSP – Statutory Sick Pay 
UK – United Kingdom 
UVA – Dutch Social Insurance Agency 
WOA - Previous Dutch Disability Pension Scheme/Wet op de 
arbeidsongeschiktheidsverzekering  
WCA – Work Capacity Assessment 
WFIs – Work Focused Interviews 
WGA - Return to Work Scheme for the Partially Disabled/Regeling Werkhervatting 
Gedeeltelijk Arbeidsgehandicapten 
WIA – Current Dutch Disability Pension Scheme/Wet Werk en Inkomen naar 
Arbeidsvermogen  
WRAG – Work-Related Activity Group 
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Annexes of country reports 
Australia  
 
1. Overview  
In Australia, private sector employees are (subject to certain conditions) entitled 
under employment law to up to 10 days paid sick leave per year.34 If this is used up, 
an employee may (depending on the employment contract) be entitled to some 
further sick leave or make take unpaid sick leave.35 Alternatively, s/he may claim the 
means-tested sickness allowance if s/he can show that all illness is ‘temporary’ and 
that s/he has a job to go back to. A person who is long-term incapable of work can 
claim the means-tested disability support pension (DSP). The policy intention is that 
income support payments should be adequate enough to allow disabled people to 
live with dignity, whilst also encouraging disabled people to seek employment. 
2. Description of main payments 
Sickness Allowance is a means-tested payment for persons with ‘temporary’ illness. 
Sickness allowance and Disability Support pension (DSP) are aimed at different 
segments of the population suffering incapacity and ill-health, although Sickness 
Allowance may be a route to and/or off DSP for some people.  Sickness Allowance 
has different medical eligibility criteria from DSP.  It is intended to provide income 
support for those of working age who are temporarily unable to work or study due 
to a medical condition.  There is a link with the DSP criteria in that a temporary 
medical condition is taken to mean two years or less - if the condition was expected 
to last for longer, then the person should consider a DSP application.  Critically the 
Sickness Allowance applicant must have a job or a course to return to at the end of 
their period of incapacity. If not then they are required to claim unemployment 
benefit.  Claims for Sickness Allowance have to be supported by a medical certificate 
from their doctor, which must state that the person is unable to work or 
study.  Usually the medical certificate has to be reviewed at least every 13 
weeks.  The income and asset tests and the residency requirements that apply to 
DSP also apply to Sickness Allowance.  The number of Sickness Allowance recipients 
is significantly smaller than for DSP; 7,937 in June 2015 compared to over 800,000 on 
DSP.36 
                                         
34 Fair Work Act 2009. 
35 For up to three months, a person cannot be dismissed  
36 In terms of Ireland’s population size, this would be the equivalent of about 1,500 people on 
Sickness Allowance, and about 160,000 on Disability Support Pension 
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Disability Support Pension (DSP) was announced in the 1990 Budget and introduced 
by Part 2.3 of the Social Security Act 1991 (SSA) as part of a wider policy initiative, 
the Disability Reform Package, which also increased spending on training and 
rehabilitation services.  DSP replaced the Invalid Pension in November 1991.37  The 
reform was designed to reduce the number of recipients and to promote disabled 
people’s engagement in the labour market through combining income support with 
training and rehabilitation services (Yeend, 2002a).  As Yeend (2002a:4) observes: 
‘For the first time the Department of Social Security (DSS) employed specialist 
Disability Support Officers (DSOs) who conducted interviews of all DSP 
applicants jointly with Commonwealth Employment Service (CES) and 
Commonwealth Rehabilitation Service (CRS) officers, providing holistic 
assessments and management.’ 
As part of the reform, the assessment of impairment was changed.  There were 
concerns that under the Invalid Pension scheme, Commonwealth Medical Officers 
were too often taking into account the applicant’s socio-economic circumstances 
(such as ethnicity, basic skills, and local labour market conditions) rather than 
concentrating on their impairment and its effect on work capacity (Yeend, 2002a).  
However, numbers in receipt of DSP still increased over time; from under 200,000 in 
the 1970s to over 800,000 by 2015.  This has led to a number of further reforms to 
tighten eligibility for DSP.  These reforms include:  
 A reduction in the number of hours per week a claimant is unable work from 30 
to 15 for those claiming after 2006.  The change did not affect people qualifying 
for the DSP prior to May 2005, and only affected those qualifying between May 
2005 and June 2006 after their first review.  The change meant that people who 
were partially incapacitated (those who could work for 15 to 29 hours per week) 
now claimed Newstart, an unemployment benefit with payments that are lower 
than those for DSP.  These changes were introduced as part of the then Howard 
Government’s Welfare to Work reforms.   
 The introduction of a Program of Support in 2011 - a Program of Support is 
designed to help disabled people find paid work and has to be wholly or partially 
funded by the Commonwealth Government.   
 The Impairment Tables, used to assess capacity for work, were revised in 2012. 
 Since July 2012 new and existing DSP recipients aged under 35 years who have an 
assessed work capacity of eight to 15 hours a week are required to attend 
periodic participation interviews with Centrelink staff to develop participation 
plans.   
                                         
37 A more detailed history of DSP up to 2010 is given in Daniels (2011). 
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 A targeted review of past cases commenced in July 2014, covering DSP recipients 
who were under the age of 35 and were granted the payment between 1 January 
2008 and 31 December 2011; they are known as ‘reviewed 2008-2011 DSP 
starters’.38  
Transitional protection arrangements have been put in place as these reforms have 
been implemented.  This protection adds to the complexity of the system, because 
different eligibility rules apply to the stock of DSP recipients, with the criteria applied 
depending on when recipients made their claims and in some instances reviewed. 
DSP is means-tested and for those under pension age non-taxable.  Payment rates 
and methods for calculating the payments are set out in legislation - Part 2.3, 
Division 5 and Parts 3.1 to 3.4B of the Social Security Act 1991. The maximum 
amount paid also depends upon the recipients’ age, presence of children and family 
structure; and for those aged under 21 their living arrangements.  Younger DSP 
recipients receive a lower rate of payment. In addition, a DSP recipient whilst 
participating in the Program of Support obtains a payment of $20.80 per fortnight 
(known as the approved program of work supplement) (Section 118, SSA 1991). The 
amount of DSP paid is reduced if the claimant has an income and assets above set 
thresholds.   
DSP claimants have a long-term impairment that can make returning to work 
difficult.  Nonetheless, successive Australian governments have sought to make DSP 
a more active benefit, encouraging more claimants to return to employment.  DSP is 
administered by Centrelink, which is part of the Department for Human Services.  In 
June 2015 there were 814,391 DSP recipients.  It represents the largest income 
support payment to people of working age – a half of all such payments in 2008/9 
(Productivity Commission, 2011). 
The work capacity of DSP recipients varies from those unable to work to those able 
to undertake a few hours each week.  However, notwithstanding a series of 
measures as outlined below to encourage recipients to move into employment 
relatively few do so.  Fewer than one in ten recipients declare earnings from 
employment:  9.8 per cent in June 2008, 9.2 per cent in June 2009, 8.7 per cent in 
June 2010 (Productivity Commission, 2011:K3), and 8 per cent in June 2015 (see 
Table AUS2).  Their employment durations can be relatively brief; of the 100,000 or 
so disability pensioners who reported earnings over the two years to the end of June 
2008, only 36,000 were employed for the whole two years (Australian Government, 
2009a).  Of those that exit DSP for employment many return to the benefit 
(Productivity Commission, 2011:K3). 
                                         
38  Recipients may also become a reviewed 2008-2011 DSP starter due to other reviews of DSP claims 
that take place, such as random sample surveys or medical qualification updates.  NB the reviewee is 
assessed against all of the eligibility criteria for DSP (these are discussed below). 
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In recent years the Commonwealth Government has been increasingly expecting DSP 
recipients to search for, and enter, employment (Lam, 2014; Hammer, 2009; 
Australian Government, 2009a and 2009b).  Accordingly, new and reviewed DSP 
claimants, unless they are ‘manifestly eligible’ (due to a congenital disability, 
catastrophic injury or illness), are required to undertake a Job Capacity 
Assessment.39  This is used to assess the individual’s medical eligibility for DSP and 
whether they are capable of work.  The assessment is conducted by an Assessor, 
namely, an allied health or health professional.  Prior to July 2011 these Assessors 
were from a mix of government and private providers but concerns about the 
accuracy of the assessment led Centrelink (with the assistance of the 
Commonwealth Rehabilitation Service Australia) to take over all assessments.  The 
Assessor uses Impairment Tables to assess the extent to which the applicant’s 
medical condition has a functional impact on their capacity to work.  The Impairment 
Tables and the separate work capacity assessment, known as the Continuing Inability 
to Work (CITW) test, are discussed in more detail below.  The assessments are 
typically conduced at a Centrelink Service Centre.  There is no user charge levied for 
the assessment.  At the same time an assessment is made as to whether the 
applicant should be required to participate in a Program of Support, and a referral 
may be made to employment services.  That is, policy makers see the Job Capacity 
Assessment as not simply a means to determine eligibility for DSP but also as a 
referral tool.  
Many DSP recipients aged less than 35 years must have a participation plan and 
attend regular interviews at Centrelink (SSA, section 94 and 94A).  In addition, it was 
announced in the 2014 Federal Budget that some DSP claimants aged less than 35 
years who were able to work more than eight hours per week will be mandated to 
participate in work-related activities (NWRN, 2014; SSA, section 96).  These activities 
include job search, work experience, education or training, Work for the Dole, 
rehabilitation or engaging with an agency that can help people find work, such as a 
Disability Employment Service or a Job Services Australia provider.  There are some 
exclusions, for example, if the recipient has a dependent child under six years, or 
they employed in supported employment (that is, under the Supported Wage 
System or work in an Australian Disability Enterprise). 
Although exemptions apply (see below), DSP applicants must have completed, or 
actively participate in, a Program of Support for at least 18 months over the last 
three years (Australian Government, 2015: Section 1.1.A.30).  A Program of Support 
is meant to be a tailored programme to help people ‘prepare for, find or maintain 
work’ (SSA Section 94(5)).  Those taking part in the Program of Support are those 
                                         
39  The JCA was introduced in July 2006.  Non-DSP applicants who are disabled may be referred to an 
Employment Services Assessment.   
Mel Cousins & Associates  
 
65  
 
making new claims for DSP on or after the 3rd September 2011 and who do not have 
a severe impairment; and the reviewed 2008-2011 DSP starters (SSA, Section 94).40 
A Program of Support must be delivered by a ‘designated provider’, include 
vocational, rehabilitation or employment services and at least one of the following 
elements (Australian Government, 2015: Section 1.1.A.30): job search, job 
preparation, education and training, work experience, employment, return to work, 
vocational or occupational rehabilitation, injury management, an activity designed to 
assist the person to prepare for, find or maintain work. 
Programs of Support include:  
- Disability Employment Services – run by the Department of Social Services 
which comprise a mix of for-profit and non-for-profit organisations that 
support both disabled job-seekers looking for employment and employers 
to support disabled workers. 
- Jobactive – a Department for Employment job brokerage service. 
- the Remote Jobs and Communities Program – a Department of the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet programme to develop skills and support local 
communities.  
- Australian Disability Enterprises – which are not-for-profit supported 
(sheltered) employment providers funded by the Department of Social 
Services. 
DSP recipients can for up to two years combine paid work and benefit payments 
provide they do not exceed the working hour limit (30 hours since July 2012) or the 
income test.  
In terms of exits from DSP, which amount to 7 per cent of the stock, there are few 
returns to employment.  Many recipients die or flow on to the Age Pension, some 
because they no longer fulfil the income and asset tests (Productivity Commission, 
2011:K2-3).  For the year June 2012 to June 2013 there were 56,836 exits from DSP 
of which 62 per cent were transfers to Age Pension (Department of Social Services, 
2014). 
                                         
40  A ‘severe impairment’ arises when an applicant has an impairment rating of 20 or more and a 
score of at least 20 on one or more of the Impairment Tables.  Thus someone who is not classed as 
having a severe impairment will have an overall score of 20 or over, but not a score or 20 or more 
across any one of the 15 Impairment Tables.  These applicants must take part in a Program of 
Support. 
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3. Incapacity criteria  
Short-term incapacity 
A person is entitled to paid sick leave if ‘the employee is not fit for work because of a 
personal illness, or personal injury, affecting the employee’.41  
A person is qualified for sickness allowance if (a) the person is incapacitated for work 
or study because of sickness or an accident; and (b) the incapacity is caused wholly 
or virtually wholly by a medical condition arising from the sickness or accident; and 
(c) the incapacity is, or is likely to be, of a temporary nature.42 
Long-term incapacity 
There are a number of criteria used to determine eligibility for DSP.  Assessment for 
DSP includes the use of Impairment Tables; and new tables were introduced as part 
of replacing Invalid Pension with DSP.  The current three key work capacity tests are 
that claimants (Department of Human Service, nd; SSA, Section 94): 
 are either permanently blind or have a permanent physical, intellectual or 
psychiatric impairment of 20 points or more against the Impairment Tables.  
To achieve this minimum percentage requires that the applicant has a 
‘significant impairment’ (Yeend, 2002a:4); and 
 have an inability to work at or above minimum wage, or to be retrained for 
work, for at least 15 hours a week within the next two years because of the 
impairment (that is, the Continuing Inability to Work (CITW) test).  The CITW 
test is essentially a time-based work capacity assessment (Morris et al., 
2015); and 
 have taken part in or completed a Program of Support if required (see 
above).  This requirement was added to the eligibility criteria in September 
2012 – it forms part of the CITW test.  It is used to demonstrate that an 
applicant cannot obtain employment without assistance. 
Following publication of the final report of the Reference Group on Welfare Reform 
(2000), Participation Support for a More Equitable Society (the McClure Report), 
there were three attempts to tighten the CITW test in 2002 (see Yeend, 2002a and 
2002b).  The 2002 attempts at reform sought to reduce the then 30 hours per week 
threshold to 15 hours.  When DSP was introduced the 30 hour test was not seen as 
problematic because it was believed that most recipients would receive payments 
for a relatively short period of time and aided by training and rehabilitation 
                                         
41 Fair Work Act 2009, s. 97. 
42 Social Security Act 1991, s. 666. 
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measures the 30 hour rule would assist people’s transition from DSP into full-time 
employment (Yeend, 2002a).  However, reducing the threshold from 30 to 15 hours 
for new applicants had to wait until the Employment and Workplace Relations 
Legislation Amendment (Welfare to Work and Other Measures) Act 2005, with the 
change taking effect in the July of the following year (Mendes, 2009).  The change, 
which occurred at a time of a wider neo-liberal critique of the Australian welfare 
state (see Mendes, 2001 and 2009), was designed to encourage many DSP recipients 
with a partial work capacity onto unemployment benefits.  Those affected by the 
reduction in hours risked losing up to AU$120 a week43 (Mendes, 2009) if they 
received Newstart instead of DSP. 
The CITW test is conducted because policy makers recognise that an applicant may 
have a significant impairment but still have a substantive capacity for paid work or 
training, in which case they would be ineligible for DSP.  The CITW test takes into 
account the medical assessment using the Impairment Tables, as well as the 
applicants previous work history and access to employment services.  It does not 
take into account the state of (local) labour markets. 
Accessing DSP was further restricted with the introduction of revised Impairment 
Tables on 1st January 2012 (see Advisory Committee, 2011).  A comparison of the 
new and old tables based on a representative but small sample of DSP cases (n=207) 
revealed that 41 per cent of people eligible under the old tables would no longer be 
eligible under the revised tables (Department of Families, Housing, Community 
Services and Indigenous Affairs, 2011:16).  This analysis implies that between a third 
(36 per cent) and nearly a half (45 per cent) the DSP population would be affected by 
the introduction of the revised tables.44   
The tables, which as mentioned above are used in a Job Capacity Assessment, are 
specified in secondary legislation, the Social Security (Tables for the Assessment of 
Work-related Impairment for Disability Support Pension) Determination 2011.45  The 
Determination was made by the then Minister for Families, Housing, Community 
Services and Indigenous Affairs using powers under the SSA (subsection 26(1)).  
However, the revised Tables only apply to those required to take part in an 
assessment on or after 1st January 2012.  Recipients with older claims continue to be 
assessed against the pre-2012 Impairment Tables when their cases are reviewed. 
The Determination defines impairment as ‘… a loss of functional capacity affecting a 
person’s ability to work that results from the person’s [medical] condition.’  The 
Tables are function based (rather than diagnosis based) and cover the activities, 
                                         
43 About €80 a week at January 2016 exchange rates 
44 This estimate is based on using a 90 per cent confidence interval. 
45 Available at:  https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/F2011L02716/Download.  
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abilities, symptoms and limitations of a claimant.  They exclude possible non-
medical/socio-economic barriers to obtaining employment.   
There are 15 Impairment Tables (see Box 1), and each Table comprises five 
functional descriptors, which describe possible levels of impact of a medical 
condition.  The five levels of functional impact specify what ‘no’, ‘mild’, ‘moderate’, 
‘severe’ and ‘extreme’ impacts would look like.  Each descriptor has an assigned 
impairment rating (or points); and the points awarded are summed to give the 
claimant’s overall impairment score.  The number of points for each level of 
functional impact is:  
Impact level  Points 
No     0 
Mild     5 
Moderate   10 
Severe   20 
Extreme   30 
 
Box AUS 1: The Tables 
Table 1 - Functions requiring Physical Exertion and Stamina 
Table 2 – Upper Limb Function  
Table 3 – Lower Limb Function  
Table 4 – Spinal Function. 
Table 5 – Mental Health Function 
Table 6 – Functioning related to Alcohol, Drug and Other Substance Use 
Table 7 – Brain Function  
Table 8 – Communication Function 
Table 9 – Intellectual Function 
Table 10 – Digestive and Reproductive Function. 
Table 11 – Hearing and other Functions of the Ear 
Table 12 – Visual Function 
Table 13 – Continence Function 
Table 14 – Functions of the Skin 
Table 15 – Functions of Consciousness  
Source:  Social Security (Tables for the Assessment of Work-related Impairment for 
Disability Support Pension) Determination 2011. 
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An example of a descriptor and it impairment rating (or points) is as follows: 
Table 8 Communication Function 
Points Descriptor 
5 (1) There is a mild functional impact on communication in the 
person’s main language. At least one of the following applies:  
(a) the person has some difficulty understanding complex 
words and long sentences (e.g. a complex newspaper 
article); or  
(b) the person has mild difficulty in producing speech and 
has minor difficulty with being understood due to 
speech production or content. 
Source:  Social Security (Tables for the Assessment of Work-related Impairment for 
Disability Support Pension) Determination 2011, p.37. 
For impairment ratings to be assigned, two conditions must be met (Sections 6(3)): 
 The claimants’ medical condition must be permanent, that is, it has been 
diagnosed by a qualified medical practitioner, the condition has been fully 
treated and is stabilised 
 The impairment (due to the condition) is likely to last for two years.   
When assessing the impairment, claimants must wear/use any aids, equipment or 
assistive technologies that they usually use (Section 9). For episodic and fluctuating 
conditions (which are stabilised (see above)) the rating must reflect ‘… the overall 
functional impact of those impairments, taking into account the severity, duration 
and frequency of the episodes or fluctuations as appropriate.’ (Section 11(4)). 
The Determination highlights that assessment of impairment is evidence-based, and 
the medical practitioner must have received corroborating evidence (such as worker 
compensation reports, or hospital or outpatient reports).  Since the 1st July 2015, 
medical reports from the treating doctor are no longer required to be submitted as 
medical evidence.  Instead, the applicant must provide their medical records. 
Those not meeting the income and asset test may be eligible for the Newstart 
Allowance. 
 
4. Assessment of incapacity 
Short-term 
Australian employees (except casual staff) have an entitlement to sick and carer’s 
leave of up to 10 days per year for full-time workers; and unused leave can be rolled 
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forward to the next year.  Sick leave is paid at the employee’s base pay rate for each 
hour of sick leave.  Following the implementation of the controversial WorkChoices 
legislation in 2006, employers were given more scope to demand medical evidence 
to justify sickness absences.46  Prior to the reform employees could take up to four 
days sick leave without medical evidence, post-reform employers can demand a 
certificate from the first day of sickness absence.  The form of the medical evidence 
must take is not specified in law (the Fair Work Act 2009), but a medical certificate 
from a registered medical practitioner is usually taken as proof of illness (although it 
can be challenged by an employer).  However, the legislation also deregulated who 
could write a medical certificate.  Medical certificates can be issued by 10 types of 
‘registered health practitioner’, including pharmacists, acupuncturists, chiropractors 
and traditional Chinese medicine practitioners.  In 2013 there were 95,013 registered 
medical practitioners in Australia.47  Nonetheless, GPs continue to have a key role in 
the return to work process (Mazza et al., 2015). 
For short-term illness the main route into the incapacity system is the GP and 
obtaining a medical certificate.  Most people’s initial contact with the health care 
system is with a general practitioner (GP).  GPs see approximately 96 per cent of 
injured workers (Mazza et al., 2015).  There have been relatively few studies of 
sickness certification in Australia (e.g. Dunstan, 2009; Mazza et al., 2015).  As in some 
other countries, there have been concerns expressed about GPs acting as patients’ 
advocates, prioritising their relationship with patients over other factors and lacking 
sufficient information about patients’ job roles (Mazza et al., 2015).  These concerns 
lead to sickness certificates being issued unnecessarily and endangered the return to 
work process.  Also, there are allegations of ‘doctor-shopping’ whereby patients will 
contact health practitioners until they obtain the certificate outcome desired.   
The various bodies that regulate the medical practitioners who can issue medical 
certificates have responsibility for quality assuring professional practice.  In addition, 
medical practitioners are registered with the Australian Health Practitioner 
Regulation Agency. 
Most employees claiming replacement income from a worker’s compensation 
scheme return to work.  A 2013/14 survey of returns to work shows that 87 per cent 
of injured workers who had been off work for 10 or more days had returned to work 
(The Social Research Centre, 2014).  This is a rate of return that has been fairly stable 
over time. 
 
                                         
46  WorkChoices was introduced by the Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005, 
which amended the Workplace Relations Act 1996. 
47  Source:  Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 
http://www.aihw.gov.au/workforce/medical/how-many-medical-practitioners/ 
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Long-term 
As mentioned above, a person’s medical eligibility for DSP requires a Job Capacity 
Assessment to be conducted using Impairment Tables.  In addition, claimants may 
have been required to undergo a Disability Medical Assessment (DMA).  Indeed, all 
claims for DSP submitted on or after 1st July 2015 must have a DMA.  These 
assessments are conducted to review the medical evidence used to support a DSP 
claim.  They are conducted by a government-contracted doctor, and cannot be 
carried out by the applicant’s own doctor or specialist.  The DMA does not involve 
any diagnosis of conditions, medical advice or treatment; rather it is a review of the 
supporting medical evidence for a claim for DSP. 
Eligibility for DSP is determined by a social security decision-maker (or delegate) 
under the Social Security Act, and not by Commonwealth Medical Officers (CMO) or 
doctors (Yeend, 2002).  Many Australians incorrectly believe that it is the CMOs or 
doctors that determine eligibility for DSP.   
 
Desk based assessments 
Desk based Job Capacity Assessments (JCAs), known as file assessments, are under 
certain circumstances allowed, but they are the exception. Job Capacity Assessments 
can be conducted face-to-face, by telephone/video-conference or paper-based.  The 
preferred method is face-to-face interviews – 90 per cent were conducted this way 
in 2008/09 (Jackson, 2009:21).48 Telephone/video-conference assessments are 
permitted where a claimant is geographically disadvantaged or their medical 
condition prevents them from attending an interview in person (Anon., 2006; 
Parliamentary Ombudsman, 2008:7).  Official guidance has recognised that 
telephone/video-conference assessments may be necessary where: 
• ‘the client has severe mobility restrictions due to a disability, illness or injury; 
or 
• the client is confined to hospital, home or an institution due to a medical 
condition or legal requirement; or 
• the client would be required to travel for more than 60 minutes to attend an 
assessment AND there are no suitable facilities for the assessor to conduct an 
assessment in the client’s local area; or  
                                         
48  Note not all of these will have been DSP claimants as claimants of other benefits may also have a 
JCA. 
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• travel for both the client and assessor is impossible or unreasonable for other 
reasons such as flood or storm.’49 
The decision about whether a telephone/video-conference assessment is permitted 
is taken by the JCA assessor on a case by case basis.  Guidance to assessors makes it 
clear that telephone/video-conference assessments are not to be used simply 
because a face-to-face appointment would be inconvenient.  The Parliamentary 
Ombudsman (2008:7-8) has been critical of the use of telephone JCA assessments 
because it can ‘…lead to poor outcomes.’ 
File (or paper) assessments may be allowed were: 
 a client’s medical condition(s) prevents them from attending a face-to-face 
assessment or participating in a telephone or other assessment;  
 a DSP or foreign pension client is overseas;  
 a client has a history of aggressive behaviour and/or difficulty dealing with 
Centrelink;   
 a client’s geographic isolation prevents them from attending a face-to-face 
assessment and also prevents the assessor from arranging an assessment in 
the client’s local area, and telephone or other media are unavailable; or 
 a client’s medical condition or geographic isolation prevents them from 
attending a face-to-face assessment, and medical, cultural or linguistic factors 
preclude a telephone or video-conference assessment.’ 
A difference with telephone/video-conference assessments is that Centrelink (not 
the JCA assessor) decides whether a file assessment is required.  
In addition, JCAs are conducted by an Allied Health Professional, and their primary 
qualification should align with the Impairment Table being used in a claimant’s 
assessment.  When this does not occur a Contributing Assessor is used to review the 
evidence in order to quality assure the assessment.  The Contributing Assessor does 
not need to attend the interview, as they have electronic access to the primary 
assessor’s report.  If required the Contributing Assessor can advise the primary 
Assessor over the phone or in writing. 
‘Manifestly eligible’   
                                         
49 
http://www.aph.gov.au/~/media/estimates/live/fapa_ctte/estimates/bud_0607/human_services/hs2
5.ashx 
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There is a procedure, ‘manifestly eligible’, whereby DSP can be granted without a 
referral to the incapacity/medical assessments conducted as part of the Job Capacity 
Assessment (Social Security Act, Section 94).  ‘Manifest grants’ of DSP are limited to 
the following circumstances: 
 The prognosis for the claimant’s current medical condition is terminal, the 
average life expectancy of patients with the condition is two years or less and 
there is a significantly reduced work capacity during this period. 
 Permanent blindness (that is, no vision). 
 The claimant has an intellectual disability and an IQ of less than 70 using the 
WAIS IV or equivalent assessment. 
 Evidence indicating that a claimant is receipt of, or requires nursing home 
level of care for the foreseeable future due to illness or infirmity. 
 Claimant has category 4 HIV/AIDS. 
 Claimant is in receipt of a Department of Veterans’ Affairs disability pension 
at special rate due to being ‘totally and permanently incapacitated’. 
To aid decision makers determine whether DSP should be manifestly granted on the 
grounds of terminal illness, nursing home level care requirements, and/or 
intellectual disability there are lists of medical conditions where DSP should be 
granted (list 1) or further investigations conducted (list 2). 50  
 
5. Review and appeals  
The review of 2008-2011 DSP starters (mentioned above) will cover 28,000 
recipients aged under 35 years (NWRN, 2015a).  The reviews include the use of the 
revised Impairment Tables.  Between 1st July 2014 and 15th May 2015, about a 
quarter (7,249 cases) had been reviewed and 10.3 per cent (or 746) had their DSP 
payment cancelled because they were assessed as no longer eligible.  Of these 
former recipients, 308 launched an appeal between 1st July 2014 and 14th March 
2015.  
In addition, Centrelink undertakes reviews of cases (known as ‘service updates’, 
which were introduced in September 2003) (Australian Government, 2015: Sections 
6.2.5.05 and 6.2.5.15).  The objective is to ensure that recipients have an ongoing 
eligibility for DSP.  The selection of cases for review is risked-based (‘statistical 
profiling’) and considers the recipients’ circumstances (such as medical condition, 
                                         
50 Further details are provided in the Guide to Social Security Law (section 3.6.2.20): 
http://guides.dss.gov.au/guide-social-security-law/3/6/2/20 
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and their income and assets).  Whilst selection is focused on those whose 
circumstances are most likely to have changes, some categories of DSP recipient are 
exempt from review, for example, those that are permanently blind or if they are 
manifestly eligible for DSP. The service update reviews cover all details about a 
claim.  The medical aspect to the review is used to check that the recipients continue 
to fulfil the relevant impairment and CITW criteria for DSP.  The process includes the 
recipients having to get a medical report from their treating doctor.  
Eligibility for DSP can be rescinded without conducting another Job Capacity 
Assessment if it is ‘clear and evident’ that the claimant’s impairment would score 
less than 20 points using the Impairment Tables or if it is clear that they could work 
for more than 15 hours per week.  Where there are doubts about the individual’s 
work capacity then they should be referred for a Job Capacity Assessment. 
Centrelink customers dissatisfied with the service they received are encouraged to 
initially raise issues with a member of staff before using one of the ‘feedback 
options’ (online, telephone or post) to make any complaints. Customers unhappy 
about a decision on their entitlement to a benefit, including DSP, have a number of 
review rights.  The National Welfare Rights Network (2009b) reports that the 
proportion of claims rejected has been increasing.  In 2011/12 50 per cent of DSP 
claims were rejected, but this increased to 63 per cent in 2014/5.  The reasons why 
claims for DSP are rejected are given in Table AUS1.  The top two reasons, 
accounting for seven out ten rejections in total, is that the applicant’s medical 
condition has not been fully diagnosed, treated and stabilised or they were awarded 
less than 20 points on the impairment Tables. 
Table AUS 1:  Reasons for rejecting DSP applications 
Rejection Reason  Number  Percentage  
Medical condition not fully diagnosed, treated & 
stabilised  
30,001  35.8  
Less than 20 points on the Impairment Tables  28,504  34. 0 
Failed to supply information  12,275  14.6  
Did not meet the Program of Support 
requirements  
3,309  3.9  
Disability is short-term  1,391  1.7  
Other  8,439  11.3  
Total  83,829  100 0 
Source:  National Welfare Rights Network (2015b) 
If an individual is unhappy with a decision they may request a review.  The legislation 
covering internal reviews and appeals is contained in Part 4 of the Social Security 
(Administration) Act 1999, which also applies and modifies the Administrative 
Appeals Tribunal Act 1975.  They may request: 
- A full explanation of the decision. 
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- Request an internal review of the decision, which is conducted by an 
independent review officer.   
- If the person disputes the internal review decision, then they may appeal to 
the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT).  An appeal from Centrelink is 
heard by the Social Services & Child Support Division of the Administrative 
Appeals Tribunal.  The tribunal conducts two levels of appeal.  The initial 
review is known as an ‘AAT first review’, an application for a further review 
(an ‘AAT second review’) is also possible. 
- An appeal through the courts.  The Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 
allows an individual to appeal to the Federal Court from a decision of the 
AAT on AAT second review.  Decisions of this court can be appealed to the 
High Court. 
 
6. Overall assessment 
The Australian welfare system is very complex both as a whole and as it relates to 
the disability and incapacity sub-system and to Disability Support Pension in 
particular.  The complexity is in part due to the governance and institutional 
framework of the welfare system – notably the mix of federal and state/territory 
legislation and of public and private sector provision.  For DSP the complexity is also 
because of incremental reforms to the eligibility criteria, which have sought to 
reduce the numbers on, and hence the cost of, DSP.  Changes to the eligibility criteria 
have led to different cohorts of recipients with varying eligibility criteria.  This 
emphasises the importance of getting the eligibility criteria for a reformed system as 
correct as possible at the outset. 
There is an on-going review of the national welfare system.  The Government 
commission an independent review and its final report, A New System for Better 
Employment and Social Outcomes, was published on 25th February 2015 (Reference 
Group on Welfare Reform, 2015).  The Reference Group argues for a simpler and 
more integrated welfare system with a greater focus on employment.  For disabled 
people its proposals would appear to lead to some significant changes.  The 
Reference Group proposes the introduction of a three Tiered Working Age Payment, 
where claimants of the Upper Tier and the Middle Tier would include disabled 
people with some capacity to work – eight to 14 hours per week for the Upper Tier, 
and 15 to 29 hours per week for the Middle Tier.  There would also be a Supported 
Living Pension for those aged over 22 years with a permanent incapacity (not 
disability) to work for less than eight hours per week.  The incapacity has to be 
expected to last for at least five years.  Some commentators believe that the 
proposals will mean a loss of benefit income as many on DSP are unlikely to qualify 
for the Supported Living Pension (Morris et al., 2015). 
Mel Cousins & Associates  
 
76  
 
The deregulation of sickness certification and removing self-certification by 
employees has led to a rapid increase in the number of medical certificates issued.  
For instance, over a 10 year period the rate of issue of sickness certificates by GPs 
has increased from 0.6 per 100 encounters with patients in 1999/00 to 1.9 per 100 
encounters in 2008/9; an estimated increase of 1.5m sickness certificates over the 
period (Britt, et al., 2009:75).  Accompanying this have been concerns about 
certificates being written where the medical evidence would not always justify their 
use (Dunstan, 2009).  The factors influencing the issue of sickness certificates are 
complex, and non-clinical factors are known to influence their issue; for example, a 
general practice is busy or patients having low job satisfaction, domestic 
arrangements and so on.  As Dunstan (2009:62) notes: 
When multiple factors are influencing the patient’s request for a sickness 
certificate, GPs can feel torn between the desire to ‘advocate’ for their 
patient, and their legal responsibility to objectively ‘judge’ the patient’s level 
of work disability. … The priority for most GPs is to maintain a good 
relationship with their patient, so that even if the GP disagrees with a 
patient’s request for extended time off work, many will acquiesce in order to 
avoid confrontation or damage to rapport. 
Mazza et al. (2015) call for greater clarity about the GPs role in the return to work 
process. 
A major change to the DSP eligibility criteria was the reduction from 30 hours per 
week to 15 hours per week in the Continuing Inability to Work (CITW) test in 2006/7 
as part of the Government’s wider Welfare to Work reforms.  The official evaluation 
used a before and after design and whilst it acknowledged that its findings were not 
conclusive and other factors may have affected outcomes it found that (DEEWR, 
2008:57): 
people with disability who were directly affected by Welfare to Work during 
2006-07 were those with a capacity to work of 15 to 29 hours per week.  For 
these people, increases in workforce participation and decreases in income 
support reliance emerged.  Those assessed with a capacity to work of 15 to 
29 hours per week under Welfare to Work left income support at rates twice 
as high as in previous years, and mainly for employment.  Also, they had a 
higher likelihood of being in employment, while remaining on income 
support.  
The evidence presented provides evidence to indicate that Welfare to Work, 
with its changed payment eligibility conditions for DSP and the introduction 
of part-time participation requirements, was a key driver of the observed 
outcomes for this group. 
More specifically, there was a reduction of four per cent in the number of claimants 
to DSP in 2006/7 compared to 2005/6 (DEEWR, 2008:25-6).  Yet at the time the new 
criterion was seen as a significant tightening of the eligibility criteria. 
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Allowing partial DSP payments with up to 30 hours of paid work per week (subject to 
the means-tests) over a two year period may mean recipients cycle between hours 
worked/jobs towards the end on the period.  Someone working between 15 and 30 
hours and wishing to retain their benefit entitlement after the two years will wish to 
reduce their hours below 15 hours per week because this is the threshold in the 
CITW test.  Indeed, the interaction between the rules may mean that a recipient is 
reluctant to take up offers of employment of more than 15 hours per week. 
The Australian Government have undertaken some pilots to encourage DSP 
recipients to move into employment (see Productivity Commission, 2011).  These 
include the $6.8m Disability Support Pension Employment Incentive Pilot which 
commenced in March 2010 and lasted for two years.  The pilot was part of the 
National Mental Health and Disability Employment Strategy.  It covered 1,000 DSP 
recipients, and was a subsidy scheme with employers receiving up to $3,000 after 
the DSP recipient remained in employment for at least eight hours a week for 26-
weeks.  The subsidy was paid as a lump sum at the end of the period.  The normal 
income tapers applied to DSP participants.  A 2010 DEEWR Survey of Employers and 
qualitative data from an online discussion forum conducted in 2011 (DEEWR, 2011) 
revealed that employers were divided on whether it encouraged recruitment of 
disabled people. However, employers believed that the scheme was not sustainable 
in the long-term; there were concerns about the cost to firms after the 26 week 
period.  Employers claimed they may have to ‘let go’ of disabled employees because 
of higher costs due to lower productivity.  Employers also thought the rules around 
when a payment was made were too restrictive – they could feel ‘locked in’ to the 
arrangements.  When an employee left before the end of the 26-weeks they wanted 
a partial payment.  They were critical of the payment being a lump-sum (they would 
prefer a phased payment).  
DSP recipients are relatively dissatisfied with their benefit and everyday life.  The 
Hammer review of pensions (2009:39) found that in comparison with recipients of 
Age Pension and Carer Payment, DSP recipients were: 
 the least satisfied with the rate of payment; 
 the least satisfied with their standard of living; and 
 more likely to see their standard of living as worse than the community as a 
whole. 
Those undergoing a Job Capacity Assessment can be critical of the process, seeing it 
as the state assuming they are dishonest and that its introduction represented a 
return to a medicalised model of provision (Marston and Lantz, 2012). 
DSP recipients can have relatively long benefit durations.  DSP has been regarded by 
some as a route into early retirement (Productivity Commission, 2011) and as a 
mechanism for militating against what would otherwise be higher unemployment (in 
effect an unemployment programme) (Morris et al., 2015).  The Productivity 
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Commission’s Inquiry into disability (2011:K4) concluded that with respect to DSP ‘… 
policy measures have (so far) faced great difficulties in achieving permanent exits to 
more positive economic outcomes for people with disabilities.’ 
7. Data 
Overall, the number of DSP recipients has grown steadily since it was introduced 
from less than 200,000 in the 1970s to over 800,000 by 2015.  However, the rate of 
increase has in recent years slowed, especially since 2010.  Indeed, the total number 
of recipients fell from 830,454 in June 2014 to 814,391 in June 2015.  The increase in 
DSP numbers is due to an increase in the number of women claiming the benefit 
(Productivity Commission, 2011:K5; Department of Social Services, 2014:6).  The 
main reasons for the increase in the numbers are (Productivity Commission, 2011): 
• An increase in the size of the general population. 
• An ageing population, which increases the rate or prevalence of disability and 
hence claims for DSP. 
• Increases in the age-specific prevalence of DSP usage.  This helps to account for 
the increase in female recipients, which largely reflects changes made elsewhere 
in the welfare system, for instance, the increase in the qualifying age for the Age 
Pension has led some women to claim DSP when they would have been eligible 
for the Age Pension. 
• Structural changes in the economy which have seen a loss of low skilled manual 
work mean that it has become difficult for people with a disability and relatively 
low skills to find employment.   
The last of these reasons appears to be the most important factor behind the growth 
in numbers. 
The estimated cost of the DSP was $11.6 billion in 2009-10 (Productivity 
Commission, 2011:K1).  The cost in 2015 is about $15bn and represents 21 per cent 
of the welfare budget (Morris et al.., 2015:43).51 
Selected socio-economic characterises of the DSP recipients as at June 2015 are 
shown in Table AUS2.  A majority of the DSP population is male (53 per cent), single 
(74 per cent), and is not in paid work (92 per cent).  The probability of a disabled 
person being a DSP recipient increases with age (Productivity Commission, 2011:K12-
3).  Thus two-thirds (68 per cent) of recipients are aged 45 years or over.   
As indicated in Table AUS2 recipients tend to stay on DSP for relatively long periods 
of time.  Seven out of ten (71 per cent) claimants have been in receipt of DSP 
                                         
51 This is equivalent to just under €10bn at the 2016 exchange rate – adjusted for the different size of 
population between Ireland and Australia, it would be equivalent to spending of about €200m in 
Ireland 
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payments for five or more years.  The average DSP duration is 11 years (570 weeks) 
(Australian Government, 2015b). 
Table AUS 2:  DSP population characteristics, June 2015 
Characteristic Number  Percentage 
Sex:   
Male 432,744 53 
Female 381,647 47 
Marital status:   
Partnered 211,985 26 
Not partnered 602,406 74 
Age   
Under 16 0 0 
16-20 23,837 3 
21-24 29,913 4 
25-34 83,619 10 
35-44 124,581 15 
45-54 203,872 25 
55-64 307,396 38 
65 and over 41,173 5 
Payment duration:   
Under 1 year 38,985 5 
1 < 2 years 45,552 6 
2 < 5 years 156,788 19 
5 < 10 years 217,028 27 
10 years +  356,038 44 
Earnings from employment in last fortnight:   
No earnings 747,885 92 
Had earnings, of which 66,506 8 
 >$0 - <$100 10,022 1 
 >$100 - <$143 6,150 1 
 >$143 - <$250 12,820 2 
 $250+ 37,514 5 
Source:  Australian Government (2015b); percentages are author’s calculations 
In 2013 the ‘top 5’ main medical conditions for DSP recipients were: 
psychological/psychiatric; musculo-skeletal and connective tissue; 
intellectual/learning; nervous system; and circulatory system (see Table AUS3).  
Since 2004 the proportion of DSP recipients with a musculo-skeletal and connective 
tissue condition has fallen, and the proportion with a psychological/psychiatric 
condition has increased (Department of Social Services, 2014:6). 
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Table AUS 3: Recipients by top five primary medical conditions, June 2001 and June 
2013 
 Psychological/ 
psychiatric 
Musculo-
skeletal and 
connective 
tissue 
Intellectual/ 
learning 
Nervous 
System 
Circulatory 
System 
Year 
 No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
2001 140,965 22.6 202,732 32.5 63,168 10.1 19,270 3.1 33,742 5.4 
2013 256,380 31.2 214,745 26.1 101,631 12.4 42,045 5.1 33,179 4.0 
Source:  Department of Social Services (2014:22) 
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Finland 
 
1.  Overview of supports during sickness absence 
Finland has the characteristics of a Social-Democratic welfare regime, which include: 
a prominent role for the state, which provides access to benefits and services for all 
residents and aims for universal coverage, provides high replacement values of 
income, with dependence on the family minimised through extensive high quality 
services (these include day care, care for elderly, home help, etc.). The model is 
based on full employment and high female participation rates. Hantrais (2004) 
characterises Finland as a ‘defamilialised’ country which provides family policies that 
are explicit, coherent, legitimised, coordinated and supportive of working parents 
‘The state can be described as family and women friendly’ (Hantrais, 2004). 
Nevertheless, Finland was a late comer to the community of Scandinavian/Nordic 
welfare states. While an Industrial Accident scheme had been introduced in Finland 
to cover workmen’s compensation in 1895 it was not until the 1950s and 60s that 
social insurance was expanded with a series of Acts that created the basis of today’s 
national social security system (van Gerven, 2008). The first provisions for sickness 
and disability were introduced by the Sickness Insurance Act (Sairausvakuutuslaki 
364/1963) in 1963. By the beginning of the 1980s the Finnish welfare state had 
caught up with the other Scandinavian/Nordic countries (Denmark, Norway and 
Sweden) in its comprehensiveness (van Gerven, 2008). However, at this stage, the 
Finnish programmes provided relatively low levels of benefits. Adequacy of benefit 
payments was improved during the expansion of provision in the 1980s. This 
expansion was reflected in the increased costs of welfare as social spending as a 
share of GDP rose from 19.3 per cent in 1980 to 25.1 per cent in 1990 (van Gerven, 
2008). 
2. Description of main payment(s) 
The focus of this report is on the short term Sickness Allowance and the long term 
Disability Pension and the Rehabilitation Allowance.  The Sickness Allowance and the 
Disability Pension have two components:  an earnings-related benefit and a 
minimum benefit. The former is intended for employed and self-employed people 
who meet the contribution conditions while the latter is for people who have either 
a low income or no income at all (Toivonen, 2012). After being expanded in 1982 the 
earnings-related sickness benefit programme has remained relatively similar since 
then. However, the minimum sickness benefit has been revised and reformed. It was 
abolished and replaced with a new means-tested sickness benefit in 1995 which in 
turn was abolished in 2001 and replaced by a new minimum sickness benefit. The 
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long term Disability Pension has remained relatively unchanged since the beginning 
of the 1980s, but the temporary Disability Pension was replaced in 1995 by a 
Rehabilitation Subsidy and at the same time a programme of rehabilitation 
allowances was introduced for young people (van Gerven, 2008). 
Today Finland provides statutory sickness schemes to compensate for loss of 
earnings during short and long term sickness and disability under the Sickness 
Insurance Act (Sairausvakuutuslaki) of 21 December 2004. The institutional 
framework for sickness and disability benefits is provided by the Ministry of Social 
Affairs and the Social Insurance Institution (Kela), which administers universal 
benefits and pensions through district offices and managed by a Parliamentary 
appointed governing body (Kela: http://www.kela.fi). 
The financing of social protection expenditure is made up of contributions paid from 
central government and local authority taxes, insured persons’ and employers’ social 
insurance contributions, and income from property owned by the social security 
funds (Tanhua and Knape, 2015). 
A timeline for recent reforms to sickness and disability benefits is shown below.  
2004 
 Vocational rehabilitation became a statutory earnings-related pension 
benefit. 
2011  
 Minimum sickness allowances were linked to the national pension index 
(1144/2010; 1145/2010; 1142/2010). 
2014  
 The act for promoting re-entry into employment for those on disability 
pension was continued for 2014–2016 (979/2013; 1051/2014).  
 The maximum period of partial sickness allowance was lengthened to 120 
weekdays (from the earlier 72 weekdays) (972/2013) 
Grounds for granting occupational rehabilitation became less strict and the threat of 
disability was no longer a prerequisite (973/2013). 
This section looks at the short term Sickness Allowance, the long term Disability 
Pension and Rehabilitation Allowance. As mentioned above, Sickness and Disability 
benefits in Finland have two components: an earnings-related insurance based 
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benefit and a minimum income benefit. The former is intended for employed and 
self-employed people (Toivonen, 2012).  
To qualify for Sickness Allowance, a person must be aged between 16–67 years and 
reside in Finland and they must be unfit for their usual or closely related work on 
medical grounds. If a person has been employed for at least one month, their 
employer will continue to pay their full salary for the first nine days of their sickness 
absence. If, on the other hand, the employment relationship has lasted for less than 
one month, the employer will pay 50 per cent of their salary. Under collective 
agreements most employers pay full salary during the first one or two months of 
sickness absence (European Commission, 2013). Where an employer provides 
employees with paid sick leave the Sickness Allowance is paid directly to the 
employer. After the waiting period has elapsed, the Social Insurance Institution, Kela, 
takes over the payment. Sickness Allowance is income-related and the amount 
payable is calculated on the basis of annual earnings from a previous tax year 
(Toivonen, 2012; European Commission, 2013).  The amount of Sickness Allowance 
payable has no ceiling (Toivonen, 2012).   
Sickness Allowance is payable for the same illness for up to 300 days within a two 
year period. A person may be entitled to an additional 50 days of sickness allowance 
if, following receipt of Sickness Allowance for the full 300 days, they return to work 
for 30 days or longer. Of periods of Sickness Allowance that commenced in 2009, 5.7 
per cent lasted between 241-300 days (Toivonen, 2012). A Partial Sickness 
Allowance, paid at 50 per cent of the full Sickness Allowance, may be payable for up 
to 120 days over a two year period for an employed or self-employed person who 
has been on sick leave for an uninterrupted period of at least 60 days. Partial 
Sickness Allowance is intended to facilitate a phased return to full time work for 
people who are sick or incapacitated. This allows full-time employees to return to 
work on a part-time basis with their employer. In response, to the low take up of the 
Partial Sickness Allowance the conditions of entitlement were eased at the beginning 
of 2010 and that year take up doubled to approximately 4,700 people (Toivonen, 
2012).52 
After 300 days in receipt of Sickness Allowance, a person may become eligible for 
receipt of a long term Disability Pension (Työkyvyttömyyseläke). As with the short 
term Sickness Allowance, there is a dual system for the long term Disability Pension 
in Finland:   
 an insurance system – the statutory earnings-related pension (Työeläke) 
which is financed by contributions and covers all economically active persons 
                                         
52 Equivalent to about 4,200 in Ireland on a pro-rata population basis 
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aged between 18 and 68 years, including employees, self-employed persons 
and farmers;  
 a tax-financed universal system – the national disability pension 
(Kansaneläke) and the guarantee pension (Takuueläke) which provide a 
minimum pension to all residents aged 16 to 65.  
The contributory and residence based pension schemes are coordinated and when 
statutory earnings-related pension exceeds a given limit, there is no entitlement to a 
national residence based pension or guarantee pension.  
The residence conditions for the national pension or guarantee pension are that a 
person must have resided in Finland for at least three years of residence after 
reaching the age of 16. Residence periods completed in other European Union 
member states and Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway (EEA) and Switzerland may be 
taken into account to satisfy the three year residence requirement, although one 
year of residence in Finland is always required (European Commission, 2013). 
As long as the conditions of entitlement are met, the long term Disability Pension is 
payable indefinitely or until the claimant reaches old-age pension age (which is age 
63 years for the contributory earnings-related pensions scheme and 65 years for the 
national residence based minimum income pension scheme). More lenient eligibility 
criteria are applied to receipt of Disability Pension from the age of 60 years onwards 
(European Commission, 2013). Different eligibility criteria apply to young people. A 
person under the age of 20 years is not eligible for a Disability Pension until their 
rehabilitation prospects have been assessed.  
Within certain limits, a disability pensioner is permitted to work while receiving a 
pension. However, the full Disability Pension can be suspended for 3 to 24 months if 
the earnings are greater than 40 per cent of the pensionable salary. The Partial 
Disability Pension (Osatyökyvyttömyyseläke) can be suspended if earnings are more 
than 60 per cent of the pensionable salary. However, the pension is unaffected by 
earnings below a certain monthly threshold. In 2009, 7.5 per cent of Finnish people 
aged 16–64 years were receiving a Disability Pension (Toivonen, 2012). 
To prevent ‘disability’, the pension institutions provide rehabilitation services. Before 
making the Disability Pension (Työkyvyttömyyseläke) determination, the pension 
provider has to make sure that the applicant’s prospects of rehabilitation have been 
investigated (European Commission, 2013). Vocational rehabilitation became a 
statutory earnings-related pension benefit from the beginning of 2004.  When a 
person has been absent from work on account of illness and has received sickness 
allowance for 150 working days, Kela will send information to their home address 
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about the process of applying for a Disability Pension and the availability of 
rehabilitation.53  
A Rehabilitation Allowance may be payable for a defined period when it seems likely 
that the worker’s condition will be improved by participating in a rehabilitation 
programme. Rehabilitation Allowance is contingent on the beneficiary following a 
treatment and re-education programme. A claimant must draw up an individual 
treatment and rehabilitation plan, which can be provided as part of the statement 
from their doctor or as a separate document. A Rehabilitation Allowance is paid over 
the duration of the treatment period if the treatment is intended to allow patients to 
pursue or recommence their occupation or to enter the labour market. All eligibility 
criteria are the same as those that apply to a Disability Pension and, as a general 
rule, the amount of the Rehabilitation Allowance is determined in the same way as 
that of the Sickness Allowance.54  
In addition to statutory sickness insurance, most employed people in Finland are 
covered against the risk of sickness by a collective agreement. The coverage of 
collective agreements is around 90 percent of workers and they play an important 
role in supplementing the statutory schemes. The level of payment under schemes 
provided by collective agreements is usually higher than under the statutory scheme 
(Toivonen, 2012). However, this report focuses on the statutory scheme and does 
not include Finland’s collective agreement schemes. 
3. Nature of incapacity criteria or fitness to work criteria 
To qualify for Sickness Allowance, a person must be unfit for their usual or closely 
related work on medical grounds.  
To receive a disability pension under the earnings-related system, a person must 
have lost at least three-fifths of their working capacity (which is lowered to two-fifths 
for eligibility for a partial disability pension). Under the residence based national 
Disability Pension scheme the eligibility criteria is loss of at least three-fifths of 
working capacity. There is no partial pension under the residence based national 
Disability Pension scheme. From the age of 60, more lenient criteria are applied to 
disability pension. Persons under 20 years of age are not eligible for a Disability 
Pension until their prospects for ‘rehabilitation’ and entry into the labour market 
have been assessed.  
                                         
53 http://www.kela.fi/web/en/decreased-capacity-for-work_disability-pension 
 
54 http://www.kela.fi/web/en/decreased-capacity-for-work_rehabilitation-subsidy 
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Rehabilitation Allowance is paid when it seems likely that a person’s condition will 
improve with care or re-education. This benefit is contingent on the beneficiary 
following a treatment and re-education programme. 
4. Assessment of incapacity 
Applications for sickness and disability benefits are addressed to the local Social 
Insurance Institution office or the occupational insurance fund. Applications for 
rehabilitation and Rehabilitation Allowance are also addressed to the local Social 
Insurance Institution office.  
The employer pays the salary for the first 9 days after which the Social Insurance 
Institution (Kela) takes over the responsibility for covering the loss of salary. At this 
point a person who wishes to claim short term Sickness Allowance is required to 
provide a sickness certificate. If the employer pays the employee’s salary while on 
sick leave, the Social Insurance Institution (Kela) pays the benefit entitlement as 
compensation from the tenth day onwards.  
Incapacity for work is certified by a doctor – usually the claimant’s GP - from the 9th 
day of illness. In Finland, the role of a doctor in the sickness certification process is 
one of ‘medical expert’. In this respect the sickness certificate provides a 
recommendation and evidence for the basis of that recommendation. On receiving a 
sickness certificate, the Social Insurance Institution decides whether or not the 
claimant meets the criteria to qualify for sick leave and Sickness Allowance. Thus in 
Finland the doctor’s sick certification is a recommendation and is not binding on the 
Social Security Institution which may reject the sickness certificate and make an 
adjudication decision that the claimant is not entitled to sick leave or payment of 
Sickness Allowance. 
With respect to prescribing of sick leave in Finland, a more recent study by 
Kankaanpää (2014) found that there ‘was considerable variation in the sick leave 
prescribing practices of Finnish health care professionals. This suggests that patients 
may not receive equal social benefits (Kankaanpää , 2014: 39). The difference 
between the lowest and the highest number of sick leave days prescribed for the 19 
patient cases was almost four-fold in primary health care physicians and surgeons 
and eight-fold in occupational health care physicians. Some dentists did not 
prescribe sick leave to any of the 16 patient cases, and some prescribed nearly a 
hundred days altogether. The overall number of sick leave days occupational health 
care (OHC) physicians prescribed was smaller than in primary health care (PHC) 
physicians. More days of sick leave were prescribed by those working in smaller 
municipalities than larger population centres.’ (Kankaanpää , 2014: 3). 
Contextualising the study Kankaanpää (2014) describes the current system of 
prescribing sick leave in Finland: 
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In the Finnish health care system all doctors and dentists are equally entitled 
to prescribe sick leave and it is a part of every doctor’s daily clinical practice. 
However, estimating the need for adequate length of sick leave is not 
included in the curriculum of medical students, and the guidelines for doctors 
on appropriate prescribing of sick leave are not well-known among doctors. 
In Finland, most health care professionals are familiar with Current Care 
Guidelines (CCG) and use these guidelines in their daily practice. CCGs are 
independent, evidence-based clinical practice guidelines that cover important 
issues related to Finnish health, medical treatment and prevention of 
diseases. Yet there is no guideline specifically about sick leave, and there is 
no recommendation on the reasonable amount of sick leave on each disease. 
Mostly, prescribing of sick leave is solely dependent on the experience, 
impressions and customs of each individual doctor. (Kankaanpää, 2014: 9). 
Kankaanpää (2014) cites a Finnish 7-year follow-up study of the changes in the job 
characteristics of workers during the recession to predict their subsequent sick leave. 
The study found that ‘Lowered job control increased the risk of sick leave. Decreased 
social support and increased job demands had similar effects. The highest risk of sick 
leave was associated with the combined effects of low job control, negative changes 
in job control, job demands and low social support.’ (Kankaanpää , 2014: 16-17). 
As described above, a full-time employee who has been on sick leave for an 
uninterrupted period of at least 60 days can agree with their employer to return to 
work on a part-time basis and receive a Partial Sickness Allowance, intended to 
facilitate return to full time work, which is paid at 50 per cent of the full Sickness 
Allowance, for up to 120 days over a two year period. To obtain Partial Sickness 
Allowance, an assessment is required from an occupational health care physician 
stating that the recovery from the illness or condition will not be compromised by 
working part-time. A number of studies of the part-time benefit indicate that 
persons on part-time benefit had more periods of sick leave during the study period 
than persons on full time benefit; they were less likely to go onto full time disability 
benefit but more likely to go to part-time disability benefit; and they experienced 
less sickness absence than those on full-time benefit. Kausto (2013) concluded that 
there were ‘beneficial effects of partial sick leave on RTW and work participation’. 
There is a move in Finland towards increased activation for the beneficiaries. In 
2012, three changes were introduced to the sickness allowance in Finland. The first 
requires the employers to inform the occupational health service (OHS) provider 
whenever an employee has been ill for 30 or more calendar-days. The medical 
certificate for short-term SA was also modified with an addition of a specific section 
to include suggestions for work modifications or rehabilitation that could enhance 
RTW. Second, after 60 days on Sickness Allowance, recipients’ rehabilitation needs 
and outlook are assessed. The third amendment was that although any physician can 
assess work disability and issue-related certificates, the Social Insurance Institution 
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will start to require an assessment by an occupational physician, if work disability 
persists for more than 90 compensated days. Halonen et al. (2015) examined the 
impact of the assessment of work capacity and found that the reforms had a modest 
positive impact and led to a sustainable return to work at an earlier point after the 
changes for employees with 60 days absence (but not at 30 and 90s days). 
If rehabilitation is initiated, claimants are transferred under the Rehabilitation 
Allowance programme and the payment of the Sickness Allowance ends. This change 
is aimed at achieving faster re-entry to work. A Rehabilitation Allowance can be 
stopped if there is a change in working capacity or if rehabilitation treatment is 
refused without good reason. In the earnings-related scheme, the full disability 
pension and full re-education allowance can be converted into a partial disability 
pension and a partial re-education allowance if there is a change in working capacity 
and income.  
The next assessment of work incapacity (with a stricter definition of suitable work) 
takes place after the 300 days when claimant is transferred to the Disability Pension 
programme. Assessment under the Sickness Allowance programme is reasonably 
relaxed as claimants are required for the first 300 days only to be unable to do their 
habitual activities (work/study). However, a wider concept of suitable work comes 
into play when considering entitlement to a Disability Pension. The assessment takes 
into account not only the medical reports but amongst other criteria such as level of 
education, professional experience, age and likelihood of finding work in the area 
(European Commission, 2013). Assessment is normally by desk review although an 
additional medical examination can be requested if this is felt to be necessary (ISF, 
2013:7). 
Persons receiving the Disability Pension must inform the Social Insurance Institution 
of any changes in circumstances that may affect entitlement. Social Insurance 
Institution doctors may assess the degree of incapacity at any time.  Claimants apply 
for the Disability Pension using an application form, typically at their own or treating 
doctor's initiative. The form includes a medical certificate which includes history, 
status, findings, assessment of functional and working capacity, chances to recover 
working capacity through rehabilitation and final conclusion filled in by the treating 
doctor. Claims can be sent in by mail or submitted at the local Social Insurance 
Institute office.  Sometimes the pension provider gets further information from the 
claimant, his or her employer or from the attending doctor(s). The applicant may 
also be subject to further medical examination. A social insurance doctor will provide 
a further opinion on eligibility but the final decision is made by a non-medical social 
insurance official. 
The advantages of the system as identified by de Boer et al. (2004) are that: 
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 The occupational health services play an important role with regard to early 
reintegration.  
 Specialised rehabilitation centres are responsible not only for the 
assessment, but also for rehabilitation.  
 Local agencies/the Social Security Institute fulfil an important task with 
regard to coordination of the different schemes. 
 The process requires two medical assessments in many cases (one by SSI and 
one by the earnings related insurance company). This implies a form of 
control for the assessing doctors. 
Conversely the disadvantages are that  
 The information about the labour market and occupational issues is not very 
well integrated in the process. The knowledge with regard to the possibilities 
of claimants to do other work is very poor. 
 Local administrative staff and treating doctors lack information with regard to 
the standards and criteria of applications and the requirements of the 
assessment. 
 Many decisions require more then one assessment, which causes inefficiency. 
 There is no quality control in the process of decision making. The medical 
process is often controlled by the doctor providing the second opinion, but 
the final result is based on negotiation, not on objective criteria. 
 ‘Shopping’ for certificates by the claimants (i.e. visiting several doctors in 
order to obtain a certificate). 
 Efficiency and logistics could be better and, as there are many insurance 
bodies, the decisions take too much time so rehabilitation may be offered too 
late. 
 
5. Review and appeals 
The appeal procedure in social security matters varies according to the benefit in 
question and the authority which made the decision. Decisions by the Social Security 
Institution (Kela) may be appealed primarily by sending a letter of appeal to the 
office which made the decision. If Kela does not consider it possible to correct the 
decision in the manner requested, it forwards the appeal to the relevant Appeal 
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Board. It is further possible to appeal the decision of the Appeal Board to the 
Insurance Court, which is the highest and last level of appeal. 
In the event of disputes arising out of any matter relating to invalidity benefits, the 
applicant can lodge an appeal with the pension provider, who will consider a possible 
correction. If this is not possible at this level, the complaint is referred to the Social 
Insurance Appeal Board or the Earnings-related Pension Appeal Board. The decisions 
of the appeal boards can further be appealed to the Social Insurance Court.  
Anyone who believes that an authority, an official or other party performing a public 
task has violated fundamental or human rights, or in some other way acted 
unlawfully may file a complaint with the Parliamentary Ombudsman or the 
Chancellor of Justice. The Parliamentary Ombudsman and the Chancellor of Justice 
cannot investigate the matter, if it is subject of an appeal. 
 
6. Overall assessment 
In the 1990s Finland decided there was a need to ‘activate’ disabled people on 
benefits which led to the introduction of special rehabilitation programmes and 
Rehabilitation Allowance. From then on, the national Disability Pension was only 
available for claimants who are considered to be permanently disabled; while those 
who are assessed to have the potential to (re)join the labour market are directed to 
the Rehabilitation Allowance. As described above, young people aged 16–20 are 
automatically directed to rehabilitation rather than to a Disability Pension. A 
compulsory care and rehabilitation plan is required and even those people who are 
in receipt of a Disability Pension are encouraged to work, for instance by permitting 
their benefit to be suspended while they explore their potential to work. At the same 
time conditions of entitlement governing access to early retirement programmes 
have been tightened to promote the employment of older claimants (van Gerven, 
2008).  
Despite these policy aims, Kankaanpää (2014) found that  
The sickness absence rate in Finland appears to have increased in the 21st 
century. According to Statistics Finland, in 2008, 67% of women and 62% of 
men were absent from work because of sickness at least once during the 
preceding year. In 2011, the average number of sick leave days in Finland was 
9.4 per person per year. In 2012 in Finland, there was 336,647 new periods of 
sickness allowance. Every month sickness allowance was paid to an average 
of 56,430 people. (Kankaanpää, 2014: 10). 
Miettinen et al. (2013) consider that the Finnish system of rehabilitation policies is 
‘an example of a complex welfare system with several problems’ (Miettinen et. al, 
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2013: 1). The OECD has reported that the Finnish rehabilitation system is a complex 
one with several subsystems and lack of coordination. Miettinen et al. (2013) cite a 
recent report by Finland’s National Institute of Health and Welfare which described 
the rehabilitation system as ‘diffuse and fragmented’ (Miettinen et. al, 2013: 1). 
Miettinen et al. (2013) identify ‘lack of cooperation and clear allocation of 
responsibilities’ as frequently cited concerns in Finnish national reports and studies 
and note that ‘better cooperation between the subsystems has ... been one of the 
main goals in reforming the system in recent decades’. They suggest that the 
problems that have been identified ‘at the upper level of the system may lead to 
important problems at the level of service delivery, such as citizens falling through 
‘the rehabilitation net’ and ending up living without the rehabilitation services they 
need.’ (Miettinen et. al., 2013: 1). 
The Constitution of Finland prohibits any discrimination on the basis of a disability 
and Finland has signed The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
which entered into force in 2009.  Nevertheless, Teittinen (2012) argues that Finnish 
labour policy is ‘undeveloped’ for the employment of disabled people and suggests 
that the ‘ethos and practice of welfare is based on the idea that disabled people do 
not have to be at work and the welfare state disability pension attempts to 
compensate this matter.’ (Teittinen, 2012). 
Teittinen (2012) suggests that there needs to be better public support for the 
employment of disabled people in Finland and that sanctions should be considered if 
businesses fail to employ disabled people and notes that there is a need for further 
research on disabled people’s employment in Finland pointing out that ‘Only a few 
surveys or statistical analysis have been done, and these are not included in the 
strong Finnish tradition of the sociology of work’ (Teittinen, 2012). 
 
7. Data 
In 2014, expenditure on sickness allowance was €866.6 million while expenditure on 
disability benefits was €744 million and rehabilitation benefit was €120 million. 
As shown in the table FIN1 below the numbers on sickness allowance have declined 
in recent years from 345,000 in 2008 to 308,000 in 2014 although costs have 
continued to rise. As can be seen (table FIN 2), partial sickness allowance makes up a 
very small proportion of total allowances (13,000 out of over 300,000) and about 3% 
of total sickness allowance expenditure. The numbers on disability pension from Kela 
have also declined although the amount of pension has increased (table FIN3). 
Table FIN 1: Sickness Allowance 2008-14 
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Year 
 
 
Benefit 
 
 
Recipients 
Benefit  
paid out 
in EUR  
2014 Sickness allowances 308,239 866,623,436 
2013 Sickness allowances 311,677 856,482,443 
2012 Sickness allowances 325,310 862,849,281 
2011 Sickness allowances 323,468 850,787,934 
2010 Sickness allowances 320,305 826,118,925 
2009 Sickness allowances 329,036 808,460,083 
2008 Sickness allowances 345,179 781,004,563 
 
Table FIN 2: Sickness Allowance: Number of Recipients 
 
Time 
 
Benefit 
 
Recipients 
2014 Sickness Allowance 304573 
2014 Partial Sickness Allowance 13128 
 
Table FIN 3: Recipients of Disability Pension in Kela 
Time Recipients Average Benefit 
EUR/month 
2008 166 736 345,82 
2009 167 902 361,07 
2010 165 686 362,77 
2011 162 181 367,22 
2012 156 800 385,38 
2013 152 163 403,16 
2014 146 764 410,91 
Source: Kelasto-reports | Kela / Statistics / tilastot@kela.fi / NIT100A 
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As in other countries, musculoskeletal diseases and psychological disorders are 
amongst the main causes of sickness absence. The breakdown of sickness allowance 
days paid in 2014 was musculoskeletal diseases (4.8 million days), psychological 
disorders (3.6 million), injuries, poisonings (2.3 million) and others (3.0 million). 
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France  
 
1. Overview of supports during sickness absence 
The French system involves a range of different sickness and invalidity benefits for 
different categories of workers (public sector, private sector, agriculture, self-
employed). We focus here on the general scheme for private sector workers. In 
France there is a sickness benefit payable for up to a maximum of 3 years. In the case 
of long-term incapacity for work, there is an invalidity pension. Unlike most other 
countries there have been very limited reforms of the French system and, for 
example, the invalidity pension system has hardly changed since 1945 (Cour des 
Comptes, 2012). 
2. Description of main payment(s) 
In the case of short-term absence there is a sickness benefit (Régime général 
d'assurance maladie des travailleurs salariés, RGAMTS) paid by the relevant social 
security agency.55  Benefits are payable after a waiting period of three days. The 
benefit pays 50% of the average earnings up to 1.8 times the minimum wage (SMIC). 
Employers are required to pay some or all of the difference between the salary and 
the amount of the sickness benefit in accordance with national inter‐professional 
agreement on wages or collective agreement conditions (up to a maximum of 90% of 
net pay during the first 30 days). Sickness benefit is payable as a rule, for 12 months 
(360 days) per period of 3 consecutive years; up to 36 months in case of long-term 
sickness. 
Although the general (private sector) population is covered by this scheme the Cour 
des Comptes56 has estimated that 20-30% of employees are not covered by sickness 
insurance or are only covered by the basic scheme with no supplementary cover 
(Cour des Comptes, 2012, 7). It also estimated that somewhere between 55-80% of 
private sector employees were covered by diverse supplementary sickness 
insurance. These supplementary schemes varied greatly both in terms of their source 
(collective or individual) and their detail.  
                                         
55 Social Security Code (Code de la sécurité sociale), Articles L 323‐1, et seq. The administration of the 
sickness benefit scheme is the responsibility of the local caisse primaire d'assurance maladie (CPAM) 
of which there are over 100. There is also a Caisse nationale de l’assurance maladie (CNAM) which is 
responsible for the organisation of the national system.  
56 Court of Auditors which plays a similar role to the Comptroller and Auditor General. 
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In the case of long-term incapacity, there is an invalidity pension (pension 
d’invalidité).57  
3. Nature of incapacity criteria  
In the case of short-term incapacity, sickness absence is prescribed where the person 
is unable to continue (or resume) work due to a bodily incapacity (l’incapacité 
physique).58 
In the case of long-term incapacity, a worker who, as a result of a non‐occupational 
accident or sickness, cannot earn more than one third of the normal earnings of a 
worker in the same category with the same training and in the same region will 
qualify for a pension. There are three different levels of payment of IP: 
Group Description Rate of pension Average amount 
of pension (p.m.) 
% of 
claimants 
I Medically still able to 
work 
30% of average 
earnings 
€378 23 
II Medically unable to 
work 
50% of average 
earnings 
€621 74 
III Requiring care from 
another person 
As group II plus 
supplement 
€1,466  3 
 
4. Assessment of incapacity 
In the case of sickness benefit, a medical certificate must be provided by a GP or 
other doctor (or midwife). About 8-10% of GP consultations give rise to a sickness 
absence certification. GPs provide 75% of certificates with specialists providing the 
remainder. This must be provided to the CPAM within 2 days of certification. The 
certificate must specify the cause and likely duration of incapacity. Decisions are 
made by the CPAM on the basis of this certification. Unlike other countries, there 
                                         
57 Social Security Code (Code de la sécurité sociale).  
341‐1. A recent study by IGAS (Inspection general des affairs sociales) (Roquel  et al., 2012) states that 
in addition to the general invalidity pension regime, there are supplementary pension schemes for 
more than 200 occupational groups, a dozen schemes for public sector workers, about 20 schemes for 
non-salaried workers, and numerous individual insurance schemes. 
58 Article L-321-1 of the Social Security Code. 
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have been limited studies of the certification process and we have not located any 
studies of the actual decision-making.  
Duflot (2012) carried out focus groups with certifying doctors to identify key factors 
in their decision making.  She found that the issues taken into account included 
factors such as pathology, intensity of symptoms, pain, risk of contagion, type of 
illness, occupation and type of work, travel time, health and safety risks, family 
situation, social context, patient’s personality, viewpoint and request for 
certification, and medical benefits to the person from work absence. Difficulties 
identified included prescribing for reasons other than medical, lack of expertise re 
occupational requirements, and identifying the length of absence. 
One of the more interesting studies of certification is the sociological approach 
adopted by Monneuse (2015). He emphasised the extent to which, in practice, 
certification involves a negotiation between the doctor and the claimant (a factor 
also found in Duflot’s study). Monneuse found that 90% of patients who approached 
a GP for a certificate were given one. He found that most GPs made some 
concessions to their patients (due to fear of losing a patient or damaging their 
relationship of trust) even if this led to unjustified or overestimated periods of sick 
leave. Interestingly, however, he also found that up to 15% of certificates issued at 
the initiative of the doctor were refused by the patient.  
The CNAM issued guidelines in 2009 setting out indicative durations for sickness 
absence according to the pathology.59  Before being issued these are reviewed by 
the Haute autorité de santé (National Health Authority). For example, in the case of 
minor anxiety-depression, the recommended period is 14 days. There does not 
appear to have been any evaluation to date of the impact of these guidelines.  
A study found that five medical problems caused 86% of certification: musculosketal 
27%, respiratory 25%, psychological 15%, general 12% and digestion 7%. For short-
term absence fatigue, fever, and respiratory infections were more common while for 
longer-term illness (more than 15 days) psychological issues, lumbago and fractures 
were more prominent (Duflot, 2012).  A more recent study found that the health 
problems most frequently reported in sick leave certificates concerned respiratory 
(27%), psychological (14%), or digestive (12%) systems; general problems (11%); 
pregnancy (3.5%); the neurological system (2.9%) (Leguevaquesa et al., 2014). This 
study found that while sick leave certificates almost always provided justifications for 
sick leave in nosological terms (i.e. by type of medical condition), less than one third 
of certificates provided information in functional or contextual terms. It 
recommended training practitioners to make functional and contextual assessments 
                                         
59 http://www.ameli.fr/professionnels-de-sante/medecins/exercer-au-quotidien/aide-a-la-pratique-
memos/les-memos-de-bonne-pratique/arrets-de-travail-des-referentiels-de-duree.php 
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which would allow them better to assess the nature and the duration of sick leave, 
and facilitate communication around the patient. 
It is clear that there are significant regional variations in awards of sickness benefit 
(Ben Halima, et al., 2011; Cour de Comptes, 2012). For example the Cour des 
Comptes found a variation from 2.7 days in Paris (average number of sick days per 
employee) to 12-13 days in a number of departments (i.e. the French administrative 
district) (2012, 34). These variations  are explained, in part, by factors such as the 
extent of controls, the medical supply (density of GPs) and age when work started (a 
proxy indicator for human capital) (Ben Halima, et al., 2011).60  
In addition, there are also significant variations by sector of employment and by 
occupational type (for example, mangers are much less likely to be sick absent than 
manual labourers) (Commission de affaires sociales, 2013, 13-14). Amongst the 
factors which increase the rate of sickness absence are age (especially for men), level 
of sick leave in the last year, full time work and size of enterprise61 (Ben Halima and 
Debrand, 2011). The factors which reduced absence were age of commencing work 
(a proxy for human capital) and level of salary. Absence also varied by sector of 
employment. 
Ben Halima et al. (2015) found that women had sickness absence durations longer 
than men, age had a negative effect of the chances of exiting sick leave, part-time 
workers were more likely to exit sickness absence than full-time workers, employees 
of larger enterprises (10-49 employees) were more likely to have sickness absence 
than small enterprises, and that sickness absences were shorter where departmental 
unemployment was higher. 
In general, women are more likely to be absent than men. Marbot and Pollak (2015) 
studied the differences between men and women in sickness absence. They found 
that pregnancy explained about 30% of the difference. However, they also found 
that low paid women were much more likely to take sick leave than better paid 
women or low paid men. 
In the case of the invalidity pension, decisions are made by social insurance doctors 
employed in the local medical service (ELSM). A recent study by Roquel et al. (2012) 
has highlighted the lack of any oversight of how decision-making is carried out and 
the lack of any guideline for decision makers.  The only procedures found by the 
                                         
60 Departments which have low GP density increases the possibility of sick leave (though one might 
speculate as to whether this relationship is causal or whether the low density of GPs is simply a proxy 
for other socio-economic factors).  
61 It is speculated that individual control is lower in large enterprises and (perhaps more likely) large 
enterprises are more likely to have reinsurance. 
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report which would contribute to a standardisation of decision-making were the 
employment of medical professionals, initial training and collective case studies 
(2012, p. 40). The study found that there strong regional variations in the level of IP 
awards in different departments. Refusals of claims varied from 13% in one 
department up to 30% in another (with an even wider level of variation between 
offices from 9-54%). There is also a wide variation in terms of the number of 
pensions granted per 100,000 population from 167 in one department up to 341 in 
another (Roquel et al., 2012, 42).62 The study concluded that this variation could not 
be fully explained by variations in health status or the employment situation. 
On average persons moving onto IP have been absent from work for 2 years and are 
aged about 50 years old (Cour des Comptes, 2010).63 The main causes of invalidity 
are mental disorders (27%) and ostéo-articulaire (musculoskeletal) (25%). 
In general, there appear to be very weak links to return to work for those on 
invalidity pension (Roquel et al., 2012). 
 
5. Review and appeals 
In the case of sickness absence, there is a complicated system of measures to control 
the claim although one might wonder how effective these are in practice. The rules 
have been tightened up somewhat in 2010, and in 2013 2.5 million administrative 
and medical controls were carried out. However, recent reports by the Cour des 
Comptes (2012) and by a Parliamentary committee concluded that the controls had 
limited impact (Commission de affaires sociales, 2013).64  
In principle, the claimant is supposed to remain at his or her home except during 
periods specified on the certificate by the doctor.  The CPAM may make home visits 
and/or may call the claimant for examination by its medical service. The home visits 
are unannounced and the inspector is normally not a doctor. If the CPAM decides 
that the absence is not justified it can terminate the benefits. The Cour des Comptes 
found that the control by the CPAM of the person’s presence at home varied greatly. 
                                         
62 Indeed there are also important variations in the level of claim for IP between different 
departments (2012, 43). 
63 Again there are significant variation sin the prior duration of sick leave arising from variations in the 
system of control (Cour des Comptes, 2012). 
64 A recent Bill proposed by Opposition MPs which aimed to tighten up controls was rejected by 
Parliament. 
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Claimants who receive supplementary employer benefits are required to make 
themselves available for a control visit (usually by a doctor) organised by the 
employer. These visits are at the home of the claimant and may be unannounced. If 
the doctor is unable to find the claimant or decides that the sickness absence is 
unjustified, the employer may terminate any supplementary payments and should 
notify the CPAM which may decide to suspend the public benefit. However, in the 
majority of cases to date, the CPAM does not accept these notifications as justifying 
a termination of benefits (either because they are sent late or because the doctor 
was unable to see the claimant).  
Since 2007, a systematic control of long-term claims has been put in place at 45 days 
(formerly 60 days from 2005 and 90 days before that) whereby the medical assessors 
of the CPAM call persons for review. These make up 90% of all controls carried out 
by the CPAMs. Unfortunately, there does not appear to have been an evaluation of 
the impact of this change. However, some impression of its effectiveness may be 
gained from the fact that in 2011 the aim for the medical services was to assess 95% 
of these claims within a period of 120 days (Cour des Comptes, 2012).  And the 
intention was to review 70% of these claims on the papers only, with 30% being 
called for re-assessment. 
The Cour des Comptes (2012, 87) found that, despite some improvements since 
2004, the oversight of medical awards of sickness benefit  It found that one quarter 
of all sickness absences had been controlled by the medical services in 2008. These 
mainly focussed on long-term absence (45 days or more) and shorter-term absences 
received very little attention. However, as noted elsewhere, even the longer-term 
controls appear to be of rather limited effect. The Cour found that, for short-term 
absences, the percentage of negative reviews varied from 5% to 40% from one office 
to another (ELSM). One quarter of ELSMs had a level of negative decisions below 
10% while one quarter rejected over 20%.  Similar variations could be seen for 
longer-term reviews (2012, 90).  
In the case of invalidity pension, the pension may be revised if the circumstances 
change. However, the Cour des Comptes (2010) found that revisions were very 
infrequent. In 2008, only 3% of total claims were revised and two-thirds of these 
were at the initiative of the claimant. The revisions led to an increase in pension in 
50% of cases and a reduction or termination in only 4% (46% unchanged). 
There is a rather complicated system of appeal depending on the issue involved. 
Some issues which involve the employer are considered part of employment law and 
would be subject to appeal to the employment tribunal (conseil des prudhommes). 
Others are subject to appeal to the general tribunaux des affaires de sécurité sociale 
(social security appeals tribunal). Finally, on disability assessment issues, a first 
appeal can be made to the regional CPAM office. This includes a further medical 
evaluation. Subsequently .there is a right of appeal to the tribunal du contentieux de 
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l'incapacité (Disability Appeals Tribunal) with possible further appeal to the general 
courts. However, the Roquel et al. (2012) report noted that the appeal system had 
not led to any common principles in relation to the definition of invalidity or to any 
detailed case law as to how the concept should be interpreted. 
There have been a small number of recent cases in which the procedures concerning 
disability appeals have been considered by the ECtHR. In the case of Augusto v. 
France,65 the Court of Human Rights followed its general approach and held that all 
medical reports which were relied on by the courts must be provided to the 
appellant. 
 
6. Overall assessment 
Although there have been a number of recent studies of both the sickness benefit 
(Cour des Comptes, 2012; Commission de affaires sociales, 2013; 2014) and invalidity 
pension system (Cour des Comptes, 2010; Roquel et al., 2012 ), there has been very 
limited reform of either. In the case of the sickness benefit scheme, the Cour (2010) 
found that there was a lack of proper analysis of the system which would allow for 
better regulation; that policies vis-a-vis different actors (employees, employers and 
medical) need to be strengthened; and that there was a need to modernise the 
service to improve the quality of service, improve productivity of the CPAMs and 
reduce costs. A subsequent more detailed study by the Cour des Comptes (2012) 
found that the system of sickness insurance was very complicated, identified a range 
of issues with the management of sickness benefit (including its assessment of the 
limited control discussed above), and again set out a range of proposals for reform. 
There was a significant rise in sickness claims between 1997 and 2002 (34%). These 
fell back after 2003 and this was largely attributed to intensified control (Kusnik-
Joinville et al., 2006; Lé and Raynaud, 2007; Behaghel et al., 2011).66 However, 
although an enhanced review of long-term claims was put in place after 2005 (see 
above), there has again been a rise in claims in recent years. The number of sick days 
rose by 5% from 2008 to 2012 (from 195.3 million in 2008 to 204.7million in 2012). 
This has been due largely to increased duration for longer-terms claims (Commission 
de affaires sociales, 2014). The rise has been attributed to a number of factors 
including the ageing of the population and dis-improvements in conditions of work 
(Commission de affaires sociales, 2013, 15-16). However, it does call into question 
                                         
65 71665/01, 11 January 2007. 
66 The number of controls on short-term claims rose from 34,000 in 2003 to 250,000 in 2005. 
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whether the dip after 2002 was due to increased controls or (if it was) why these 
controls have failed to have an impact on the recent rise.67 
Studies have looked at the effect of the level of sickness benefits on sickness 
absence. Ben Halima et al. (2015) found that the level of supplementary benefit had 
a very significant and negative effect on leaving sickness absence.68  However, 
Grignon and Renaud (2007) found that the individual propensity to take sick leave 
was mainly influenced by strain in the workplace and by labour force composition. 
Perhaps surprisingly, Pollak (2015) found that employees who were entitled to 
supplementary sickness benefit during the three day waiting period were not more 
likely to have an absence during the year but did have significantly shorter 
absences.69 
The Court des Comptes (2012) found that the administrative and medical controls in 
relation to sickness insurance varied greatly depending on local practices, were 
insufficient and were of limited effectiveness (2012, 9). 
In the case of invalidity pension, access to such pensions has played a less important 
role in early retirement in France than in other countries such as Netherlands and 
Sweden. However, this is not because of any particular factor related to the invalidity 
pension but because access to early retirement has been very easy in France due to 
the low age of retirement, ready access to early retirement schemes (at least in the 
past) and unemployment benefits (Behaghel et al., 2011). The detailed study of the 
evaluation of invalidity in France was rather critical of the lack of any standardised 
approach in this area and set out a range of recommendations to improve the 
situation. However, although the relevant Ministry has begun to study a response to 
these recommendations, there do not appear to have been any reforms to date.70 
 
7. Data 
Due to the complexity of the system it is very difficult to get an overall estimate of 
the cost of sickness and invalidity claims in France. A recent Parliamentary 
                                         
67 Lé and Raynaud, 2007 suggested that such controls were likely to experience diminishing returns. 
68 However, Ménard and Pollak, 2014 did not find any impact of the extension of supplementary 
benefits to employees employed for one year (compared to three years before) has any effect on the 
number of volume of sickness claims. 
69 No convincing reason was advanced for this pattern. 
70 Parliamentary Question, 11 February 2014 http://www2.assemblee-
nationale.fr/questions/detail/14/QE/14441 
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committee concluded that it was impossible to establish the total cost of 
supplementary pension schemes. 
It has been estimated that the sickness benefit scheme for the private sector cost 
€6.3 billion in 2011.71 The Cour des Comptes (2010) estimated that in 2010 the 
invalidity pension system cost about €7.5 billion.72  In any year, about 20% of insured 
employees take sick leave. 
The Cour des Comptes (2012) examined the rise in sickness benefit expenditure for 
private sector employees and in the sick days over the period from 2000 to 2011. It 
found that sickness expenditure has grown significantly over the period compared to 
changes in salary and compared to changes in the number of private sector 
employees. 
It is interesting to note that, despite the lack of major reforms, there has been a 
significant variation in the level of sickness and invalidity claims in recent years. This 
emphasises the extent to which such claims are affected by factors such as changes 
in the composition of the labour force, the age of workers,73 the economic cycle74 
and the relationship between disability payments and other welfare schemes. For 
example, in France it is estimated that there are significant numbers of persons 
(aged 55-59) who could qualify as incapable of work but who are in receipt of 
unemployment benefits which provide a higher replacement rate (Cour des 
Comptes, 2010). 
 
                                         
71 This would rise to €9.3 billion including occupational injuries and sickness benefit for the self-
employed. There appears to be no reliable estimate of the cost of supplementary schemes. 
72 Pro rata to the Irish population, this would be the equivalent of about €520m.  
73 Studies found that the number of claims for sickness benefit fell with age but that the duration of 
claims increased (Kusnik-Joinville et al., 2006).  
74 For example, Lé and Raynaud, 2007 found that short-term sickness benefit claims increased when 
unemployment fell.  
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Netherlands  
 
1. Overview of supports during sickness absence 
The Dutch sickness and disability system has undergone extensive reform in the last 
two decades. Responsibility for payment during sick leave was transferred to 
employers initially for 1 year, later extended to 2 years.75 In 2002 a Gatekeeper 
Protocol was introduced (see below) which sets out detailed structure as to the 
rights and obligations of employers and employees in cases of sickness absence. The 
previous disability pension scheme (Wet op de arbeidsongeschiktheidsverzekering, 
WAO) was replaced in 2006 by a new scheme (Wet Werk en Inkomen naar 
Arbeidsvermogen, WIA).76 At the same time the existing stock of disability 
pensioners were reassessed using new criteria. Experience-rating of disability 
pension contributions for employers was also introduced in 1998.77 There have been 
several evaluations of the impact of these reforms which are discussed below. 
 
2. Description of main payment(s) 
The employer is responsible for continued payment of 70% of wages for 104 weeks 
(subject to a maximum wage). This percentage can be increased by collective wage 
agreements. 
The WIA covers all risks of inability to work for employees who are unable to work. 
The occupational disability level is set at 35%. The reforms split the previous all-
encompassing disability benefits scheme into two separate programs. The Income 
Provision Scheme for People Fully Occupationally Disabled (Regeling 
inkomensvoorziening volledig en duurzaam arbeidsongeschikten, IVA) provides for 
income in case of full and permanent occupational disability, with no prospect or 
only a small chance of recovery. It provides benefits to those judged to have an 
                                         
75 Many small and medium employees reinsure against these costs but studies have not found any 
impact on the rate of sickness absence from an employer’s choice of whether to insure or not (de 
Jong and Lindeboom, 2004). The Sickness Benefit Act (Ziektewet, ZW) continues to exist as a "safety 
net" for employees who do not or no longer have an employer, and in a few special circumstances. 
This is not discussed in this report but see Pennings (2013, 89-93). 
76 Work and Income according to Labour Capacity Act. 
77 Koning (2009) found that the introduction of experience-rating led to a significant fall in claims for 
disability pension. Van Sonsbeek and Gradus, 2013 found a similar impact and see the discussion in 
Koning and Lindeboom (2015). 
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unrecoverable loss of earnings capacity of at least 80 %. These individuals are eligible 
for full and permanent disability benefits replacing 75 % of gross earnings (subject to 
an upper limit).  
The second provides benefits to those judged to have a loss of earnings capacity 
between 35 and 80 %, and those that are fully disabled when examined but with the 
prospect to recover part or all of their capacity. These individuals are eligible for 
partial benefits or temporary full benefits. Partial and temporary full beneficiaries 
can receive up to 70 % of gross earnings, but the percentage varies depending on 
actual work status and significant incentives have been built in to the program to 
encourage beneficiaries to work to their estimated earnings capacity. For the partly 
disabled, the emphasis is not on income protection but on the possibilities of 
rehabilitation; the Return to Work Scheme for the Partially Disabled (Regeling 
Werkhervatting Gedeeltelijk Arbeidsgehandicapten, WGA) encourages both the 
employee and the employer to endeavour to rehabilitate the employee. 
 
3. Nature of incapacity criteria  
An employee is entitled to sick pay, s ‘if s/he has not done the agreed work on the 
grounds that s/he was unable to do so because of illness’.78 Thus ‘illness’ (including 
infirmity) must be the cause of the inability to work and illness or infirmity must lead 
to an ‘inability to work’. In the case of sickness absence (up to 2 years), the employer 
is obliged to reintegrate sick employees: first in his/her own previous work; secondly, 
if this is not possible, in other suitable work within the company; thirdly, if this is not 
possible, in work with another employer. 
For the disability pensions, a person is considered completely or partially incapable 
of working when, as a result of sickness or infirmity, he/she cannot earn the same as 
healthy workers with similar training and equivalent skills normally earn at the 
location where he/she works or most previously worked, or in the vicinity. No 
distinction is made as to the cause of incapacity (invalidity or employment injury).79  
 
 
 
                                         
78 See Pennings (2013, 82). 
79 See Pennings (2013, 96-102) for a legal discussion on the approach to defining incapacity to work. 
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4. Assessment of incapacity 
Sickness absence 
Sickness certification in the Netherlands is organized quite differently than in other 
countries and separates treatment from control (Meershoek, 2012; de Jong, 2015). 
In the Netherlands, only doctors that work for an arbodienst are licensed to assess 
employees’ sick leave claims. Arbodiensten are private organizations that are 
responsible for advising employers in matters relating to the health and safety of 
their employees. The main task of the doctors is to inform employers about the 
legitimacy of their employees’ sick leave and to provide socio-medical coaching to 
employees who have reported ill. They are not involved in treating employees’ 
health complaints. Depending on the agreements made between the employer and 
the arbodienst, doctors have an initial consultation with sick employees between 
two days and four weeks after they report ill. Subsequent visits are dependent on 
the specific nature of the complaints and, again, on the agreements made between 
the employer and the arbodienst. Most arbodiensten are specialized and work for 
certain sectors, such as industry, health care and transport.  
Meershoek (2012) found that doctors tended to deal with claimants so as to 
encourage them to ‘internalise the implicit norms of active and responsible 
behaviour’ rather than immediately imposing sanctions. In some cases, doctors 
preferred to grant claims which they did not feel were warranted so as to build up a 
relationship of trust so as to influence the claimant’s long-term behaviour. 
Meershoek et al. (2007), from a sociological perspective, found that, in practice, 
assessing incapacity involved much more than formal rational decision-making. They 
argued that assessment were less a technical matter and more a normative one, i.e. 
that decisions were ‘driven by often implicit, routinely and contextually determined 
views of what is appropriate in a given situation’. Thus the existence of guidelines 
and protocols, rather than generating transparency, made ‘the complex 
deliberations on which such judgements are based invisible’. 
Return to work 
As noted above, employers are responsible for payment of sick pay for the first two 
years and during that period they are generally not allowed to dismiss a sick 
employee. Employers are subject to various financial and administrative incentives 
to recue long-term sickness absence and disability and have a strong interest in 
ensuring return to work (Everhardt et al., 2011).  
In the first two years, employers may only dismiss employees who refuse to 
cooperate in a reasonable work-resumption plan. Employers have a set of prescribed 
rehabilitation and accommodation activities that they (via a contracted private 
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occupational health agency) must provide to try either to retain disabled employees 
or to find alternative employment for them in this period.  
The reforms included the establishment of a ‘Gatekeeper Protocol’ which sets out a 
guideline and time-table for employers in case of sickness. The protocol indicate the 
following steps in the process:  
 A sick employee has to contact his employer immediately (same day).  
 In case of threatened disability, a problem analysis has to be made by a 
professional doctor from the health occupational service (within 6 weeks). 
This professional advises the employer and employee on sickness issues.  
 The employer and employee have to make a plan on work rehabilitation and 
agree on this (within 8 weeks). They have to execute this plan and evaluate it 
regularly.  
 In case of problems or disagreement, both the employer and the employee 
can ask for an expert-opinion from the Social Insurance Agency (UWV).  
 Towards the end of the second year, the employer and employee have to 
make a reintegration file, in which they report on all rehabilitation activities 
undertaken. This file is checked by the UWV. When the file is approved, the 
employee is assessed for a disability benefit.  
The system is mandatory and if an employer doesn’t meet its obligations it must pay 
additional sickness benefit. A non-cooperating employee risks losing sick pay during 
the sickness period and can even be fired in severe cases.  
Employers and employees are assisted by professionals (health occupational 
services, insurance companies) or Gatekeeper Centres (set up by employers). The 
implementation of the Gatekeeper Law was facilitated by a special Gatekeeper Task 
Force. All parties concerned are represented: the Ministry, social partners, the 
insurance companies, and the occupational health services. Its task is to implement 
the Gatekeeper Law and to solve problems that arise in practice.   
As noted above, after a maximum of 6 weeks of sickness an occupational physician 
has to make a Problem Analysis, i.e. an assessment of medical cause, functional 
limitations and prognosis regarding work resumption. On the basis of this 
assessment the employer and sick employee together draft a return-to-work (RTW) 
plan in which they specify an aim (resumption of current/other job under 
current/accommodated conditions) and the steps needed to reach that aim. They 
appoint a case-manager, and fix dates at which the plan should be evaluated, and 
modified if necessary. The RTW-plan should be ready in the eighth week of sickness. 
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It is binding for both parties, and one party may summon the other when considered 
negligent. 
Disability pension claims are only admissible if they are accompanied by a report 
containing an assessment as to why the plan has not resulted in work resumption. 
The claim is not processed by the UWV if the report is delayed or incomplete or if it 
is clear that the rehabilitation efforts were insufficient. Depending on the 
seriousness of the negligence, the UWV can return the reintegration report and give 
the employer the opportunity to complete it, or the UWV can start a sanction 
procedure against the employer. In 2007, nearly 11 % of disability insurance claims 
were returned to employers and the employer continued to be responsible for 
employing the worker until the employee had returned to work, or sufficient RTW 
activities were tried the benefit claim was considered admissible. 
Assessments of the return to work approach (the Gatekeeper Protocol) indicate that 
it has been successful in increasing return to work. At the introduction of the 
Gatekeeper approach, stricter screening was piloted in certain areas, and evaluation 
showed that it reduced sickness benefit and disability applications (de Jong et al., 
2006). One study found that the frequency of contact with the occupational doctor 
increased return to work (Dutch language studies quoted in van Sonsbeek and 
Gradus, 2013 and Everhardt et al., 2011). A second found that the full and timely 
implementation of the Protocol doubled the probability of having returned to work 9 
months later. A third found that the Protocol had contributed to about half of the 
43% reduction to inflows to disability pension between 2001-4. Everhardt et al., 2011 
also found that employer-based vocational interventions (e.g. graduated work 
resumption) under the Gatekeeper Protocol had a strong impact on RTW. There have 
been a number of studies of issues concerning RTW for particular groups such as 
persons with mental disorders (Flach et al., 2012; Noordik, 2013; Witte, 2013; 
Dekkers-Sánchez, 2013).  
Disability pensions 
After two years, the employee can apply for a disability pension from the Social 
Security Office (see Spanjer, 2010). The pension is based on the loss of wage-earning 
capacity by the employee. This is the difference between what the employee’s 
income was before the sick leave, and what he or she is theoretically still able to 
earn in suitable work. Assessment if normally by way of face-to-face interview. The 
first step in this work disability assessment is an assessment of the patient’s work 
limitations by an insurance doctor. These work limitations are recorded in a 
standardised list – the Functional Ability List (FAL). In this list the insurance doctor 
registers what work limitations the patient has and their extent. In the next step, a 
labour expert examines which jobs the employee is still able to perform despite the 
work limitations as assessed by the insurance doctor. The labour expert is supported 
by a computer which matches the work limitations as listed in the FAL with a 
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database of 7,000 occupations that describes the job demands in detail. The 
occupations selected by the computer are assessed by the labour expert as to their 
suitability for the individual employee. 
The FAL is an important instrument in communicating between insurance doctors 
and labour experts. The FAL consists of a list of 70 different mental, physical and 
social items entailed in functioning on the job that are, in turn, grouped into 6 
functional domains (Box 1). Each item can be rated as a nominal or ordinal variable 
on a two-to-ten scale.  
 
One example is ‘walking’ which comes under the domain of ‘dynamic movement’, in 
which the insurance doctor has to choose among four gradations (Box 2). 
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Insurance doctors in the Netherlands base their assessments on the following data: 
 a report from the employer in which the course of the first two years of work 
disability is summarized. 
 medical information from the occupational physician who attended to the 
first two years of work disability. 
 often, but not always, information from treating physicians (such as the 
primary care doctor or specialists). This is only available if the occupational 
physician has requested this information (in about half of the cases). The 
insurance doctor can always request medical information from the treating 
doctors if the patient agrees to this. 
 every patient is seen by the insurance doctor for an interview, observation 
and, in case of somatic complaints, a physical examination. 
It appears from studies that the decision of the insurance doctor concerning work 
limitations is based, for the most part, on the patient interview (Spanjer, 2010). 
As part of the assessment interviews, doctors use standard medical history-taking, 
including inquiring about symptoms, therapeutic interventions and medication. In 
addition, they specifically focus their attention on activity limitations and 
participation restrictions. For instance, the patient is asked how a normal day is 
spent. Three defined interview protocols are described in the Netherlands (see 
Annex), but the insurance doctors often use various parts of the three different 
models in daily practice. The three protocols are: 
 Methodical Assessment Interview: The interview is semi-structured and has 
10 topics including work possibilities, motivation, personal ideas about the 
pathology, vitality, personal changes, life events, thoughts about the future, 
medical history, work history and a description of a normal day. 
 Multi-causal Analysis: This is an interview with a limited structure that 
includes five broad fields which can be interchanged. These fields include 
medical history and complaints, functioning, personal characteristics, work 
factors and personal factors.  
 Disability Assessment Structured Interview (DASI): This is a semi-structured 
interview protocol with fixed topics which are largely based on the 
International Classification of Functioning Disability and Health (ICF). The 
main topics are: introduction, work, impairments, the limitations to activity 
that are experienced, participation, the patient’s opinion, and the doctor’s 
opinion.  
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De Boer et al. (2009) carried out a study of the extent to which doctors used these 
models and found that all used some form of protocol, whether one of the above or 
their own combination of different approaches.80 There was a general consensus 
amongst doctors about the approach to assessment.  
There have been a number of studies of disability assessment by insurance doctors. 
Spanjer et al. (2009) found that consistency in assessment between insurance 
doctors was generally reasonable to good. However, they found low consistency in 
relation to the important issue of the number of hours claimants were able to 
work.81  A further study found that both insurance doctors and disability claimants 
were unable to predict improvements in work capacity with high levels of accuracy 
(Nieuwenhuijsen et al., 2014). One might speculate that Meershoek et al. (2007) 
findings as to the normative nature of decision-making may well also apply to 
disability decision making. 
There have been a large number of studies in the Netherlands of approaches to 
improve adjudication by insurance doctors. However, considerable caution is 
required in considering these as they are often carried out under ‘experimental’ 
conditions (rather than in actual working conditions) and the assessment is based on 
the views of participants rather than on an actual assessment of the outcome on 
real-life decision-making. For example, there have been a number of studies of the 
use of evidence-based medicine (EBM) in disability assessment. Kok et al. (2008) 
found that a 1-day workshop on EBM led to a significant improvement in self-
assessed skills. However, they did point out that in the implementation of any such 
program attention would need to be paid to organisational barriers which might limit 
the use of EBM, e.g. lack of time. The same team found that the use of EBM 
improved the use of evidence in disability evaluation but again without any ‘real life’ 
assessment of the implications for awards (Kok et al., 2013).82  
Spanjer et al. (2009) investigated the provision of detailed information on 
participation and activity limitations instead of or as well as medical information. 
They  found that doctors who were provided with only the functional information 
gave higher disability assessments than those who had only medical information or 
both medical and functional data. 
Other studies have advocated communication skills training for medical assessors 
(e.g. van Rijssen et al., 2010). 
                                         
80 See also Spanjer et al. (2010) for an assessment of the DASI protocol.  
81 See also Schellart et al. (2011) who found small to moderate variations in the outcome of disability 
assessments. 
82 See also Kok et al. (2011). 
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5. Review and appeals 
The position in relation to reviews during sickness absence (Gatekeeper protocol) 
has been set out above. In the case of disability pensions, claimants are generally 
reassessed after 1 and 5 years of their initial claim. In the past, these reviews had a 
limited effect on entitlement but more focussed criteria for review have recently 
been introduced. 
Persons who disagree with the decision taken by the UWV must first file a note of 
objection with the same body (see Pennings, 2013, 188-89) and, once the objection 
procedure has been completed, may lodge an appeal with the administrative law 
department of the district court. 
Appeals in relation to decisions by the social security authorities go to the district 
court (see Pennings, 2013, 190-94 and 197). In cases involving disability appeals, a 
medical doctor can be appointed by the court to give an expert opinion on the case. 
This is done on paper. It appears that the view of this independent expert is often 
quite decisive. A further appeal on a point of law and good administration can be 
made to the Central Administrative Court (Centrale Raad van Beroep). There do not 
appear to be any recent cases before the European Court of Human Rights 
concerning disability appeals procedures in the Netherlands. 
 
6. Overall assessment 
As in other countries, studies in the Netherlands indicate that there is a relationship 
between the cash level of disability benefits and the level of inflow to benefits. Van 
Vuren and van Vuren (2007) estimated that a 5% rise in replacement rates led to a 
6% increase in claims for disability pensions.83 
There have been a number of evaluations of the different reforms of the sickness 
and disability systems in the Netherlands. Van Sonsbeek and Gradus, 2013 found 
that the combined reforms had led to a fall in inflows to disability pension of over 
60%, of which the introduction of experience rating led to a 13% fall and the 
Gatekeeper protocol to a 25% reduction. The study found that most reforms 
focussed on reducing inflows and that only the re-examination of the disability stock 
in the mid-2000s had led to a significant increase in disability outflows. Van der Burg 
                                         
83 See also the discussion by Koning and van Sonsbeek (2015) as to the effect of financial incentives on 
partially disabled workers. 
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and Prins (2010) studied the reassessment of disability pensioners in the mid-2000s 
and found that 20% had been disqualified and 12% had had their disability rating 
reduced (62% were unchanged and 6% increased). The study found that, of those 
with reduced or terminated benefit, after 18 months about one third were on 
unemployment benefits, one third still on Disability Pension and one third received 
no benefit. However, the percentage in employment increased to about two-thirds 
over time. They concluded that the reassessment had led to significant savings in 
public expenditure (although reduced by about 50% by the transfer of some 
claimants to unemployment benefits).  
Koning and Lindeboom (2015) identified the three main areas of reform in disability 
insurance as (i) enhancing employer incentives to avoid sickness (e.g. experience 
rating), (ii) increased gatekeeping; and (iii) tightening eligibility criteria. As noted 
above, they found positive impacts in all three areas in reducing disability inflows 
with the introduction of the Gatekeeper Protocol consider to the most effective 
policy measure. The found that the tightening of eligibility criteria had led to a sharp 
increase in claims refused since 2006 (introduction of WIA).  They found (2015, 164) 
that  
The key to the success of disability insurance reform in the Netherlands has been 
the intensified role of employers in preventing long-term sickness, absence, and 
subsequent disability, with a strong emphasis on early interventions. The 
employer incentives increased the economic urgency among employers to exert 
sickness and accident prevention and workforce reintegration activities, while 
the Gatekeeper protocol has facilitated employer awareness and guided 
employers in their new role. 
Koning and Lindeboom (2015) found that the percentage of Disability Pension 
claimants with musculoskeletal disorders had been almost halved as result of the 
reforms although there had been only small fall in the rate of reduction in awards 
due to mental disorders (which meant that this group increased as a percentage of 
new claims). 
However, studies have also found some potentially negative impacts from the 
reforms. In particular, Koning and Lindeboom (2015) concluded that it is likely 
(although hard evidence seems to be lacking) that employers have responded to the 
new incentives by employing high-risk individuals on a temporary basis only. The 
Dutch government has, as a result, decided to extend sick pay and experience rating 
to such workers from 2016. The researchers also found that while effective in 
curbing inflows, the reforms had been less effective in using the residual work 
capacity of disability pensioners (perhaps unsurprisingly). 
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7. Data 
There has been a long-term fall in both the numbers on disability pension and the 
cost of pensions (de Jong, 2015). 
The Dutch statistics indicate that there were almost 210,000 persons in receipt of a 
disability pension (WIA) at the end of 2014.84 Of these 49% were men and 51% 
women and 79% were fully disabled while 21% were partially disabled. This 
represented a significant increase from 186,000 in 2013 (12.4%). The number of new 
claims in 2013 and 2014 was about 37,000 per annum.   
The longer term trends are analysed by Koning and Lindeboom (2015) who show 
that the level of awards of disability pension fell significantly after about 2002 with 
the percentage of the insured population on DP falling from about 11% to 7.2% in 
2012 and the percentage of the insurance population being awarded a new claim for 
DP falling from 1.5% in 2001 to 0.5% in 2012.  As in other countries the main 
diagnosis types for disability pensions are musculoskeletal disorders and mental 
disorders (Koning and Lindeboom, 2015). 
In 2014, about 34,000 claims were terminated. The main reason for this was 
assessment as being no longer disabled (recovery) (35.6%), followed to retirement 
(33%), death (23.3%) and other reasons (8.1%).85 
 
                                         
84 Data is taken from UWV, 2014. On a pro-rata population basis, this would be equivalent to about 
58,000 claimant in Ireland 
85 39% of claimants are in the age range 55-64 years. 
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Annex NET: Disability Interview Protocols. The description of three 
disability interview protocols, procedure and topics. 
 
Interview of Methodical Assessment (IMA) 
1 The IMA protocol describes ten topics that need to be addressed by at least one 
question and more if the Social Insurance Physician] (SIP) thinks the topic to be 
relevant to the case he is handling. The topics are clustered into topics that permit 
the claimant to state his claim and topics that permit the SIP to check on plausibility 
and consistency. The topics are best addressed in the sequence of the protocol and 
for the first three topics, this is mandatory. The description of the IMA contains 
many detailed instructions on how to ask specific questions and how to interpret 
answers. This enables the SIP to draft a complete picture of the claimant in his 
situation.   
2 The IMA protocol requires a precise introduction, in which the aim and procedure 
of the assessment are explained and in which the SIP stresses that the claimant’s 
opinion of his actual situation is of great importance and that the opinion of other 
people (for example, the treating doctor) and events of the past will be dealt with 
later on during the interview. The claimant is asked to agree with these rules. Thus, 
the SIP introduces rules for the interview that challenge the claimant to show his 
self-consciousness and autonomy. This enables the SIP to see if the claimant is able 
to follow these rules. 
3 A physical examination, if necessary, is scheduled after the interview. 
4 After each topic, a summary is given by the SIP and after the entire interview, a 
general summary is given. After each summary, the claimant is invited to comment 
on it. At the end, the SIP gives his provisional opinion and explains the further 
procedure.  
1) Claim items:  
- Work description: Would you please describe the work you used to do? 
- Claimant’s perception of his capacity for own work: Do you think you could 
do that work now, fully or partly? If not, what do you experience in your 
health that prevents you from doing it? 
- Claimant’s perception of his capacity for other work: Do you think you 
could do other work? What would that need to look like? 
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2) Items to check: 
- Motivation: How do/ did you like doing the work you used to do? 
- Claimant’s perception of the cause of disease and handicap: What do you 
think to be the cause of your being ill and disabled? 
- General Health: Were you generally healthy and fit before you became 
disabled? 
- Changes (mental, personal): Would you say you have changed as a person 
over the past period of sick leave? 
- Life – events: Did you experience important events in the years before you 
reported sick? Which? 
- Claimant’s perception of the future: What do you expect about your future 
health/ work situation? 
- Activities of daily living: Could you please describe an ordinary day, e.g. 
yesterday and indicate what you did, how you managed that and whom 
you met, in a chronological order? 
- Physical Examination is scheduled at the end of the assessment. 
3)   Conclusion of the Social Insurance Physician, for the moment, is relative to the 
claimant’s opinion.  
Disability Assessment Structured Interview (DASI)  
1 The Social Insurance Physician is focused on the differences between the pre-
morbid state and the actual state that indicates disease. Another key role is played 
by concrete and detailed examples that the claimant gives or is asked to give of 
every activity he performs and of the restriction of capacity that he claims to 
experience. This serves to reduce possible malingering or aggravation by the 
claimant. These examples are used to identify residual capacity to work. A semi-
structured interview is conducted in which topics are fixed by the SIP but their 
sequence is free. All topics must be discussed, preferably in order of the protocol, 
but the SIP can decide to do otherwise. The description of DASI does not give 
examples of questions but considerations as to why and how the different topics are 
of importance. The purpose of this method is to reach a systematic assessment of 
what is to be assessed – the claimant’s capacity for work.  
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DASI has a strong structure; in particular, in topics 3 and 4 the Social Insurance 
Physician (SIP) asks for concrete and detailed examples, which must be consistent 
and plausible.  
2 In the interview, the SIP explains the purpose of the assessment and the 
procedure. The SIP summarises the claimant’s record. Putting the client at ease, the 
SIP explains the aim of the assessment.  
3 A physical examination is scheduled after the interview. 
4 At the end, the SIP states clearly his opinion of the claimant’s capacities.  
1) Work description and perceived burden in the work (motivation and 
consistency).  
2) Medical history and information on disease: complaints, cause, treatment 
(impairments). 
3) Claimant’s perception of (in-) capacity in examples, if needed, with help of 
LFC (restrictions of activities). 
4) Actual functioning and problems of participation: current activities and 
relationships (focus on capacities). 
5) Claimant’s perception of his capacity to do his own or other work (claimant’s 
position in the assessment). 
6) Physical examination (consistency and plausibility). 
7) Opinion of the SIP. 
Multi Causal Analysis (MCA) 
1 MCA is designed to help the Social Insurance Physician to determine the causes of 
restricted functioning and so to be able to give suggestions to promote a return to 
work. The approach is biopsychosocial and the disability is primarily conceived of as 
behaviour. The instruction describes general principles, fields of discussion and the 
relevance of these. The emphasis is put to the claimant’s motivation and hindrances 
he experiences. The psychological and social aspects are determined as well as 
medical aspects. All subjects must be discussed but the order is free. 
2 The SIP briefly explains the procedure and gives a short summary of the patient’s 
records. A dialogue should be reached fast. A relationship of trust of the claimant in 
the SIP is necessary. Consequently, the SIP tries to explore the claimant’s opinion on 
his situation. The SIP shows an attitude of empathy, respect and interest by 
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continually asking questions and by taking subjective perceptions of the claimant 
into account. There is much room for the claimant to follow his line of thought and 
for the SIP to decide how he wants to conduct the interview, provided he pays 
attention to all five fields of the discussion. This leads to a light structuring of the 
interview. Precise questioning reveals the plausibility and consistency of the image 
that the claimant puts forward and how serious his incapacity is. The purpose of this 
method is to reach an understanding evaluation.  
3 A physical examination is scheduled after the interview.  
4 The SIP’s final conclusion is stated clearly to the claimant, who is invited to react to 
that. The SIP presents his conclusion about limitations in functioning, with room to 
discuss remarks from the claimant. Then, the SIP explains the further procedure. 
1) Health and disease (actual complaints, medical history, treatment and 
restrictions as experienced by claimant). 
2) Work description (description and stressors). 
3) Private situation (description and stressors). 
4) Actual functioning (micro and meso, activities for the restoration of health 
and resumption of work). 
5) Person (coping, locus of control etc.). 
6) Physical examination. 
7) Conclusion of the Social insurance Physician, plan of action, if relevant, and 
plan of evaluation, if relevant. 
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Sweden 
 
1. Overview of supports during sickness absence 
In Sweden, the employer is responsible for payment of sickness pay for the first 14 
days (with one waiting day).86 After that, the social security authorities pay sickness 
benefit to persons unable to perform their regular job due to temporary sickness.87 
The replacement ratio is 80% up to a benefit cap during the first year. After that the 
benefit is reduced to 75% for up to a maximum of 2.5 further years. In addition to 
the public benefit, many Swedish employees (about 90% of employees) qualify for 
additional employment-related benefits negotiated between trade unions and 
employer bodies. The maximum limit for total compensation is normally 90% but this 
depends on the agreement.  
Persons whose working capacity is permanently reduced are entitled to a disability 
pension which provides compensation at up to 64% of lost income. Again many 
individuals have supplementary disability cover which can increase the replacement 
rate to 79%. 
Studies have indicated that there are strong associations between receipt of sickness 
benefit and the likelihood of going on to receive disability pension (Kivimäki, 200788; 
Karlsson et al., 2008).89 
There have been a range of reforms to the Swedish sickness and disability pension 
systems over the 1990s and 2000s. These include restrictions on the qualification 
conditions for benefits (e.g. excluding entitlement to disability pensions on labour 
market grounds), reductions in benefit levels and duration, more rigorous screening 
(e.g. the rehabilitation chain),90 and the introduction of guidelines for sickness 
                                         
86 Sick Pay Act 1991. However, there is a public subvention of high sick pay costs that applies to all 
employers in Sweden. The policy means that employers can receive compensation for the annual sick 
pay cost that exceeds a certain level. The objective is that employers should be encouraged to hire 
people who may be a risk of sickness absence. However, this only amounted to 55 SEK million in 2013. 
87 Social Insurance Code 2010, section C, chapters 23-31. 
88 For example, an episode of certified sick leave was associated with an over 3 fold increased risk of 
receipt of disability pension. 
89 Karlsson et al. (2008) found that those with higher age, low income, previous sick leave, no 
employment and non-Swedish origin had a higher risk of disability pension and suggested that this 
type of study might be useful for identifying risk groups for receipt of DP. 
90 The rehabilitation chain involves a requirement for an additional work capacity assessment at about 
the 91st and 181st day of entitlement to sickness benefit. Despite the name, the chain has little to do 
with rehabilitation. 
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certification. The government also introduced a rehabilitation guarantee offering 
cognitive therapy and multidisciplinary treatment for people with mental health 
conditions. The reforms have been evaluated both by the Swedish Social Insurance 
Inspectorate (ISF) and by academic researchers and these evaluations are discussed 
in more detail below. 
 
2. Description of main payment(s) 
Sickness benefit (sjukpenning) is payable to persons unable to perform their regular 
job due to temporary sickness.91 The replacement ratio is 80% up to a benefit cap 
during the first year. After that the benefit is reduced to 75% for up to a maximum of 
2.5 further years. Musculoskeletal and psychological disorders are the most common 
causes of sick leave in Sweden (see below). It has been argued that in some cases, 
employees with a diagnosis belonging to these two groups are better off if they do 
not leave the labour force but instead are supported to remain at work. Therefore, 
since the late 1990s there has been a focus on the use of part-time sick leave (PTSL) 
when possible. PTSL is a complex process that requires an initial joint decision made 
by the employee, employer, physician, and social insurance officer as well as actions 
and decisions (by the employee, colleagues, and employer) to adjust both the work 
time and work demands during the period of intervention and afterwards. 
Persons whose working capacity is permanently reduced are entitled to a disability 
pension which provides compensation at up to 64% of lost income.92 The current 
disability pension consists of sickness compensation (sjukersättning) paid to persons 
aged 30‐64 years or activity compensation (aktivitetsersättning) to persons aged 19-
29 with fully or partially reduced work capacity. If the person has a partial disability, 
a reduced benefit is paid at 25, 50 or 75% of the full benefit according to the 
assessed degree of disability. Sickness compensation and activity compensation 
consist of two parts: 
 The income‐related sickness/activity compensation (inkomstrelaterad 
sjukersättning/aktivitetsersättning) financed by contributions paid by the 
working population (employees and self‐employed); 
The tax- financed sickness compensation and activity compensation, in the form of 
guaranteed compensation (garantiersättning) for all residents with low or no income 
related sickness/activity compensation. As noted, young adults (19-29 years) whose 
working capacity is reduced for at least one year may be entitled to activity 
                                         
91 Social Insurance Code 2010, section C, chapters 23-31. 
92 Social Insurance Code, Section C, Chapters 33‐37. 
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compensation. The aim of the benefit is to provide special support for this age group 
and to encourage activity (including school attendance in some cases) while 
providing financial support (Kaltenbrunner et al., 2013; ISF, 2013:7).93 
 
3. Nature of incapacity criteria  
In the case of sickness benefit, the insured person’s work capacity must be reduced 
by at least 25% due to sickness in order to receive sickness cash benefit. Persons who 
have not lost more than 75% of their work capacity may qualify for part-time sick 
leave and partial sickness benefit. 
In the case of disability pension, the definition of incapacity involves permanent full 
or partial incapacity for work (by at least 25%), on grounds of illness, or other 
impairments to the physical or mental capacity for work. 
 
4. Assessment of incapacity 
Initial certification 
For the first week there does not have to be any certification. From the eighth day, 
the sickness absence must be certified by a doctor. The insured person’s work 
capacity must be reduced by at least 25% due to sickness in order to receive sickness 
cash benefit. The sickness certificate should specify medical diagnosis, functional 
impairment and activity limitation. The doctor must also indicate his or her 
assessment of the person’s ability to work and make recommendations about the 
degree and length of sick leave. The SSIA grants sickness benefit in about 98% of all 
applications for sickness benefit (i.e. where sickness certificates have been provided) 
(ISF, 2014).  About 80% of those who terminated their sick leave did so on the day 
their medical certificate expired, i.e. less than one in five returned to work earlier 
than the prescribed duration of sick leave.  
There have been many studies of the operation of sickness certification in Sweden. 
For example, Ljungquist et al. (2015) found that over half of GPs found it fairly or 
very problematic to assess a person’s work capacity (58%), to make a long-term 
prognosis about work capacity (56%) and to handle long-term sickness certification 
(52%). Löfgren et al. (2007) found that about three quarters of doctors provided 
                                         
93 However, Kaltenbrunner et al., (2013) state that, contrary to objectives, the system appears to 
encourage long-term dependency on disability benefits as the majority of those who receive benefits 
for schooling continue onto regular disability benefits after they leave school. 
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sickness certification at least a few times a year (50% had at least 6 cases per week 
and 10% had 20 or more). The main issues identified as problematic from the 
doctors’ perspective were conflicts with patients over certification, assessing work 
ability, estimated length and degree of absence, and handling cases originally 
certified by another doctor.94 It has been noted that doctors often give into patient 
demand for sickness certification, even in cases when the doctor feels that sick-
listing is not needed (Englund and Svärdsudd, 2000).  
It appears that sickness certification and rehabilitation is not given a high priority by 
doctors who see this as somewhat peripheral to their main activities (Nilsing et al., 
2013). A recent study assessing the quality of sickness certificates found that one-
third (34%) of the certificates did not contain sufficient information requested, in 
particular, the descriptions of impairment of body function and activity limitation.95 
Full-time sick leave was more often prescribed for men than for women and there 
were significant differences between certificates issued for women and certificates 
issued for men in the group of musculoskeletal diseases. The study suggested a need 
for increased knowledge about the descriptions of functioning for sick-listed persons; 
more cooperation between health professionals and better gender awareness. 
One study found that the identity of the certifying doctor had an important impact 
on rates of certification with GPs with GPs with a long experience of family medicine 
and doctors working part-time being more likely to issue certificates (Norrmén, 
2010).  
An examination of a national register of sickness certificates (ISF, 2014) found that 
the doctor’s role was essential in deciding the length and degree of sick leave. It 
recommended that interventions to affect the duration and degree of sick leave 
need to include measures aimed at GPs’ certification practices. 
Diagnosis specific sickness certificates were introduced in Sweden in 2007-2008. The 
guidelines include suggestions for duration of sick leave spells due to different 
diagnoses. For example, the guidelines for ‘social anxiety’ are: sick leave should 
generally be avoided; work capacity may be temporarily impaired; sick leave 
duration should be short, 2–4 weeks, and combined with activating treatment and 
close follow up; Part Time Sick Leave should always be considered; for sick leave 
periods longer than 3 months cooperation with psychiatry should be established. 
                                         
94 Other studies to look at certification and the views of GPs in relation to sickness absence include 
Engblum, 2011; Nilsing et al., 2013; Nilsig, 2013; von Knorring et al., 2008; Lindholm et al., 2010. 
These studies again identified a range of areas considered problematic by GPs.  
95 See also Söderberg and Alexandersson (2005a) for an earlier study of the quality of sickness 
certificates which found that only about half (48%) of certificates contained a clear assessment of 
functional capacity and only a quarter (27%) were clear as to both functional capacity and medical 
disorder. 
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Evaluations have come to different conclusions about the impact of these guidelines. 
A study found that these were being widely used by GPs and that the GPs found 
them useful (Skånér et al., 2011). Nilsing (2013) found an improvement in the quality 
of sickness certificates issued between 2007 and 2009 with more relevant details 
being included (e.g. claimant’s type of work). Skånér et al. (2013) also found an 
improvement in quality of certification. However, Brekke (2014) argues that this has 
not led to a significant change in the amount of sickness certification. Referring to 
previous studies, Brekke argues that the effect of guidelines tended to be short-term 
and has no effect on the amount of sickness certification (see also Englund et al. 
(2000) who found that an earlier reform of sick-listing practices led to forms being 
completed more fully but had no effect on duration of sick-listing). In contrast, 
Lidwall (2013) found that the guidelines had a considerable impact on the 
termination of sickness absence.  
One study found that an experimental reduction in screening whereby the 
requirement for certification was extended from the eighth day to the 15th day led to 
an increase in sickness absence by 0.6 days (Hartman et al., 2013). Although there 
was some reduction in certification costs, overall the experiment led to increased 
pubic expenditure. 
Decision making 
Decisions in relation to entitlement to sickness benefit are made by social insurance 
officers (SIOs) employed by the social security agency. There have been a number of 
studies of the work of these officials (Söderberg and Alexanderson, 2005b; Ydreborg 
et al., 2007; Thorstensson et al., 2008). As noted above, in the vast majority of cases, 
the views of the certifying doctors are accepted by the social insurance officers 
(98%). Studies indicate that in many cases the certification provided does not 
provide sufficient information for the SIO to from an independent decision 
(Söderberg and Alexandersson, 2005a).  Other studies suggest that this was also 
party due to limited time available (Hensing et al., 1997). The studies of the work of 
SIOs indicated problems in communications with other health care professionals. 
SIOs frequently have to contact certifying doctors to obtain further information. In 
general, decisions are based on the documentation from the certifying doctor 
although studies indicate that, in some cases, SIOs are in direct contact with 
claimants either because the claimant contacts them to clarify the status of the claim 
or because the SIO contacts the claimant to try to clarify some information.  
Return to work 
One of the functions of sickness certification includes advice on return to work and 
rehabilitation. However, Söderberg and Alexanderson (2005a) found that 
information on rehabilitation measures was not included in a large proportion of 
certificates, particularly those for women (64% of women’s certificates and 35% of 
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men’s lacked such information). More recently, Nilsing (2013) found that RTW 
measures were proposed in only 13% of all certificates and that rehabilitation (i.e. 
physiotherapy, occupational therapy, counselling or a referral to an occupational 
health specialist or rehabilitation clinic) was proposed in only 35% of all certificates.  
The ISF (ISF, 2012) evaluated the impact of the rehabilitation guarantee introduced 
in 2009. This provided cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) to persons with light-
moderate mental and behavioural disorders and rehabilitation (MMR) for persons 
with musculoskeletal-related pain in the back, neck and shoulders. CBT reduced 
sickness absence for persons not already on sick leave when treatment started but 
MMR increased sickness absence for all patients. Perhaps surprisingly, the ISF (ISF, 
2011; Engström et al., 2012) found that early interventions to assess the possibilities 
for vocational rehabilitation were linked to more sickness absence and a higher 
probability of receiving disability pension. The study suggested that this negative 
impact was due to the difficulties of screening those who did need such an 
intervention from those who did not. It noted that the empirical literature did not 
provide strong support for reduced sickness absence from vocational rehabilitation.  
A recent study of sick leave diagnosis and return to work was able to identify clear 
differences between rates of RTW for different diagnoses (Lidwall, 2013). High rates 
of RTW were seen for infectious respiratory diseases, viral infections and less severe 
cardiovascular diseases while the diseases with the lowest RTW included malign 
neoplasms, severe mental disorders and severe cardiovascular diseases. The study 
suggested that systematic use of such diagnostic information could, at a low cost, 
pinpoint cases at risk for prolonged sick leave. However, it also noted that there 
were large variations within some diagnostic categories such as mental disorders and 
musculoskeletal diseases which are the most common causes of sick leave. 
There have been limited evaluations of the impact of part-time sick leave. However, 
recent evaluations indicate that this can lead to higher return to work for both 
persons certified with mental disorders (at least where it is assigned after 60 days of 
full-time sick leave) and musculoskeletal diseases (Andrén and Svensson, 2012; 
Andrén, 2014). 
Reassessment (Rehabilitation Chain) 
For the first 90 days, working capacity is assessed against the person’s existing job, 
or other temporary suitable work provided by the employer. From the 91st to the 
180th days, the worker is assessed against an alternative job with the same 
employer. Alternatively the worker may be given leave of absence to ty to find 
another job with an alternative employer. From the 181st day, working capacity is 
evaluated against all jobs on the regular labour market. However, an exception can 
be made if the person is undergoing rehabilitation and is expected to be able to 
resume work within 12 months. Fewer than 20% of sickness spells reach 91 days and 
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fewer than 10% reach 181 days. This assessment if carried out by officials of the 
SSIA. 
The Swedish system involves the use of Social Insurance Officers (or case-workers) 
employed by the Swedish Social Insurance Agency (SSIA).96 They play an important 
role in deciding whether or not a person is entitled to sickness benefit and/or 
requires rehabilitation measures. The ISF (ISF, 2014) found that the more positive 
the case-worker was towards the rules of the SI system and to the operational goals 
specified at the workplace, the faster people return to regular employment. 
The SSIA developed a new model for assessment of a person’s capacity for work 
known as the AFU (activity capacity assessment). This is intended to be used mainly 
in relation to assessment for all work that normally occurs in the labour market (i.e. 
after 181 days). It is based on a standardised survey format. The SSIA in conjunction 
with the Swedish Employment Services had also developed a knowledge-base of 
requirements in relation to jobs normally occurring in the labour market for use by 
social insurance officers in the assessment of capacity for work. An evaluation of this 
new model by the ISF (2015:8) found that there was a lack of clarity about when the 
assessment should be applied and a lack of uniformity about how it was applies. It 
recommended process improvements to achieve proper functioning of the new 
system   
However, an evaluation by the ISF of the ‘rehabilitation chain’ introduced in 2008 
(i.e. the requirement that a person be reassessed for work capacity at about the 91st 
and 181st day of sickness) absence found that introducing time-restricted 
assessments had strengthened the downward trend in sickness absence (Hägglund, 
2010). Large and positive effects on the exit rate from sickness benefit were found 
around the 181st day and smaller but positive impacts around the 91st day. The 
reform reduced the number of compensated days by 0.27 days.97  
Assessment of disability pensions 
In the case of disability pensions, the definition of incapacity involves permanent full 
or partial incapacity for work (by at least 25%), on grounds of illness, or other 
impairments to the physical or mental capacity for work. The person may apply 
him/herself, or the social insurance office may propose that a person on a long-term 
sickness benefit should be granted a disability pension. A claimant may also be 
advised to apply for disability pension by a doctor, or by officers at the employment 
office or social services. Social insurance officers always deal with the applications. In 
one study the social insurance officers handled 100–175 cases at the same time 
                                         
96 Försäkringskassan in Swedish. 
97 While this may seem small, relatively few claimants reach either the 91st or 181st day. 
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(Ydreborg et al., 2007). The social insurance officer summarises all the information of 
a case to form the basis for a formal decision by the Social Insurance Board. The 
decision is based on assessment of the applicant's reduced work capacity due to 
medical reasons and is based on a medical certificate. The certifying doctor 
completes the medical certificate with details of diagnoses and treatment, functional 
limitations, rehabilitation measures, date of recovery, and, finally, whether or not 
work capacity is reduced. Studies indicate that the medical certificates sent to social 
insurance offices are of great importance. Findings from studies in relation to 
doctors’ limited knowledge of various working conditions and of changing social 
insurance regulations also apply in this context. Assessment is normally by way of 
desk review but cases may be referred to doctors employed by the social insurance 
agency for a further opinion and for assessments of the need for additional 
examinations and rehabilitation. The social insurance doctor may refer the client for 
further assessment by insurance medical specialists such as physiotherapists, 
qualified social workers, behavioural scientists or physicians with specific 
competence to improve assessments of work capacity. The decisions of the social 
insurance board follow the recommendations of the officer reporting the cases in 
90% of cases.  
Focus groups with social insurance officers highlighted the heterogeneous nature of 
claims and the difficulty in dealing with some types of illness (e.g. ADHD); delays in 
obtaining medical certificates and incomplete certification; and differing 
understandings of the definition of disability amongst different stakeholders 
(Ydreborg et al., 2007). For example, it was said that certifying doctors may focus on 
medical issues without a clear understanding of incapacity for work while 
employment services may refer claimants who they consider lacking in capacity to 
work but who may not meet the legal criteria of incapacity. 
The most common diagnosis groups for newly granted disability pension in 2009-11 
were musculoskeletal diseases (32%) and psychological disorders (30%). 
In relation to assessment of disability pension a study indicated that there were 
considerable geographic variations in the level of awards of DP by social insurance 
boards in different geographic areas for reasons other than ‘medical’ (Ydreborg and 
Ekborg, 2004).98 The study suggested that the socio-economic situation was one of 
the factors which affected outcomes while Blomberg (2013) suggested that the 
variations could be due to local variations in norms and attitudes concerning sickness 
and disability pension. 
 
                                         
98 See also Blomberg, 2010. 
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5. Review and appeals 
As we have noted, the Swedish system requires a reassessment of work capacity at 
the 91st and 181st day. In addition, Swedish law does provide that long-term 
recipients of sickness benefit or disability pensions should be reviewed at least every 
three years. The review is carried out by the SSIA and should involve a new 
assessment of work capacity and the need for rehabilitation. However, a study by 
the ISF (ISF, 2014) found that such reviews were only carried out to a limited extent 
and that few involved personal contact with the claimant with most being based on 
information already held by the SSIA. Few reviews led to a change in the level of 
sickness compensation.  Between 2006-2008, the SSIA carried out a specific project 
(Pila) to provide more intense follow-up of the cases of persons on long-term sick 
leave to assess for any remaining work capacity (ISF, 2015:10). This project increased 
exits from sick leave by almost 30% after six months. However, part of this was due 
to increased exits to disability pension.  
The ISF (ISF, 2013) carried out a survey of refused claims and found that the social 
security authorities did not fully describe the circumstances justifying denial or 
sickness benefits in 25% of decisions and that the information given to individuals 
was insufficient and did not allow them to fully exercise their legal rights. 
Persons who disagree with a decision concerning entitlement to sickness or disability 
benefit can appeal to the general administrative courts. The social security agency 
must first review the decision. There are three levels of appeal: the county 
administrative court, the administrative court of appeal and the supreme 
administrative court.  Generally, the administrative courts do not allow oral hearings 
in relation to disability appeals and there have been a number of cases before the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) as to whether this is compatible with 
Article 6 of the Convention which provides for a ‘fair and public hearing’. There have 
been a number of cases in which the ECtHR has held that an oral hearing should have 
been held.99 However, these cases generally involved an assessment of disability 
needs and costs. In contrast, in Döry the issue was the applicant’s ability to work.100 
Here the courts’ assessments were entirely based on the medical evidence 
presented in the form of written opinions. The ECtHR took the view that there was 
no dispute as to the medical evidence but only as to ‘the correct interpretation of 
written medical evidence’. The Court considered that the appellate courts could 
adequately resolve this issue on the basis of the medical certificates in question and 
the appellant's written submissions. The Court noted that the appellant did not 
                                         
99 Lundervall v. Sweden, 38629/97, 12 November 2002; Salomonsson v. Sweden, 38978/97, 12 
November 2002; Miller v Sweden, 55853/00, 8 February 2005; Fexler v Sweden, 36801/06, 13 October 
2011. 
100 Döry v. Sweden 28394/95, 12 November 2002. 
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request the appeal court to call any witness, did not rely on any other oral evidence, 
and did not state any reasons for her request for an oral hearing.101 Accordingly the 
Court held that there were exceptional reasons justifying dispensing with an oral 
hearing in this case.102 
 
6. Overall assessment 
The basic structure of the Swedish sickness and disability system is long standing and 
changes have been incremental and parametric rather than paradigmatic. The ISF 
(2015) concluded that despite decreases in the replacement rate of public benefits, 
sickness insurance as a whole (public and occupational schemes) provide 
replacement rates which largely corresponded to the income lost during illness. 
However, it found that there had been an ‘institutional shift’ in the provision of 
income protection from public to private with occupational insurance now playing a 
larger role. This has increased the complexity of the insurance system103 and 
increased the differences in income protection between different groups in society. 
Thus the ISF identified a trend towards a more segmented approach with different 
risk groups divided along socio-economic lines. However, from an external 
perspective, one might suggest that this overstates the changes which have occurred 
and it is arguable that continuity is more apparent than change in the Swedish 
system. 
Sweden was not included in the 15 country study carried out by de Boer at al (2004). 
However, there have been numerous evaluations of specific changes in the Swedish 
system. 
A recent assessment of changes in the level of sickness absence (SSIA, 2014:17) 
found that it was not explained by changes in public health. Rather there were a 
range of factors including more restrictive regulations and an economic downturn in 
the 1990s which led to a fall in absence. However, the rise in absence after 1997 may 
have been influenced by the economic upturn which weakened the ‘disciplinary’ 
effect of high unemployment.  The decline after 2003 was affected by grants of early 
retirement, and strengthening of review (such as the rehabilitation chain).  In general 
                                         
101 Although, before the Court, she had argued that the investigation had been inadequate and that 
an oral hearing was necessary for her to explain matters of importance to the Court’s assessment, 
paras 15 and 34. 
102 Döry, supra, paras. 42-44. 
103 Interestingly the study referred to prior investigations which had found that 25-30% of insured 
persons did not receive the benefit to which they were entitled from occupational insurance during 
sickness. 
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studies have shown that rises in levels of compensation have led to increased 
durations of sickness absence (Hesselius and Persson, 2007) while conversely, 
reductions in levels of compensation have led to reduced sickness absence 
(Johansson and Palme, 2004).   
Tightening up conditions of entitlement to disability pensions in the 1990s led to a 
reduction in the inflows to this pension but, at least in the short-term, did not lead to 
any increase in the very low rates of return to employment (Karlström et al., 2008). 
Rather those who would have been on disability pension remained on sickness 
insurance or went onto unemployment insurance. However, Karlström et al., (2008) 
suggest that there may have been some more positive longer-term impact with a 
decreased rate of leaving employment in the relevant age groups. A study of the 
impact of stricter conditions and time limits for sickness benefits and stricter 
conditions for disability pensions found that these were modesty associated with an 
increase in termination of benefits and that transition to disability pensions 
decreased for men (Lidwall, 2013). Surprisingly, however, transitions to disability 
pension increased for women. Blomberg (2013) who looked at the effects of the 
2008 reform on disability pensions found that the law did have a limited impact on 
the composition of those in receipt of benefit. Women remained overrepresented 
but less so than before 2008.104 
Some studies (quoted above) have indicated that guidelines in relation to the 
content of sickness certificates have led to improvements in the perceived quality of 
such certificates but without any marked impact of the level or duration of sickness 
certificates. However, guidelines as to the granting and duration of sick leave have 
led to a significant reduction in sickness absence. The introduction of time-limited 
reviews (the so-called rehabilitation chain) also had a significant impact on the level 
of sickness absence. 
There is little to suggest that rehabilitation measures have had a clear positive 
impact on sickness absence and particularly for long-term disability pensioners there 
appears to have been limited RTW from any of the reform measures. 
7. Data105 
Sickness benefit 
The number of sickness benefit recipients rose rapidly from 1999 to 2002, including 
increasing long-term sickness absence. The number of recipients declined in 2002–
                                         
104 This seems to be inconsistent with Lidwall’s finding that women were more likely to transition to 
DB after 2008. 
105 Data is from SSIA, 2014. 
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2010 and then started rising again. Approximately 530,000 people, 63 per cent 
women and 37 per cent men, received sickness benefit at some point in 2013 
(around 9 per cent of registered insured 16–64 year-olds). 
Psychological and musculoskeletal conditions were among the most common 
diagnoses for both women and men who received sickness benefit in 2013. 
Psychological conditions accounted for 44 per cent of all cases among women and 32 
per cent of all cases among men. Musculoskeletal conditions caused 24 per cent of 
cases among women and 28 per cent of cases among men. 
Partial sickness benefit was encouraged by the Government and the proportion of 
partial sickness benefit days increased in the early 2000s but declined again after 
2007. Approximately 30 per cent of sickness benefit days for women and 24 per cent 
for men were partial in 2013. This is most common among people with a 
psychological diagnosis. 
Disability pension 
There has been a significant fall in claims for disability pension in recent years. The 
number of people who were granted sickness compensation steadily declined in 
2004–2011 but began rising again in 2012 and reached almost 12,000 in 2013.  
Activity compensation was granted to approximately 7,300 people younger than 30 
in 2013. In contrast to sickness compensation, there has been a significant increase 
in these numbers. 
The proportion of partial sickness compensation and activity compensation has 
varied over time but has consistently been more common among women than men. 
A total of 32 per cent of women and 21 per cent of men on disability pensions in 
December 2013 were receiving partial compensation. 
Conditions of the musculoskeletal system, etc., represented the most common types 
of diagnoses for people who were granted sickness compensation until 2005. In 
2006–2013, psychological conditions represented the most common types of 
diagnoses. Psychological conditions accounted for 43 per cent of sickness 
compensation among women and 39 per cent among men in 2013. 
 
Overall costs 
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Sickness insurance expenditure amounted to 27,941 SEK million in 2013 and 
disability pension to 47,722 SEK million.106 This represented 0.74 and 1.27% of GDP 
respectively. This does not include the full costs of sick pay paid by employers. 
 
                                         
106 Equivalent to approximately €1.5bn and €2.5bn respectively if adjusted pro-rata to Ireland’s 
population  
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United Kingdom 
 
1. Overview of supports during sickness absence  
There are three broad categories of social security benefits in the United Kingdom: 
contributory, non-contributory categorical and non-contributory income-related. 
The contributory benefits include the contingencies of sickness and disability.  
Contributory benefits for sickness and disability are paid at a single prescribed flat 
rate, on the basis of the claimant’s contributions record during the relevant income 
tax years.  The cost of most of the contributory benefits and their administration is 
met from the National Insurance Fund, which is financed largely by employers' and 
employees' National Insurance contributions and the Fund's investment income. 
Income-related benefits are non-contributory and means-tested, designed to 
provide a minimum level of income for those out of work without means, or as a top 
up to other benefits or low wages or for workers with disabilities.  Within this 
framework the UK provides a range of sickness and disability-related financial 
support which, in addition to benefits and tax credits, also includes direct payments, 
grants and concessions. This report focuses on Employment and Support Allowance 
(ESA), which has both a contributory and non-contributory income based element 
and is described in more detail in section 2 below. 
 
2. Description of main payments 
The benefits discussed in this section are Statutory Sick Pay (SSP) and the evolution 
of Sickness and Invalidity Benefit to Incapacity Benefit to Employment and Support 
Allowance. 
Statutory Sick Pay  
Statutory Sick Pay (SSP) is a legal minimum allowance paid and administered by the 
employer for up to 28 weeks to an employee who is incapable of work for four or 
more days in a row.  To qualify the claimant must be working under a contract of 
service (ss 152-5 and Schs 11 and 12 SSCBA 1992).  
Statutory Sick Pay was first introduced in April 1983. ‘Its aims were, and still are, to 
provide a prescribed minimum amount of sick pay to employees unable to work 
because of short-term illness; to cut out duplication of cover between the state and 
industry by building on employers' occupational sick pay schemes; and to provide as 
simple a scheme as possible for employers to administer while at the same time 
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protecting the interests of employees –Statutory Sick Pay Bill.’ (House of Lords, 
1994). 
Sickness and Invalidity Benefit    Incapacity Benefit   Employment and Support 
Allowance 
Incapacity Benefit replaced Sickness and Invalidity Benefit from 13 April, 1995.  
Incapacity Benefit was paid to a person whose work is interrupted by sickness, who 
was not entitled to Statutory Sick Pay and who satisfied the contribution conditions 
(unless the incapacity was the result of a prescribed disease or an industrial injury in 
which case the contribution conditions were deemed to be satisfied) (ss31 and 
Schedule 3, para 2 SSCBA 1992). 
 
Incapacity Benefit was payable at three different rates.  The short-term lower rate 
was payable for the first 28 weeks of incapacity; from weeks 29-52 the short-term 
higher rate was payable, and after one year, the higher rate.  The long-term rate 
could be payable from week 29 to persons in receipt of the Disability Living 
Allowance (DLA) care component paid at the highest rate or to persons who were 
terminally ill.   
On 24 January 2006, in the Green Paper 'A new deal for welfare: Empowering people 
to work', the then Labour government set out its intention to introduce a new 
‘Employment and Support Allowance’ (comprising contributory and non-
contributory components), to ‘simplify the current system’ (Department for Work 
and Pensions, 2006; House of Commons, 2006). The Government published its 
Welfare Reform Bill on 4 July 2006. The measures in the Bill, together with other 
welfare reform measures, were intended to enable the Government to realise its 
aspiration of an 80 per cent employment rate for people of working age and an 
inclusive society where there is opportunity for all. In addition to the new 
Employment and Support Allowance the Bill included: 
 ‘A focus on early intervention, with increased support to employers and 
employees in managing health in the workplace; improved absence and 
return to work management; and increased support to health professionals 
to enable them to provide holistic treatment plans which recognise the 
benefits of work with respect to rehabilitation and long-term health.  
 More customer contact and more employment advice and support for 
individuals with health conditions to enable them to realise their ambition to 
return to work, building upon evidence from the ... Pathways to Work pilots.  
 The ongoing development of disability rights to provide a level playing field 
for those with disabilities’ (Department for Work and Pensions, 2006). 
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The Bill became law in 2007, and the Employment and Support Allowance 
Regulations were implemented in October 2008. Reforms to the system of 
assessment of incapacity accompanied the introduction of Employment and Support 
Allowance and are described in section 3 below. 
Employment and Support Allowance is an integrated contributory and income-
related allowance that from October 2008 replaced Incapacity Benefit and Income 
Support paid on the grounds of incapacity for all new claimants. It is paid at three 
different rates; the assessment rate (equivalent to Jobseeker’s Allowance) is paid for 
the first 13 weeks while the claimant undergoes the Work Capability Assessment 
(described in sections 3 and 4 below) to assess their entitlement and the support 
they would need to get back into work.  Provided the medical conditions are 
satisfied, most claimants will receive the Work Related Activity rate. However, there 
are sanctions attached for non-compliance with conditions of entitlement – receipt 
of the Work Related Activity rate is conditional on claimants undertaking work-
related interviews, agreeing an action plan and participating in some form of work-
related activity. If claimants do not fulfil these obligations, Employment and Support 
Allowance is reduced in a series of tranches, ultimately to the level of the baseline 
Assessment Rate. Claimants with the most severe health conditions or disabilities are 
paid the Support Rate set at a higher level than the Work Related Activity rate 
without the need to fulfil other conditions.  
Eligibility criteria for Employment and Support Allowance are that an illness or 
disability affects ability to work and the person is: 
 under State Pension age 
 not getting Statutory Sick Pay or Statutory Maternity Pay or Jobseeker’s 
Allowance 
 and satisfies the income and savings rules. 
A recipient of Employment and Support Allowance may carry out ‘permitted work’ 
and earn up to £20 a week; work for less than 16 hours a week and earn up to £104 a 
week, for 52 weeks or less (or for any length of time if in the Support Group); or 
carry out ‘supported permitted work’ and earn up to £104 a week. ‘Supported 
permitted work’ must be part of a treatment programme, or supervised by someone 
appropriate from a local council or voluntary organisation. Voluntary work does not 
usually affect entitlement to Employment and Support Allowance. (Gov.uk, 
https://www.gov.uk/employment-support-allowance/eligibility).  
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3. Nature of incapacity criteria  
In the case of statutory sick pay, a person may be entitled to sick pay if their illness 
causes a period of four or more consecutive days of ‘incapacity for work’. 
There have been a number of reforms of the test for long-term benefits. Invalidity 
Benefit (established in 1972) was replaced by Incapacity Benefit in 1995. At the same 
time, the All Work Test was established as the medical test to determine eligibility 
(Houses of Parliament, 2012). Prior to 1995, entitlement to Invalidity Benefit had 
been decided by an Adjudication Officer, based partly on the opinion of the 
claimant's own GP. ‘The government felt that medical assessment had to become 
more objective and rooted in occupational health to ensure that benefit was claimed 
only by those who genuinely needed it.’ (Houses of Parliament, 2012: 1).  In April 
2000, the ‘All Work Test’ was renamed the ‘Personal Capability Assessment’ under 
the slogan ‘a new test that will focus on ability rather than disability’. 
The Work Capability Assessment replaced the Personal Capability Assessment in 
2008 alongside the introduction of Employment and Support Allowance. The Work 
Capability Assessment is a functional test that examines a range of activities relating 
to physical and/or mental, intellectual and cognitive performance, to determine if a 
person can reasonably be expected to work or undertake work-related activity 
(Department for Work and Pensions, 2015). The stated aims of the Work Capability 
Assessment are to:  
Ensure that those who currently have limited capability for work or work-
related activity are identified. Accurately identify those who, despite their 
condition, are fit to continue to work. Provide a fairer, more accurate and 
more robust assessment of the level of a person’s functional ability in relation 
to capability for work in the modern workplace. Identify, for those who have 
limited capability for work, interventions that would help to support recovery 
such that return to work would again become an option. (Department for 
Work and Pensions, 2015: 22). 
At the same time, the government introduced a ‘Work Programme’ to enable people 
to return to the workplace. The Work Programme is a single package of support 
providing personalised help for everyone who finds themselves out of work 
regardless of the benefit they are claiming. (Department for Work and Pensions, 
2015: 22). 
The Department for Work and Pensions’ Training Manual for Health Care 
Professionals explains the Work Capability Assessment as follows. The WCA is based 
on ‘descriptors’. Descriptors are defined in the legislation and ‘describe’ a restriction 
in an activity – for example ‘Cannot single-handedly use a suitable keyboard or 
mouse’. The descriptors are presented in a hierarchical manner and attract various 
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points. The descriptor representing the most severe level of disability is at the top in 
each activity. This highest descriptor will attract 15 points meaning the person will be 
considered as having limited capability for work. In many of the situations, this will 
also mean the restriction is so severe that the person would also be considered as 
having limited capability for work-related activity. Within the WCA, there are a 
number of assessments:  
 Limited Capability for Work-Related Activity (LCWRA) Assessment – This aims 
to identify the most severely disabled where interaction with work-related 
activity is not required.  
 Limited Capability for Work (LCW) Assessment - This aims to identify those 
people who currently have a limited capability for work but who would 
benefit from assistance and support with work and health related activity to 
maximise their full potential. (Department for Work and Pensions 2015: 21). 
Certain well-defined groups are exempt from the test on the grounds that their level 
of functional impairment is such that they would clearly be found incapable of work. 
The exempt groups consist of those with specified severe and progressive conditions 
or severe disabilities. In addition, those who are terminally ill and claimants in 
receipt of the highest rate care component of Disability Living Allowance are exempt. 
The 2012 amendments to the Employment and Support Regulations 2008 impacted 
on several areas of the Work Capability Assessment process including the wording to 
some of the descriptors (Department for Work and Pensions 2015). 
 
4. Assessment of incapacity 
Sick pay 
In the case of statutory sick pay, certification given is by the person’s doctor 
(normally the GP).  In the UK, arising from the Review into the Health of Britain’s 
Working Age Population in 2008, the sickness certificate was revised into a 
Statement of Fitness for Work (or Fit Note). The purpose is to move the emphasis 
from certification of incapacity to a focus on capacity. Studies indicate that workers 
and doctors have a generally positive view of the reform although the impact on 
certification is less clear (Hann and Sibbald, 2012; DWP, 2013; Shiels et al., 2013; 
Coole et al., 2015). However, it is quite possible that such changes will take a number 
of years to have a full impact. 
There have been a number of studies of sick certification in the UK including 
Campbell and Ogden (2005) who looked at the factors likely to influence the decision 
to issue a sick certificate. They found that doctors were more likely to issue 
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certificates to persons with psychological problems. Wynne-Jones et al. (2010) 
reviewed studies from the UK and Scandinavia and identified three main themes: 
conflict, role responsibility, and barriers to good practice. Conflict was predominantly 
centred on conflict between GP and patients regarding the need for a certificate, but 
conflict affects all stakeholders. Role responsibility focused on the multiple roles GPs 
had to fulfil, and barriers to good practice were identified both within and outside 
the healthcare system.107 
Work Capability Assessment 
The procedure making a claim for Employment and Support Allowance is set out in 
detail in the Department for Work and Pensions’ Training Manual for Health Care 
Professionals. The initial claim for ESA is made to Jobcentre Plus, by telephone in the 
majority of cases. All initial and re-referral claims are subject to a ‘file work’ process 
to determine whether a face-to-face assessment is required. The file work process 
aims to identify claimants where a certain level of disability can be confirmed 
without the need for a face-to-face assessment. If at the time of the claim, the 
claimant indicates they are terminally ill, the case is sent straight to the contracted 
Health Care Professional for advice (formerly Atos and now Maximus – See below). 
All other claimants will be asked to provide a Fit Note from their GP detailing their 
diagnosis. In most cases, the claimant is sent a form that they are expected to 
complete. This form gives the claimant the opportunity to provide details of their 
illnesses, treatment and functional abilities and restrictions. If a claimant has a 
mental function problem there is no compulsion for them to complete this form. In 
initial claims, the Decision Maker will refer the case to the Health Care Professional 
for advice on whether there is evidence that the claimant has limited capability for 
work/limited capability for work-related activity.  At file work, a Health Care 
Professional reviews the Fit Note details as well as any information made available 
by the claimant, and may decide that further medical evidence is required. This may 
be requested from any healthcare professional involved in the claimant’s care. All 
information is then reviewed, looking for any evidence that suggests the claimant 
does not require a face-to-face assessment to determine their level of disability. 
(Department for Work and Pensions, 2015: 22).  
In initial claims, the Health Care Professional may be able to advise which category 
the claimant falls into, which means they do not need a face-to-face assessment. The 
examining Health Care Professional will complete an appropriate assessment which 
is submitted to the Decision Maker, who decides on all available evidence whether 
the claimant meets any one of the criteria for the Support Group, fulfils the 
prescribed degree of functional disability for limited capability for work, or does not 
fulfil the criteria for eligibility to ESA on grounds of disability. If the claimant fails to 
                                         
107 See also O’Brien et al., 2008; Wynne-Jones et al., 2009; Money et al, 2010 and many more. 
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reach the prescribed degree of disability where they would be considered to have 
limited capability for work, they will no longer be eligible for ESA. (Department for 
Work and Pensions, 2015: 23-24).  
The criteria for determination of limited capability for work are set out in the 
Welfare Reform Act 2007. The claimant will be considered as having limited 
capability for work if he/she scores: 15 points in respect of the physical descriptors; 
or 15 points in respect of the mental function descriptors; or 15 points in respect of 
the descriptors in a combination of mental function and physical descriptors. In both 
the physical and mental function categories, the highest descriptors in any functional 
category attract 15 points. A claimant may reach the prescribed degree of disability 
to be considered as having limited capability for work if he/she is awarded the 
highest descriptor in any one physical or mental function category, or through a 
combination of lower scoring descriptors in a number of functional areas. If the 
Decision Maker accepts that a claimant does reach the threshold of having limited 
capability for work, they are placed in the Work-Related Activity Group (WRAG). In 
this case the claimant will be required to attend a series of Work Focussed 
Interviews (WFIs) with the Personal Adviser (PA). The first Work-focussed Interview 
will take place after the decision on inclusion into the Work-Related Activity Group. 
The interviews will be conducted at intervals to suit the claimant’s labour market 
likelihood of employment and needs. During these sessions, the claimant will draw 
up an agreed action plan of activity which is intended to help them with a potential 
return to work. This may include interventions such as retraining, education or 
condition management programmes. Their engagement in this process will result in 
entitlement to the ‘work-related activity’ component of ESA in addition to the ‘basic 
ESA’ allowance.’ (Department for Work and Pensions, 2015: 24).  
There has been considerable criticism of the Work Capability Assessment since its 
introduction. In December 2008, a White Paper ‘Raising Expectations’ announced a 
departmental review of the Work Capability Assessment. The review was led by 
officials within the Department of Work and Pensions and comprised medical 
experts in the fields of physical, mental and occupational health as well as 
representatives of employers and stakeholder groups. The group reviewed several 
thousand cases using descriptor analysis and expert case study to consider the 
effectiveness of the Work Capability Assessment (ESA Regulations 2008) to 
accurately establish an individual’s capability for work. The cases comprised a wide 
range of mental health and/or physical problems covering a broad spectrum of levels 
of disability (Department for Work and Pensions, 2015: 17). 
A House of Commons Post Note reported in 2012 that ‘The Work Capability 
Assessment is controversial and has caused tension between the government and 
disability campaigners. Such groups question key aspects of the reassessment 
process, including: 
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 the extent to which the WCA can be used to assess problematic conditions 
such as mental health disorders or health conditions that fluctuate;  
 the scope of the evidence taken into account in assessing eligibility for 
benefits more generally; versus the reliability of the decision making process;  
 the impact of reassessment on disabled people;  
 the impact on perceptions of the benefit system.’ (House of Commons, 2012: 
2).  
The House of Commons Post Note suggests that ‘The WCA is politically sensitive. 
Disability organisations cite cases of suicide where the coroner has mentioned denial 
of benefit as a contributory factor. A recently leaked memorandum published in the 
Guardian suggests the Department of Work and Pensions is aware of the potential 
impact on claimants.’ (Houses of Parliament, 2012: 2). 
While the Post Note identifies ‘a consensus that some form of medical test is needed 
to determine who is entitled to disability-related benefits’ it reports that ‘a common 
criticism of the assessment process is that it places too much weight on the face-to-
face assessment. Disability groups argue that other factors should be considered. 
This includes assessment of social factors as well as evidence from a claimant’s own 
doctor.’ (Houses of Parliament, 2012: 3). 
A further ‘common complaint’ identified is that ‘the WCA is weighted in such a way 
that the mental health needs of claimants are underrepresented.’ The Post note 
states that a group of mental health experts suggested more descriptors so that a 
fuller picture of an individual’s capabilities could be drawn and would identify what 
support the individual needed to find work. They suggested 10 cognitive descriptors 
– the current WCA has 7. However, the government argues that this was too 
ambitious and required a substantial redesign of the entire system which could be 
impractical (Houses of Parliament, 2012: 2). 
In the case of R (MM and another) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions,108 the 
English Court of Appeal considered the procedures of the WCA in relation to people 
with mental health difficulties (i.e. people with impaired mental, cognitive, or 
intellectual difficulties). The Court held that the process for assessing eligibility for 
employment and support allowance by way of a questionnaire and face-to-face 
interview placed mental health patients at a substantial disadvantage compared with 
other claimants. First, there was a greater risk in these cases that the decision maker 
would not reach the right decision because the information available from the 
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claimant would often be insufficient to indicate the true nature and extent of the 
illness from which they were suffering. Second, the process itself was found to 
impose greater stress and anxiety on this group than others.  The courts had to 
consider whether the Secretary of State was, therefore, under a duty under the UK 
Equality Act 2010 to make a reasonable adjustment to accommodate them such as 
requiring the decision-maker in every mental health case to obtain further medical 
evidence.109 
A recent review by the House of Commons Work and Pensions Committee (2014) 
called on the Government to undertake a fundamental redesign of the ESA end-to-
end process to ensure that the main purpose of the benefit – helping claimants with 
health conditions and disabilities to move into employment where this is possible for 
them – is achieved. The redesign should aim to ensure that the process properly 
identifies claimants’ health barriers to employment and the particular support they 
need, so that the conditionality that they are subject to and the employment support 
they receive can be tailored more closely to their circumstances. The descriptors 
used in the WCA process should also be reviewed as part of the redesign, as 
concerns about their effectiveness, and the way they are applied, remain 
The Government established an Independent Review of the WCA which has reported 
annually. The final report (Litchfield, 2014) stated that there remained an 
overwhelmingly negative perception of the WCA’s effectiveness amongst claimants 
and supporting organisations. It suggested that if the Government did undertake 
such a redesign it should take account of a number of key principles: 
- Any assessment should not only be fair but be perceived as such 
- There must be clarity of purpose - determining benefit eligibility and 
supporting employment outcomes may not be compatible objectives  
- Residual elements of the medical model of disability should be eradicated in 
favour of a biopsychosocial model  
- Departmental staff should be at the heart of the assessment and should drive 
information requirements  
- Any revised assessment should make use of information already provided to 
the DWP, rather than duplicating effort and incurring unnecessary expense  
                                         
109 However, the Upper Tribunal subsequently dismissed this specific case on the basis that the 
individual applicants could not show that they had been disadvantaged ([2015] UKUT 107 AAC).  
Mel Cousins & Associates  
 
140  
 
- Decision Makers and Health Care Professionals should see a representative 
range of cases and have appropriate training in the capability impact of 
common conditions 
A briefing paper from the British Psychological Society (2015) also argued that the 
government should commission an ‘end-to-end redesign’ of the Work Capability 
Assessment (WCA) process. The paper cites a growing body of evidence that 
seriously ill people are being inappropriately subjected to the Work Capability 
Assessment. It also argues that the Work Capability Assessment ‘does not effectively 
measure fitness for work and that its application is producing inappropriate 
outcomes for claimants.’ To redesign the Work Capability Assessment system, the 
Society advocates a reliable, valid and fully researched method of assessment to 
replace the Limited Capacity for Work Questionnaire (ESA 50) and the face-to-face 
WCA; training in assessment, scoring and interpretation for the test administrators; 
specialist assessors to assess people with mental, cognitive and intellectual 
functioning difficulties; supervision of the assessors from qualified clinicians with 
expertise in rehabilitation, assessment and interpretation;  referral routes to 
specialist assessment and support for those with psychological, cognitive and 
intellectual functioning difficulties; and appropriate periods of reassessment for 
people with long-term conditions, based on specialist advice to accurately reflect the 
prognosis. (British Psychological Society, 2015). 
However, the Government is committed to continue with the existing WCA with 
more minor reforms. The Department for Work and Pensions, in its response to the 
House of Commons Work and Pensions Select Committee’s Report on Employment 
and Support Allowance and Work Capability Assessment announced a package of 
measures ‘to improve further the support we offer disabled people and people with 
health conditions.’ These included pilots to help better understand what support ESA 
claimants need to help them move back into work, such as enhanced Work Coach 
support, for the first six months following completion of the Work Programme.  In 
addition, the company contracted to carry out the Work Capability Assessment on 
behalf of the Department has been changed in Spring 2015.  From October 2008 
until March 2015, the assessment was carried out on behalf of the Department for 
Work and Pensions by a French multinational company, Atos Healthcare. On 1 March 
2015 an American multinational company Maximus took over. The Department for 
Work and Pensions and Atos agreed to end its contract after ‘significant quality 
failures’.  Maximus has recruited Disability Rights UK to help with training and re-
training its staff. However, Disability Rights UK said in a statement that it believed 
the work capability assessment system needed radical overhaul and was ‘simply not 
fit for purpose....It is often experienced as punitive, it has no validity and the way it 
has been delivered is far too often inaccessible, disrespectful and distressing.’  
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Desk based and face-to-face assessments 
Everyone who makes an application for Employment and Support Allowance is sent a 
capability for work questionnaire (Form ESA50).  The completed questionnaire is 
returned to the Health Assessment Advisory Service where a ‘fully trained 
Healthcare Professional’ carries out an initial paper-based assessment.  At this first 
check, the Healthcare Professional looks for information to decide whether a face-to-
face assessment is necessary and advises the Department for Work and Pensions 
(DWP) accordingly. DWP can decide to award benefit to people with the most 
serious illnesses and disabilities on the basis of the evidence submitted during this 
first desk-based assessment phase alone. If a claimant is terminally ill, they do not 
need to take part in the assessment phase or have a medical assessment. Otherwise 
claimants must attend a face-to-face Work Capability Assessment conducted by a 
Healthcare Professional. The majority of people, after submitting an ESA50 form, will 
be required to undergo a medical assessment (Work Capability Assessment). 
Claimants treated as having limited capacity to work 
Certain claimants are treated as having limited capacity to work and do not have to 
undergo a WCA.  These include hospital patients, persons who are terminally ill or 
undergoing cancer treatments and certain other treatments (e.g. for chronic renal 
failure), pregnant women where there is a serious risk of damage to her health or 
the health of the child, etc.110 
 
5. Review and appeals  
There are two stages to the appeal process. Before making an appeal a claimant who 
disagrees with a decision must within one month of the date of a decision request a 
‘mandatory reconsideration’.  Mandatory reconsideration involves a Jobcentre Plus 
Decision Maker reviewing the Health Care Assessor’s report and or any new 
evidence provided to support the reconsideration. To request a mandatory 
reconsideration a claimant must write to the Department for Work and Pensions 
stating the reasons they want the decision reconsidered including why they believe 
that the decision is wrong and including any supporting evidence.  An appellant is 
legally entitled to access the Health Care Assessor’s report under the Medical 
Records Act. Following reconsideration a ‘mandatory reconsideration notice’ is 
issued to the claimant.  
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https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/439831/admu2.pdf 
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If a claimant does not agree with the outcome of the mandatory reconsideration 
they can appeal to the independent Social Security and Child Support Tribunal within 
a month of the date of the mandatory reconsideration decision. Late appeals up to 
13 months after the date of the original decision, may be accepted if someone was ill 
or in hospital or coping with bereavement. The tribunal is comprised of a judge and 
an independent doctor. The relevant legislation governing tribunals is provided by 
the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Social Entitlement Chamber) Rules 2008 
as amended (Ref: SI 2008 No 2685). These rules, from October 2014, include changes 
made to the original rules in 2008.  
An appellant may choose to be present at the tribunal hearing or have the appeal 
decided on the basis of their application form and supporting documents. An 
appellant may have a representative, for example, a friend, lawyer or other 
advocate, at the hearing and request necessary arrangements for mobility or other 
health issues. Reasonable expenses are payable for loss of earnings, transport, 
subsistence etc. The tribunal’s decision may either be reported at the hearing or by 
post. 
A decision can be further appealed to the Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals 
Chamber) on the grounds of legal error. Decisions of the Upper Tribunal are 
appealable on points of law up through the hierarchy of courts to the Supreme 
Court. 
A House of Parliament Post Note reported in 2012 that ‘There is currently a backlog, 
with appeals taking, on average, 24.7 weeks in England, though this is falling. This is 
problematic for government and claimants. During the appeal process claimants will 
are on a lower rate of benefit. While in 2010/11, tribunals cost £42.2m. Since re-
assessment of incapacity benefits claimants began in 2010, 41% fit-for-work 
decisions have been appealed and 38% of these have found in favour of the 
claimant. DWP notes that this does not necessarily mean that the claimant’s WCA 
was flawed. Extra evidence – such as from the claimant’s doctor – can be made 
available at appeal which may not initially be available to Jobcentre Plus. Further, it 
has been shown that claimants who have representation from rights organisations 
stand a much bigger chance of being awarded ESA after appeal than those who do 
not.’ (Houses of Parliament, 2012: 2).   
 
 
6. Overall assessment 
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As in other countries, disability pensions have been under reform in the UK since the 
mid 1990s. A recent review has identified a number of lessons from these reforms 
(Banks et al., 2015). These are: 
 reforms concerning eligibility for disability benefits can reduce benefit levels 
from the levels they otherwise would have reached.  
 when calculating potential cost savings from disability reforms, it is important 
not to consider a single programme in isolation, as some of the reduction in 
spending on disability benefits led to higher spending on other benefits 
 receipt of disability has now become even more closely related to education 
level than in the past, and low-education 25–34 year-olds are now twice as 
likely to be on disability benefits as the highest-education 55–64 year-olds 
 as a greater share of women enter the labour force, a greater share are also 
eligible for and receiving disability benefits.  
 there is systematic growth over time in the proportion of claimants in any age 
and sex group with mental and behavioural disorders as their principal health 
condition,  
 the evidence with regard to reforms that seek to expedite movements back 
to employment is mixed. 
These reforms have focused on longer-term disability. However, the Government 
has also begun to focus on the role of employers and sickness absence. As we have 
seen the Government established an independent review of sickness absence (Black 
and Frost, 2011). This study highlighted that 140 million working days are lost every 
year due to sickness absence. In response to the recommendations of the 
independent review (DWP, 2013), the Government accepted many of the 
recommendations made and announced a range of measures to support people with 
health conditions both stay in and return to work. These include a health and work 
assessment and advisory service to make occupational health advice more readily 
available to employers and employees, so they can better manage sickness absence 
and improve sickness absence management (e.g. using the Employer’s Charter to 
provide better guidance on what employers can do to manage sickness absence; and 
improving education on health and work for healthcare professionals). However, it is 
as yet too early to see whether these measures will have a major impact on sickness 
absence. 
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7. Data 
Expenditure on disability payments has risen from the equivalent of £4.7 billion in 
1972/73 to £14.0 billion in 2014. The number of claimants on invalidity and sickness 
benefits has risen from 1 million to 2.5 million over that period.  The total numbers 
and cost of incapacity benefits rose rapidly to the mid-1990s. The numbers have 
declined somewhat from a high of 2.8 million in 1996-7.111  In addition, it has 
estimated that sick pay and associated costs run to £9 billion per annum (Black and 
Frost, 2011).  
  
                                         
111 DWP, Benefit Expenditure and Caseload Data. 
